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**Summary of the doctoral dissertation titled *The concept of practice and its use in Polish normative acts, the Constitutional Tribunal's judgements, and in jurisprudence***

The law deals with what humans can do – their practices. Intuitively, we are ready to accept that the law is thus related in various ways to different practices. However, framing the issue as a relationship between law and human practices leaves the door open to discussions about the nature of these relationships.

To facilitate such discussions, the doctoral dissertation conducts an analysis of the use of the concept of practice in Polish normative acts, in the judgements of the Constitutional Tribunal (and, incidentally, other selected courts), in jurisprudence, and consequently, the understanding of practices in these fields. The research problem addressed in the dissertation is to answer how the concept of practice is used in Polish normative acts, judgements of the Constitutional Tribunal, and general jurisprudence. This includes examining the manner, functions, and types of statements in which the concept appears, as such an analysis has not yet been comprehensively undertaken in legal science.

The work is divided into three parts. Part I includes two chapters dedicated to analysing the use of the concept of practice in Polish normative acts and in the justifications of the Constitutional Tribunal's judgments. Part II comprises six chapters in which the ways of solving theoretical legal problems concerning legal rules using the concept of practice by selected theorists (i.e., H. L. A. Hart, R. Dworkin, J. Coleman, G. Pavlakos, A. Kozak, M. Zirk-Sadowski, and S. Wronkowska) are reconstructed. This approach demonstrates that although the concept of practice is used in considerations on the issue of legal rules in each case and is used in a fundamentally similar way, significant differences arise between the individual theories at the level of detailed theses of these theories. Part III is constructed from two chapters in which the findings made in the two previous parts are organized. It presents conclusions regarding the ways the concept of practice is used in legal contexts, assuming that it is used in the law (i.e., from an internal perspective on the law) and in the application of law and reflection on the nature of law (i.e., in the latter two cases from an external perspective on the law, see chapter 9). The concept of practice is proposed to be explained in terms of a tool for characterising the activities of specific entities, a tool for building arguments in the process of making decisions on the application of the law, and a tool for explaining the nature of law. The final chapter presents findings regarding the concept of legal practice. Expanding M. Matczak's typology, six types of uses of the concept of legal practice are proposed. The dissertation also argues that the practice of applying the law can be treated as paradigmatic legal practice.