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Mediated political discourse:
Self-presentation on social media and
ideological shift in interpreting

Mediacja dyskursu politycznego:
Samoprezentacja w mediach
społecznościowych i przesunięcie
ideologiczne w tłumaczeniu ustnym

Rozprawa doktorska napisana

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Uniwersytetu im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu

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Ja, niżej podpisany

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przedkładam rozprawę doktorską

pt. *Mediacja dyskursu politycznego: Samoprezentacja w mediach społecznościowych i przesunięcie ideologiczne w tłumaczeniu ustnym*

na Uniwersytecie im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu

i oświadczam,

że napisałem ją samodzielnie.

Oznacza to, że przy pisaniu pracy, poza niezbędnymi konsultacjami, nie korzystałem z pomocy innych osób, a w szczególności nie zlecałem opracowania rozprawy lub jej istotnych części innym osobom, ani nie odpisywałem tej rozprawy lub jej istotnych części od innych osób.

Jednocześnie przyjmuję do wiadomości, że gdyby powyższe oświadczenie okazało się nieprawdziwe, decyzja o wydaniu mi dyplomu zostanie cofnięta.

(miejsowość, data)

(czytelny podpis)

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Introduction

The modern public sphere is heavily mediatised, multilingual and international. Political discourses instantaneously cross geographical borders on social media, and linguistic borders through translation and interpreting. Where Habermas's seminal work conceived of the public sphere as an arena for the sharing of views and opinions within national borders (Fraser 2014: 13), the public sphere as we experience it currently, especially in the European context, may be seen as transnational and transcultural (Krzyżanowski et al. 2009: 6) – a development which was made possible by the broader processes of globalisation and technological progress (Fraser 2014: 24). Such sociotechnological circumstances appear to have been beneficial to populist radical political actors, especially on the far right of the political spectrum, whose improving electoral performance and capturing of public debates have been symptomatic of two simultaneous processes: the normalisation of far-right ideologies¹ and radicalisation of the political mainstream (Krzyżanowski and Ekström 2022: 721).

The so-called “populist hype” (Glynos and Mondon 2019) has manifested itself in media coverage of the far right that has been disproportionate to the actual electoral results of these groups, and thus in wider dissemination of the illiberal policies which they propose. As “the boundaries of the ‘sayable’ are being shifted” (Wodak 2021: 6), formerly unacceptable positions on issues such as minority rights and migration are being recontextualised and re-mediated in traditional and online mass media, leading to “moral

¹ Populist ideologies on the far right of the ideological spectrum have been variably termed “right-wing populism”, the “populist radical right”, the “extreme right” or “radical right” throughout the post-war era. Mudde (2019) uses the term “the far right” and divides it into two sub-groups: the extreme right and the radical right. Fascism and Nazism are identified as examples of the extreme right – totalitarian movements which reject basic tenets of democracy. The radical right, meanwhile, “accepts the essence of democracy, but opposes fundamental elements of *liberal* democracy” (Mudde 2019: 7).

panics” and “not only a change in language but also in wider norms and patterns of perception” (Krzyżanowski 2020: 3) of issues and groups which the far right deems undesirable. The *cordon sanitaire* has proven to be weaker still in the case of social media. As “powerful agents of political transformation” (Krzyżanowski and Tucker 2018: 146), social media have allowed hitherto marginal radical voices to reach considerable audiences around the globe, thus giving rise to “uncivil society” (Krzyżanowski and Ledin 2017).

At the same time, the internationalisation of the public sphere highlights the growing importance of mediation of political discourse through translation and interpreting. Studies across a broad range of institutional discourses, ideological contexts and language pairs have shown that the process of interpreting is conducive to changes in the ideological salience of political speeches. “Ideological shifts” (Hatim and Mason 1997, Bartłomiejczyk 2021) – specified in this thesis as the mitigation or intensification of a (fragment of a) source text by employing, deliberately or not, various linguistic strategies which modulate the ideological salience of an interpreted target text – have been the focus of research exploring, among others, European Parliament debates (e.g. Beaton-Thome 2013, Bartłomiejczyk 2020), where they have been repeatedly shown to weaken the ideological salience of political discourse. Mediation of political discourse through interpreting could therefore be seen as a potential complementary element of the wider processes of normalising radical discourses.

This article-based PhD thesis analyses mediation of political discourse in the two contexts of self-presentation of political actors on image-based social media and simultaneous interpreting of parliamentary speeches. Over the course of its three constitutive papers, the thesis triangulates approaches stemming from Critical Discourse Studies, studies of social media and Interpreting Studies to analyse semiotic phenomena which could impact the ideological salience of political discourse, with the overarching aim of investigating how different types of discourse mediation may result in (radical) political texts being mitigated for their target audiences. Each of the three papers comes with its own sets of specific aims, research questions and methods of analysis which are outlined in Section 1.5 of the Introduction and stated explicitly in the bodies of the articles.

1.1. Thesis structure

The present PhD thesis is article-based – it comprises three research papers authored in full (Papers 1 and 2) or in part (Paper 3) by the PhD candidate. This Introduction outlines the aims of the thesis, presents a review of existing literature and the methodological principles applied in the studies reported in the three articles. As such, elements of literature review and methodological sections in the papers partially overlap with those presented in this Introduction – while the Introduction offers a more in-depth account of the literature and methodologies, the papers focus on those aspects which are more immediately relevant to the individual studies. The structure of the thesis and the general goals of each of its components are presented in Figure 1 below.

As shown in Figure 1, Paper 1 explores the existing research on the populist far right ideology and operationalises its features in multimodal political discourse. By focusing on strategies of visual and verbal self- and other-presentation, the paper identifies the mitigatory potential of discourse mediation in curated social media campaigns of radical political actors and proposes a methodological approach allowing for systematic study of multimodal political social media posts. Paper 2 moves from the context of social media to simultaneous interpreting in the European Parliament, but continues in its focus on mediation of political discourse, mitigation of radical discourses, and populist far-right discourse topics. The paper adopts the concept of ideological shift as a primary object of investigation and operationalises it as the mitigation and intensification of ideologically loaded language between source and target texts in interpreting. The occurrence of ideological shifts is analysed in a dataset of authentic speeches delivered during plenary debates in the European Parliament and interpreted from English into Polish. Paper 3 continues the research on ideological shift between source and target texts in interpreting in a controlled, experimental environment where stimuli speeches based on the data analysed in Paper 2 are interpreted by experienced professional interpreters. In a novel approach which bridges a significant gap in existing research on ideological shifts, the participants' political orientation is measured using a valid and reliable questionnaire, thus offering greater insight into the role of interpreters as ideological agents with discourse-constructive power. Together, the papers offer a triangulated approach to the issue of discourse mediation which explores it both in new contexts and using new methods.




Fig. 1. Structure of the article-based PhD thesis and aims of its components.

1.2. Populism and radical political discourses

The concept of populism is central to the analysis of texts in Paper 1, and one of the features of the ideologically loaded texts whose interpretations are analysed in Papers 2 and 3. In the present thesis, ideology is understood not in the pejorative sense of “a system of wrong, false, distorted or otherwise misguided beliefs, typically associated with our social or political opponents” (van Dijk 1998: 2), but more generally as a set of socially-constituted ideas about the world, “a specific type of (basic) mental representations shared by the members of groups” (van Dijk 1998: 48). As such, ideologies are mediated, reproduced and proliferated by language and other semiotic practices (Reisigl and Wodak 2009: 88), thus establishing and controlling within-group values, attitudes and power relations (Fairclough 2001: 126). The three following sub-sections introduce populist ideologies on the right and left of the political spectrum, present studies of populist far-right discourses in a variety of national contexts, and outline the process and impact of normalising radical political discourses in the public sphere.

1.2.1. Populism as a “thin ideology”

Following Mudde (2004: 544), I define populism as a “thin ideology” – a set of convictions that may be attached to other, fully fledged ideologies, such as nationalism or socialism. It is seen as a defining feature of the current wave of far-right politics (Mudde 2007: 23), while also being present in certain movements on the left (Mudde 2004: 549). Its principal tenet is the split of societies into two opposing groups: “the pure people” and “the corrupt elite” (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2012: 8). Populists postulate that politics should in its essence be “an expression of the *volonté générale* (general will) of the people” (Mudde 2019: 30) and position themselves as the *vox populi* which speaks out against “the mainstream parties [which] are working together to keep the people [...] from power” (Mudde 2019: 30).

Who, precisely, belongs to “the people” is open to interpretation. This has been suggested as an inherent weakness of populist movements (Pelinka 2013: 5). The assumption of a “homogenous people” ignores social differences within the group for the sake of creating an “Us and Them” opposition – with an absence of specific social or cultural

determinants, these imaginary groups must be constructed discursively by the populists themselves (Wodak 2015: 8, Laclau 2005: 48). As such, the discourse of left-wing populism is essentially inclusionary (Wodak 2015: 8, Barát 2017); “the people” are seen as “an open, inclusive, and pluralist subject, confronting an unresponsive and repressive elite”, often across national borders (Wodak 2021: 37). Their opponents are typically constructed as “intertwined political and economic elite groups, which profit at the expense of the majority of society” from the dominant “socio-economic order (e.g. ‘neoliberalism’, globalized capitalism)” due to wielding “excessive power” (Stavrakakis et al. 2018: 9). Populism on the far right is, conversely, “an exclusionary force” (Wodak 2015: 8).

The populist division of societies is suggested by Mudde (2007) as one of the three essential features of the far-right ideology in its currently relevant incarnation, together with nativism and authoritarianism. The far-right’s construction of “Us and Them” is clearly dictated by another of its defining features – nativism. With a history of influence on populist movements reaching at least the 19th century (Betz 2017a), and the impact being of such strength on the far right today, Mudde (2007: 26) considers nativism to be “the ultimate core feature of the ideology”. It is a nationalist and xenophobic belief that “states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group (‘the nation’) and that non-native (or ‘alien’) elements, whether persons or ideas, are fundamentally threatening to the homogeneous nation-state” (Mudde 2017: 4). Nativists seek to construct communities based around such homogenous cultures even though they have “obviously never existed, except as particularly nostalgic yet toxic imaginaries” (Wodak 2021: 253). The far-right stands in stark opposition to the reality, in the Western context, of societies becoming increasingly multicultural and multi-ethnic (Wodak 2021: 46). They often refer to imagined, simplified, past “golden ages” (e.g. “Make America Great Again”) (Lakoff 2017: 602) as a “reaction to a perceived external threat” (Teeuwen 2013: 53) – a fear of an “Other” defined on ethnic, cultural or racial grounds who is allegedly prioritised by “the elite” over “the people” (Wodak 2021: 8). Anyone who does not meet the criteria for belonging in the national ethnostate, or who opposes the concept, may be labelled an “enemy of the people”. In Europe, the European Union is typically pointed to as the “elite” enemy supporting free migration and the needs of “illegal immigrants” over the needs of “the people” (Mudde 2019: 47, Wodak 2021: 8). In recent history, nativism has most often been realised as Islamophobia. Mudde (2019: 4) sees the refugee crisis which

peaked in Europe in 2015 as a catalyst for far-right movements, and its framing by politicians and the mass media as an important step in the process of normalising far-right discourse. The resulting larger presence of far-right voices in the media legitimised ongoing anti-immigration demonstrations and acts of violence against migrants from North Africa and the Middle East.

Nativism is further complemented by authoritarianism to form the interrelated ideological foundations of the populist far right. A broad term applied in political studies, sociology and psychology, it is usually understood in studies of far-right discourse in line with social psychology and the Frankfurt School, especially Adorno et al.'s (1969: 228) definition as “a general disposition to glorify, to be subservient to and remain uncritical toward authoritative figures of the ingroup and to take an attitude of punishing outgroup figures in the name of some moral authority”. Mudde (2019: 29) follows this tradition in referring to authoritarianism as “the belief in a strictly ordered society, in which infringements on authority are to be punished severely”. Within this framework, Fuchs (2018: 56) underlines the importance of political fetishism. Authoritarianism fetishizes the nativist nation: it prioritises conservative values, stability and social order while espousing traditionalism verging on nostalgia (Taggart 2000: 95). Another object of fetishism is the authoritarian leader. They are often a charismatic figure assigned the roles of saviour of the common people and strict father – a guarantor of law and order, even at the cost of limiting personal freedoms (Wodak 2021: 34).

As summarised by Mudde (2007: 297-298), the populist far right increases in prominence and becomes normalised when it is encountered by societies in times of crises and insecurities:

Nativism feeds upon the feeling of endangered or threatened ethnic or national identity, linked most notably to (perceptions of) the process of European integration, mass immigration, and the mechanics of “multiculturalism.” Authoritarianism attracts people who are worried about crime and the wavering of traditional values, while populism speaks to dissatisfaction with political representation as well as the increased sense of individual's efficacy. (Mudde 2007: 297-298)

The three core features outlined above relate primarily to social issues. Economic policies are typically backgrounded when discussing the essential elements of the populist far right (Mudde 2019: 101) and can in fact differ between programmes and manifestos. In Western Europe, for instance, neoliberal, free-market policies advocating individual initiative are typical for the far-right (Betz 2017b: 344), while Poland's Law and Justice

government has embraced wealth redistribution and state interventionism traditionally associated with economically left-wing positions (Orenstein and Bugarič 2020: 11-14). Such contradictory economic policies employed by parties and politicians grouped under the same political ideology are reflective of the adaptivity of the far right to specific socio-economic anxieties. Supporters of the populist far right have at times been referred to as “globalisation losers” (Mudde 2019: 101) – populations which experience actual or subjective financial deprivation due to phenomena such as economic crises, changes in employment or production offshoring. Economic hardships, coupled with fears of cultural decline and ethnic “replacement” as a result of migration (Wodak 2021: 253), have contributed to feelings of resentment – “which could be viewed as both accompanying as well as a reaction to the disenchantment with politics and the growing inequalities in globalised capitalist societies” (Wodak 2017: 3). Populist far-right politicians and media outlets have instrumentalised this and directed it at the “corrupt elite” and the non-native “Other”. Stereotypical populist far-right voters are vocally “disenchanted with their individual life chances and the political system” (Betz 2017b: 339). In practical terms, these are often male, lower-educated, working-class and middle-class voters (Rydgren 2007, Oesch 2008, Wodak 2015: 155). In the face of social issues voiced by such groups, mainstream political agents are routinely criticised as being incapable of solving them, or unwilling to do so; in contrast, far-right populists appeal to voters by claiming that solutions to those issues are simple and common-sense (Wodak 2021: 27).

The views of the far right are generally seen as being incompatible with the basic values of liberal democracy, such as the rule of law, minority rights, and separation of powers (Mudde 2019: 30). As such, while far-right parties and politicians have seen fluctuating degrees of popularity and electoral success in their post-war history, they typically met with resistance from mainstream right-wing political parties who “excluded them from political coalitions and often minimised ‘their’ issues” (Mudde 2019: 3). In the 21st century, however, the far right has been able to breach the *cordon sanitaire* (Littler and Feldman 2017) and receive increased attention both from mainstream political actors (Brown et al. 2023) and the voting public. Following the electoral victories of populist far-right politicians and political parties since the early 2010s in countries such as the USA, India, Poland or Hungary, as well as in the European Parliament (Mudde 2019: 2), the extremist far-right agendas on nationalism, race and culture have firmly entered the political mainstream. With over 20 European countries having populist far-right parties

in their parliaments in 2020 (Rooduijn et al. 2023), their successful campaigns and the normalisation of their discourses have been the subject of an astounding quantity of recent research (Mudde 2017: 1-2, Krzyżanowski and Ekström 2022: 720). This stands in contrast with the arguably limited global relevance of left-wing populist movements which is reflected in the relative paucity of studies on their discourse². As a global phenomenon, the discourse of far-right populism has been analysed in a multitude of national and media contexts. Much of this research has been conducted within Critical Discourse Studies (CDS), an approach within which the present thesis is situated and whose theoretical tenets are delineated in Section 1.3.

Populist far-right discourse in Europe is typically oriented against the European Union. In the Manichean “pure people” – “corrupt elite” dichotomy, the EU is often constructed as a bloated bureaucratic body, “a socialist plot” (Taggart 2004: 281), which stands against the needs and values of the “common man” (Reiser and Hebenstreit 2020: 576). From its policies on language (Krzyżanowski and Wodak 2011) to migration (Bargłowski 2018), the European Union presents diversity as an essential constituent of the “European identity”. As ethnic homogeneity is a key position of populist far-right parties, they are naturally opposed to supranational political entities such as the EU. The issues of immigration and asylum seekers, especially in the wake of the 2015 refugee crisis, have become the central focus of populist far-right discourse and policies, with their exclusionary and nationalistic rhetoric capturing the public debate and influencing public opinion (Krzyżanowski et al. 2018: 2).

Wodak’s *The Politics of Fear* (2015) provides a comprehensive, overarching CDS account of the discursive strategies employed by the populist far right; it was later expanded to include new insights into the “shameless normalisation” of these discourses, drawing from examples of populist far-right political actors around the world (Wodak 2021). The following sub-section outlines studies of populist far-right politicians, political parties and movements in various national contexts.

² Left-wing populism has historically found its greatest popularity in South America, where leaders such as Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, Evo Morales in Bolivia or the Kirchners in Argentina have been in positions of power at various times since the 1990s (Wodak 2015: 9, 2021: 39). More recently, Spain’s Podemos and Greece’s Syriza have successfully reintroduced a European left-wing populism (Mudde 2017: 2), while Hungary’s satirical Two-Tailed Dog Party employed left-wing populist rhetoric in its widely-covered but ultimately failed election campaigns (Barát 2017).

1.2.2. Studies of populist politics in national contexts

The Brexit campaign in the United Kingdom was perhaps the most successful and most publicised populist far-right movement in Europe. Much of the debate before the referendum in which British voters would ultimately decide to leave the European Union revolved around Britain's history of sovereignty, which supporters of Brexit presented as exceptional, and to which, they argued, the EU posed a threat (Glencross 2020). The sovereignty argument was applied to the issue of immigration, where one of the leaders of the Brexit campaign, Nigel Farage, established "a lasting Us vs Them distinction, which involves consistent deictic 'othering' of the adversarial Them party, based on allegedly insurmountable historical and ideological differences" (Cap 2019: 73). Under Farage's leadership, the UK Independence Party (UKIP) was the most successful British party in the 2014 European Parliament election with its Eurosceptic, nativist and extremely anti-immigrant rhetoric (Wodak 2021: 293). UKIP was in fact so successful in its capture of the public debate with its racist and xenophobic discourses on migration that the approach of the ruling Conservative party was to "simultaneously distance themselves from such 'racists' and co-opt the very same discourses in order not to lose support" instead of "substantially challenging" them (Bennett 2016: 18), thus aiding the populist far-right rhetoric to fully penetrate the mainstream.

Anti-European rhetoric has also been a mainstay of the discourse of the *Alternative für Deutschland*. Since its founding, the German party's Euroscepticism has been at the forefront of its rhetoric, but this has also provided a successful launching pad for radical nativist, anti-multicultural argumentation, even despite the stigmatisation of the far-right ideology in the German public sphere (Berbair et al. 2015). The AfD has employed the populist "Us vs. Them" opposition while promoting Islamophobic and anti-minority messages (Doerr 2021), and in crisis communication with regards to climate change and the COVID-19 pandemic, where AfD politicians have attempted to delegitimise national elites and the European Union through explicit negative depictions and linguistic backgrounding (Forchtner and Özvatan 2022).

Among the populist far-right parties of Europe, the Austrian *Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs* has the dubious distinction of having direct historical ties to Nazism (Art 2005; Wodak 2021: 269). After years of modest successes during which the party attempted to present itself as moderate, the FPÖ pivoted to the far right with Jörg Haider as

its leader in the late 1980s and the 1990s, leading to an increase in popularity among voters (Betz 2017b: 339). Rheindorf and Wodak (2019) suggest that the populist rhetoric implemented by the FPÖ has been instrumental in obscuring the radical nature of the party's agenda, as its members have indeed made racist (Art 2005: 183-184), antisemitic (Wodak 2021: 18-19) and Islamophobic (Wodak 2021: 77) comments in public appearances, on social media and during parliamentary debates.

In France, the populist right-wing has its leading figure in Marine Le Pen, who has led an effort to normalise her Rassemblement National in the public sphere. The party, formerly known as Front National, was led for nearly four decades by her father, Jean-Marie Le Pen, and was largely excluded from the mainstream political debate during his tenure, primarily due to his open antisemitism (Stockemer and Barisione 2016: 5). Since taking over as party leader, Marine Le Pen has kept in place the anti-immigration, now predominantly Islamophobic (Shields 2013: 182), and authoritarian platform while employing a more "acceptable" and populist rhetoric (Stockemer and Barisione 2016; Geva 2020), commonly referred to as the party's "de-toxification".

As a result of the 2022 general election, a coalition led by Giorgia Meloni's Fratelli d'Italia formed the first far-right Italian government since the fall of Fascist Italy (Baraggia 2023: 208). Although less overtly Eurosceptic (Baraggia 2023: 212) than another Italian populist far-right leader and her Deputy Prime Minister, Matteo Salvini of Lega (Wodak 2021: 282), Meloni has nevertheless advanced "radically conservative, anti-immigration, and anti-globalist agendas" (De Maio 2020). These are evident, for instance, in her use of the COVID-19 pandemic to reiterate nativist arguments against migrants on social media (Barbici-Wagner et al. 2023).

Among the most vocally Eurosceptic heads of state within the EU is Viktor Orbán, the Hungarian prime minister. His leadership of the country at the helm of the populist far-right Fidesz party has been marked by illiberal policies limiting freedom of speech and media pluralism, restricting independence of the judiciary and eroding the protection of minority groups, thus contributing to the creation of an autocratic regime (Orenstein and Bugarič 2020). The rhetoric and media strategies of the Fidesz government have deliberately fostered the polarisation of public discourse, as evidenced by the aggressive, xenophobic anti-refugee campaigns since 2015 (Barát 2017; Polyák 2019).

Poland's populist far-right government of the Law and Justice party, which entered government in 2015 but was unable to secure a third consecutive term in the 2023

election, has attracted voters across lower and middle classes disillusioned with the neoliberal order post-1989 by implementing redistributive economic policies. While its introduction of the popular Family 500+ economic programme has successfully decreased child poverty rates (Orenstein and Bugarič 2020: 10-11), the government also pursued illiberal and nativist policies. The judicial reforms introduced by Law and Justice have transformed Poland's Constitutional Tribunal from "a mechanism of constitutional review" into "a reliable aide of the government and parliamentary majority" (Sadurski 2018: 82). Following the Hungarian example in its "Orbanisation" of Polish media (Williams 2021), the Law and Justice government also worked to "pre-legitimize" increased control of mass media by employing seemingly pro-democratic arguments in political discourse to favour anti-democratic policies (Krzyżanowski and Krzyżanowska 2022). It also explicitly promoted anti-refugee rhetoric in reaction to increased migration after 2015. By negatively connotating the phrases "migration crisis" and "migrant crisis", Law and Justice politicians, together with sympathetic media outlets, have normalized anti-migration discourse and public sentiment in the country (Krzyżanowska and Krzyżanowski 2018).

Outside of Europe, the Indian Bharatiya Janata Party of Prime Minister Narendra Modi is closely associated with the paramilitary, extremist Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh organisation (Mudde 2019: 23). The party has combined the three ideological features of the populist far right with anti-colonialism and neoliberalism to successfully build towards establishing a Hindu ethnostate (Leidig and Mudde 2023).

While Australia's One Nation party and its leader Pauline Hanson differ from typical European far-right parties in defining the populist "Other" as both an external threat in the form of Asian immigrants *and* an internal threat in the Indigenous Peoples of Australia (Moffitt and Sengul 2023), references to these groups have likewise been shown to include nativist discursive strategies which explicitly stoke negative sentiment. For example, by using ideologically loaded noun phrases such as "indiscriminate immigration" and "aggressive multiculturalism", Hanson routinely presents these outgroups as dangerous to white Australians (Sengul 2020).

The populist far-right ideology was evident in the electoral manifesto, social media posts and speeches of Jair Bolsonaro, the former president of Brazil (Tanscheit 2023). His authoritarian, nativist and populist rhetoric was used to attack the indigenous people

of Brazil while delegitimising climate NGOs and scientists, thus contributing to the continued destruction of his country's natural environment (Menezes and Barbosa 2021).

By far the most intensely analysed populist far-right figure is Donald Trump. The former President of the United States of America has been the subject of studies ranging in focus from the simplicity of his language (Kayam 2018) through his use of metaphors (Bates 2020) to his social media presence (e.g. Lee and Lim: 2016; Ott 2017; Schmidbauer et al. 2017). His public persona has been suggested as the epitome of the charismatic populist leader (Jackson 2019), appreciated by supporters for his perceived authenticity (Montgomery 2017) even despite his close ties to the political and media establishment. Trump's adoption of social media as one of his primary communication platforms has enabled him to foster an image of a "celebrity, brand and political leader" (Fuchs 2018: 211) while using negative other-presentation tactics such as scapegoating to further his populist far-right agenda (Kreis 2017). The xenophobic and authoritarian rhetoric and policies that characterised his term as president, such as the so-called "Muslim ban" (Everett Marko 2019), culminated in an attempted coup d'état following Trump's unsuccessful re-election campaign in 2020, eventually leading to criminal charges against the former president (Lynch et al. 2023).

1.2.3. Normalisation of radical discourses

As research on the populist far-right continues to rapidly develop and grow in volume, focus has shifted to its normalisation in the public sphere as a challenging process which has situated "openly derogatory and discriminatory positions in public discourse at the centre of society" (Wodak 2021: 252), thus "openly undermining values and norms of liberal democracy" (Krzyżanowski and Ekström 2022: 722). Studies at the intersection of politics and language have underlined the key role of discourse, and the applicability of Critical Discourse Studies, in grasping the causes and consequences of the normalisation of the populist far right (Brown et al. 2023). In his analysis of anti-immigrant discourse in Poland, Krzyżanowski (2020: 3) posits that the presence of such discourses in the public sphere, followed by their intentional and strategic recontextualization, has resulted in the evolution of xenophobic views from a radical and unacceptable position into a "rational' and largely legitimate perspective in the Polish public's perceptions of

migrants and minorities”, thus leading to “moral panics” and, eventually, to “not only a change in language but also in wider norms and patterns of perception” of social groups and issues. Similarly, in reference to how politics is currently conducted in the public sphere, Wodak (2021: 6) refers to the “shameless normalisation” of “formerly tabooed topics, wording and impolite or shameless behaviour (i.e., ‘bad manners’). The boundaries of the ‘sayable’ are being shifted, and ‘anything goes’”. Brown et al. (2023) perceive this as a cyclical process, wherein the normalisation of radical discourses is achieved not merely by radical actors seemingly “de-toxifying” their discourses, as in the French example in the previous sub-section, but also by an adaptation, or re-construction, of mainstream discourses – their reciprocal radicalisation.

To further understand this process, Krzyżanowski and Ekström (2022) point to the significance of analysing mediatised radical discourses – that is, political discourses as they are recontextualized in the mass media. As shown in a number of studies, traditional mass media have been susceptible to the so-called “populist hype” – a disproportionate coverage of populist far-right parties’ talking points relative to their actual electoral performance and policy-making power (Glynos and Mondon 2019). Krzyżanowski (2018; 2020) proposes the term “discursive shifts” to trace the process through which hitherto radical and unacceptable discourses on social issues such as migration undergo gradual transformation into mainstream discourses. A key role in this process is played by traditional and online mass media, where such rhetoric may be re-mediated (or, alternatively, introduced) with the aim of disseminating and reinforcing it. Social media, especially, allow political and media actors to reach sizeable global audiences while evading editorial practices of traditional media outlets (Wodak 2021: 27). Thus, even marginal radical voices may employ these “powerful agents of political transformation” (Krzyżanowski and Tucker 2018: 146) to amplify their incendiary agendas. The resulting “borderline discourse” (Krzyżanowski and Ledin 2017) may become host to “uncivil” views disguised in “civil” language – racist views on immigration may, for instance, be presented as “free speech” or “objective opinions” in order to legitimise and normalise them in the wider public debate.

In concert with the calls to investigate the process of normalisation of radical discourses from a variety of perspectives, including in their “secondary spheres of recontextualization and re/mediation” (Krzyżanowski and Ekström 2022: 721), this thesis approaches two distinct types of discourse (re-)mediation. Paper 1 analyses top-down

populist far-right discourse in a social media context; Paper 2 explores mediation of political discourse not in the context of mass media, but as discourse mediated by an intermediary between text producer and receiver in the form of conference interpreters in the European Parliament; and Paper 3 continues this approach to discourse in a controlled, experimental setting. As the following section shows, translation and interpreting have been shown to alter the ideological salience of political texts – they are therefore seen in this thesis as potential contributing elements of the wider process of normalisation of radical discourses.

1.3. Interpreting and ideology

Translation and interpreting are of paramount importance in modern political discourse. Especially in international bodies such as the institutions of the European Union, simultaneous interpreting allows for near-real-time communication between parties which do not share a common tongue. As intermediaries that facilitate dialogue across languages and cultures, interpreters find themselves in a unique position whose impact on the shape of political discourse remains understudied. This section of the Introduction explores the ideas of interpreters' agency and ideological shift in translation and interpreting.

1.3.1. Interpreters' agency

A traditional view of the interpreter's role, one that persists to varying degrees in professional training, the public perception of the profession and codes of conduct, is that of a "clear conduit" – an "invisible" interlingual messenger who precisely transfers meaning from a source text to a target text but does not actually participate in the discursive event (Angelelli 2004: 7). Such a viewpoint on interpreting emphasises fidelity and neutrality as the most desirable aspects of interpreters' performance, while disregarding "social and cultural considerations that may be introduced by the different parties, as well as by the interpreter" (Angelelli 2015: 214).

As fidelity, or faithfulness to the source text, constitutes a common-sense indicator of high-quality translation and interpreting (Setton 2015: 161) and neutrality "has long

been viewed as the hallmark of the professional interpreter” (Prunč and Setton 2015: 273), the two concepts have been the subject of considerable scrutiny. In interpreter training, Setton and Dawrant (2016) list neutrality and fidelity as two of the “key (near-)universal principles” of conference interpreting which “must be instilled from ‘day one’.” Similarly, Gile (2009: 53) instructs that the “‘neutral’, ‘transparent’ or ‘conduit’ role” of conference interpreters “still deserves to be taught”, even though it is “somewhat idealized”. The neutrality and fidelity of interpreters also dominates the public understanding of the profession. The mass media, when they do acknowledge the work of interpreters and translators in their reporting of multilingual events, “propagate a very rigid and restricted view of interpreting that foregrounds ‘loyalty to the words of the speakers’” (Diriker 2011: 34). Barring any serious interpreting or translation errors, however, the interpreter or translator tends to be omitted completely in newspaper reports of interpreted and translated public statements by politicians (Schäffner and Bassnett 2010: 7-8), thus highlighting their “invisibility”. Likewise, the perception of interpreters based around neutrality and faithfulness “features prominently in most published codes of interpreter ethics” (Setton and Dawrant 2016: 377). Indeed, a survey of 16 codes of ethics of interpreting associations from around the world found fidelity listed as one of the professional requirements in 12 of them (Hale 2007: 108), but the Code of Professional Ethics of AIIC, the International Association of Conference Interpreters, does not explicitly list fidelity or neutrality among its principles (Seeber and Zelger 2007: 292; Setton and Prunč 2015: 146).

While fidelity as a concept is relatively straightforward, its evaluation in interpreting may be seen as context-dependent rather than fully based on objective criteria. Beyond mere attempts to provide accurate and complete interpretation, some modification of the source text, such as “light editing or explicating cultural references” (Setton 2015: 163), might be required of the interpreter to ensure trouble-free communication between parties. At the same time, such alterations introduced in the target text may result in “dilution or even censorship” (Setton 2015: 163). The ethical complexity of faithfulness in interpreting is demonstrated by Seeber and Zelger’s (2007) VSI model of truthful rendition. The model envisages all source texts as being comprised of verbal, semantic and intentional information: the words uttered by the speaker, their meaning, and the presumed intent of the speaker. In an ideal situation, all three components are congruent with one another; in reality, a speaker may produce a turn of phrase that the interpreter

considers to be potentially, if unintentionally, offensive to the recipient. The interpreter may decide to omit the offensive phrase, thus sacrificing the verbal and semantic components of the source text to maintain its intentional element. The decision by the interpreter to alter the message they are conveying might at first appear to be an inaccurate rendition of the source text, but in the VSI model, it is an ethics-based choice to prioritise the speaker's communicative aim. Such split-second decisions, the authors argue, aid the interpreter in arriving at a "truthful rendition" of the speaker's message, even though the target text has been moved further away from the words of the source text. They also illustrate the immense mental effort required for successful interpreting, as well as the meaning-making potential of interpreters.

The related concept of interpreters' neutrality can be defined in at least three different ways, the applicability of the definitions also depending on the setting in which interpreting is being performed. Two of them refer to the relationship between the sender and receiver of a text. The first of these may be referred to as "not taking sides or favouring one or another party to the exchange" (Prunč and Setton 2015: 273). While in conference interpreting this type of neutrality is claimed to be unproblematic as the interpreter is further removed from the speakers, in medical consultations, for instance, aiding the patient could be seen as the primary goal taking precedence over strict neutrality (Hale 2007: 41). The second is referred to by Gile (2009: 34) as "rotating side-taking" – being "biased" in favour of the author's or speaker's interests as long as this is compatible with the Client's brief and interests". The interpreter is urged to "side with" whichever party is currently speaking, even if in certain settings, like community interpreting, this may be "psychologically difficult to achieve: interpreters do belong to social groups and have their own moral, political, and religious convictions as well as personal interests against which it may be difficult for them to speak" (Gile 2009: 35). The most basic meaning of neutrality, one that is embedded within the previous two and is of greatest interest to this thesis, is the avoidance of bias in interpreting caused by the interpreter's personal views or interests (Setton and Dawrant 2016: 111). Like fidelity, this type of neutrality has been codified in the ethical guidelines of interpreting associations (Hale 2007: 108). Ultimately, as hinted at by Gile in his account of the "psychological difficulty" of side-taking, complete neutrality in interpreting is impossible, "since interpreters cannot abstract themselves entirely from their own background, beliefs and cultural biases" (Prunč and Setton 2015: 275). In extreme cases of non-neutrality, even the rejection of an interpreting

assignment on the grounds of personal moral principles is deemed to be justified (Setton and Dawrant 2016: 383). Nevertheless, striving towards maximum neutrality with a “neutralistic stance” (Hale 2007: 123) remains an accepted ideal that professionals should aim for to ensure high-quality performance.

Against the backdrop of professional expectations and guidelines which often promote interpreters’ “invisibility” even though they “cannot construe meaning in a vacuum” (Prunč and Setton 2015: 273), interpreters have been the subject of studies investigating their agency in communicative situations – the (self-)awareness of interpreters’ active participation in meaning-making, rather than just “recoding” messages between sender and receiver. An important early contribution was made by Wadensjö (1998) in her discourse-analytical study of community interpreting in legal and medical settings. In suggesting a triadic model of interaction in interpreted discourse, she shows how the role of the interpreter extends well beyond recoding messages between text producer and receiver. The interpreter is shown as coordinating the interaction between parties, participating in the negotiation of meaning and having a significant impact on the outcomes of communication. Interpreters’ role is therefore elevated from “conduit” to discourse co-creator.

In an ethnographic study of conference, court and medical interpreters’ perceptions of their own roles, Angelelli (2004) discovered that practitioners in all three settings see themselves as taking on active roles as agents, to varying degrees. Interpreters have been found to side with parties whose communication they enable and express emotions, “making it almost implausible to state that they can be value-neutral or impartial” (Angelelli 2004: 98). The visibility of interpreters was also the focus of Diriker’s (2004) study of metadiscourse on interpreting, interviews with interpreters and transcripts sourced from an interpreted conference. Her results point to the complexity of meaning negotiation between parties in conference settings, and the key role that “social, psychological, physical and cognitive factors” (Diriker 2004: 145) play in interpreters’ target text production. The ethnographic approach to interpreters’ roles was continued by Duflou (2016), whose survey of interpreters working for institutions of the European Union indicates that their performance is guided not only by prescriptive criteria, or the immediate requirements of a given interpreting task, but also by the broader institutional and discursive contexts. This specific group of interpreters appears to have formed a professional

community, whose standards and strategies are guided by historical precedent in the EU, as well as by their cooperation with one another.

Outside of loyalty to professional standards, to the message sender and receiver, the interpreter also remains loyal to themselves and their own ethics (Prunč 1997). This sentiment is reflected in Monacelli's (2009: 82) forthright suggestion that interpreters' main loyalty "is ultimately to themselves and to the furthering of their professional capacity". In a study of interpreting transcripts followed by interviews with interpreters, she found a range of self-regulatory behaviours on the part of the interpreters resulting in target text modifications which lessen the illocutionary force of language that could be deemed inappropriate in a given context. Impoliteness in multilingual political discourse and interpreters' approaches to it were also the focal points of Bartłomiejczyk's (2016) study of debates in the European Parliament. Similarly to Monacelli's analysis, interpreters are found to use linguistic strategies which weaken the rhetorical impact of impolite language. The findings of this study are presented in greater detail in the following section of this Introduction.

The perception of the interpreter as "not only linguistically visible, but (...) also visible with all the social and cultural factors that allow them to co-construct a definition of reality with the other co-participants to the interaction" (Angelelli 2004: 9) leads to their definition by Beaton-Thome's (2015: 188) as "an agent who occupies an ideological space of his/her own." If interpreters are conceived of as discourse co-constructors whose work is performed not outside of but within the contexts of prior lived experiences of all participants in an interpreted event, and influenced by them, their intermediary position is likely to be significant when interpreting ideologically loaded language.

1.3.2. Ideological shift in translation and interpreting

As interpreters are increasingly being recognised, and recognising themselves, as having agency and discourse-constructive power in communicative situations, their potential impact on multilingual political debates must not be ignored. A small, yet steadily growing, body of research has explored linguistic phenomena stemming from translation and interpreting which indicate potential changes to the ideological load between source texts and target texts in political speeches, debates and other forms of public expression.

Together, they can be interpreted as investigating “ideological shift” – the modulation of a source text’s ideological salience through various linguistic strategies used in the target text. This sub-section explores existing studies evaluating discursive phenomena which constitute ideological shift in translation and interpreting.

As outlined in Section 1.2, ideology is understood in this thesis as a set of socially-constituted ideas about the world – mental representations shared within groups and reproduced via discourse. Ideology establishes and controls group values, attitudes and power relations. The previous sub-section outlines how the interpreter or translator does not exist outside of ideology in their professional capacity – they may find themselves performing a balancing act between ideologically-constituted mental models of their own, of the source text producer and the target text receiver. This complex position, paradoxically, grants the interpreter, with their aims of faithfulness and neutrality, the power to meaningfully alter the shape of the interpreted communicative event by introducing ideological shifts. While it is not presumed that interpreters abuse this power, researchers have attempted to scrutinise the impact that this phenomenon may have on discourses, initially in translation and later also in interpreting.

The term “ideological shift”, when used in the studies listed in the following two sub-sections, is typically defined rather loosely, if at all. A variety of other terms is also used, such as “discoursal shifts” (Hatim and Mason 1997), “translation shifts” (Calzada Pérez 2001), “ideologically-loaded shifts” (Gumul 2010), and “shifts” (Munday 2007). “Ideological shift” is the preferred term in this thesis, as it is the ideological salience of an analysed text that is of primary importance to the analyses. Ideological shift in translation and interpreting is therefore understood as the mitigation or intensification of a (fragment of a) source text by employing, deliberately or not, various linguistic strategies which modulate the ideological salience of a target text. The following sub-sections present the current state of the small but growing fields of research on ideological shifts in translation and interpreting, followed by a synthesis of this research with existing research on the normalisation of radical political discourses.

1.3.2.1. Mediation of ideology in translation

In translation studies, an analysis of texts translated from Farsi, Spanish and French into English provides examples of Hatim and Mason's influential framework of three degrees of translators' mediation – “the extent to which translators intervene in the transfer process, feeding their own knowledge and beliefs into their processing of a text” (1997: 147). Minimal, partial and maximal mediation are proposed as three levels of consistent shifts in the ideological salience of translated target texts, ranging from small changes to the source text ideological load to a translation which “issues from and constructs a different ideology” (Hatim and Mason 1997: 158) via specific lexical choices and passivisation, among other phenomena.

The theoretical frames put forward by Hatim and Mason influenced Calzada Pérez's (2001) study of speeches delivered in Spanish in the European Parliament and later translated into English. Her focus on transitivity, understood in the Hallidayan sense of linguistic representations of extralinguistic processes, or of “who does what to whom”, revealed a broad variety of shifts between source and target texts leading to “ideological simplification” (Calzada Pérez 2001: 235). The author judges them to be “unwarranted shifts that translators may cause, in all probability, unconsciously” (Calzada Pérez 2001: 235).

Gumul (2010) closely follows Hatim and Mason's model in her analysis of “ideologically-loaded shifts” caused by various explicitation tactics in current events articles translated from English in a Polish journal. While she found no examples of maximal mediation in the target text corpus, several of the analysed translated texts appeared to have undergone at least minimal shifts. Gumul (2010: 108) concludes that “explicitation in political discourse might serve to communicate an altered point of view to the target-text readership”. In a similar study focused on Iraq War coverage in the same Polish publication, Gumul (2011) focused on lexico-grammatical choices in translated texts. As in the previous study, she found that linguistic phenomena such as changes in modality, demetaphorisation or nominalisation, as well as specific lexical choices, contributed to partial or minimal mediation in the translated texts.

Hatim and Mason's work influenced Munday's (2007) case study of Latin American leaders' speeches and writing interpreted or translated from Spanish into English and published in the US press. His analysis focuses on shifts in patterns of transitivity and

naming strategies between source texts and target texts, where “classic examples” such as the choice between “freedom fighter” and “terrorist” may indicate the text producer’s ideological orientation. Together, the observed shifts seem to point towards a sort of ideological domestication, a move towards a rather sceptical view of Latin American politics that is hegemonic in US discourse on the region. Munday concludes with the observation that the analysed ideological shifts may result from intentional, ideologically-motivated linguistic choices but also from unintentional translation decisions, possibly based in the translators’ ideological lexical priming (Munday 2007: 213). Alternatively, the shifts may not be the result of ideological processes at all, but of “the adoption of more or less standard translation procedures between Spanish and English” (Munday 2007: 207).

Inspired both by Hatim and Mason’s and Munday’s research, Constantinou (2020) analysed ideological shifts in translated promotional materials of the European Union – a German source text and two target texts in Greek, one prepared for Greece and the other for Cyprus. Despite sharing the language, the two versions translated for two disparate audiences prove to differ considerably in their conceptualisations of the EU. Where the Cypriot target text maintained the general structure of the source text and faithfully reproduced favourable metaphors of the European Union, thus constructing a positive image of the Union, the Greek translation introduced alterations to the structure of the text, removed positive metaphorical expressions and omitted intertextual allusions to Euro-sceptic discourse, resulting in the ideological salience of the translated text being weakened in comparison to the source text. Taken together, these studies show a developing interest in how translation affects the ideological salience of political discourse, and offer a basic framework for further research on ideological shift which has directly influenced studies of this phenomenon in interpreting.

1.3.2.2. Mediation of ideology in interpreting

Among the earliest studies which approached the issue of ideological shift in interpreting, as opposed to translation, was Beaton-Thome’s (2007) analysis of European Parliament debate contributions interpreted from German into English. Her investigation of lexical repetition and strings of metaphorical expressions between source texts and target texts resulted in two sets of far-reaching conclusions. As for the first issue, a comparative

analysis of source-text and target-text instances of the phrase “European Union” and its subordinate terms (such as “EU”, “Commission” or “European Parliament”) revealed an increased absolute number of references to the European Union in the target texts, a trend towards lexical contraction in the target texts evident in the smaller number of subordinate terms used in comparison to the source texts, and foregrounding of the superordinate term “European Union” coupled with backgrounding of its various subordinate terms in the analysed target texts. These phenomena result in decreased polyphony in multilingual political debates – the different, heterogenous source text voices of the participants appear to be reduced to a more singular, homogenous target text rhetoric. The analysis of the second issue, that of strings of metaphorical expressions realising the same conceptual metaphor of MOVEMENT, such as ACCESSION IS A RACE, revealed that while some metaphorical expressions were interpreted accurately, others were demetaphorised or underwent a change in the metaphorical target domain. Instances of interpreters’ self-correction were also noted with regard to the metaphorical expressions. While the author argues that these varied target text realisations could indicate intentional ideological work on the part of the interpreter, such approaches to figurative language, which is inherently difficult to process between languages, are typical interpreting strategies intended to overcome these problem triggers (Spinolo and Garwood 2010). Nevertheless, the meaning potential of lexical repetition, contraction and metaphor work, be they intentional or not in interpreting, could result in “strengthening of EU institutional hegemony” when compared to a source text, as Beaton-Thome (2007: 293) suggests.

In a later study, also situated within the context of European Parliament debates, Beaton-Thome (2013) analysed interpreters’ realisations of naming strategies used by speakers in reference to Guantánamo Bay detainees. Contributions to a single debate made in English and German, as well as their respective interpretations into German and English, were examined for the ideological load assigned to specific lexical labels, the use of qualifying adjectives, and lexical contraction between German and English. The conclusions are somewhat more restrained in terms of assigning intentionality to the observed ideological shifts when compared to the earlier study, with the author focusing on the meaning potential that such shifts could hold for a receiver of interpreted speech. The lexical choices made by interpreters, along with phenomena such as hesitation and self-correction when encountering ideologically loaded lexis, hint at the complex positioning

of the interpreter who “is conflicted about the use of labels and is determined to be ‘correct’ in the choice of such labels” (Beaton-Thome 2013: 393).

The wealth of readily-available interpreted political speeches delivered in the European Parliament also enabled Bartłomiejczyk’s (2016) extensive study of face-threatening acts in interpreted discourse. Her research questions regarding interpreters’ approaches to face-threatening language in the source text, while not expressly concerned with ideological shift, attempt to shed light on whether “the constraints of interpreter-mediated communication enable plenary speakers to effectively damage their interlocutor’s face, if this is their communicative intent” (Bartłomiejczyk 2016: 159) – a goal that, in parliamentary debates, would typically be achieved with the use of highly ideologically loaded language. The analysis, based on Discourse-Analytical approaches and Brown and Levinson’s politeness theory, focused on two discursive phenomena, personal references and impoliteness, in a corpus of debate contributions by members of the populist far-right United Kingdom Independence Party delivered in English and simultaneously interpreted into Polish. The overarching trend in the analysed corpus appeared to be that of interpreters mitigating linguistic impoliteness, although instances of intensification and accurate rendition were also observed. Bartłomiejczyk’s study is notable for contributing a detailed inventory of specific linguistic phenomena whose use in interpreting could result in mitigation or intensification of source text face-threatening language – and, by extension, in mitigatory or intensifying ideological shift. By employing interpreting strategies such as impersonalisation, deictic shifts, omission or addition, interpreters may weaken or, conversely, strengthen the face-threatening act in their rendition of a target text (Bartłomiejczyk 2016: 231).

Bartłomiejczyk speculates whether interpreters’ mitigation of impolite, and highly ideologically loaded, language could be intentional: “self-censorship might also partly result from the interpreter’s lack of identification with the political stance of the speaker and inability to fully step into the role of someone expressing different political views” (Bartłomiejczyk 2016: 264). At the same time, she rightly notes the difficulty of distinguishing intentional, ideological work of the interpreter from practice-based and efficiency-oriented interpreting tactics. Especially in the case of tactics such as omission, they “may often be used as emergency measures due to the constraints imposed by the speaker rather than as a conscious decision to mitigate a threat to face or to filter out politeness markers as having little relevance” (Bartłomiejczyk 2016: 166), which

effectively makes the distinction between intentional and unintentional ideological shifts in interpreting impossible if the study is based solely on the analysis of existing texts.

Bartłomiejczyk extended her research on mitigation in interpreted discourse, and explicitly approached the issue from the point of view of ideological shifts, in two case studies based on European Parliament debate contributions by a far-right Polish speaker: one focused on racist discourse (Bartłomiejczyk 2020), and another on Eurosceptic discourse (Bartłomiejczyk 2021). Following the basic tenets of Hatim and Mason's conceptualisation of ideological shifts, Bartłomiejczyk analysed English and German interpreters' approaches to explicitly and implicitly racist language used by the speaker in the first study. Although the results indicate no single consistent approach to racist language in the European Parliament, explicit racial slurs were typically mitigated by the interpreters (for instance through the addition of hedging or through euphemisation) and "implicit racism tended to disappear from the interpretations" (Bartłomiejczyk 2020: 20), but metaphorical expressions of a discriminatory nature were usually transferred faithfully. However, considering the media interest generated by the speaker's use of racist language, even in its generally mitigated, interpreted form, the speaker's goal of causing controversy could be seen as achieved. In the study focused on Eurosceptic speeches delivered by the same speaker in Polish and English, Bartłomiejczyk's (2021) analysis again revealed a variety of approaches from interpreters, ranging from omission, through slight mitigation and accurate rendition, to strengthening of ideological load in target texts. Although "a large part of the blame for the shifts as exemplified in this paper must be attributed to the original speaker" (Bartłomiejczyk 2021: 14), who is infamous for his rapid speech rate and erratic speaking style, the results of the study provide further evidence of the changes to ideological salience of political speeches that interpreting may cause, intentionally or not.

Outside of the European context, intriguing insight into ideological shift in interpreting stems from studies based around a corpus of Chinese Premiers' press conferences consecutively interpreted into English (Gu 2018). As these annual press conferences are directed both at the domestic and international audience, with non-Chinese journalists also participating, they offer a glimpse at China's self-presentation to the world, and a chance for the Chinese government to have its country's "'story' properly told" (Gu 2018: 2). The series of studies based on this parallel Chinese-English corpus have investigated interpreters' use of the Present Perfect tense (Gu 2018), self-referential terms (Gu and

Tipton 2020), modal verbs and intensifiers (Gu and Wang 2021), and collocation patterns related to key government policies (Gu 2022). Together, their results consistently point towards a high alignment of interpreters with the overarching government narrative, one that often “significantly strengthens the government’s presence and institutional hegemony” (Gu and Tipton 2020: 420) in the interpreted target texts. This is also echoed in a separate study of interpreting at an economic summit organised in China, where foreign speakers’ negative other-presentation of China was mitigated by interpreters, while positive self-presentation by Chinese speakers was strengthened (Gao 2020). However, all of these results need to be perceived through the lens of their unique political context – as the authors point out, “government interpreters are usually communist party members and are recruited into China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs as part of China’s ruling elite” (Gu and Tipton 2020: 406-407). This position appears to be more highly conducive to intensifying ideological shifts than that of EU-employed interpreters’, whose professional loyalty might lie with the Union itself rather than with individual speakers representing various ideological orientations.

The existing studies of translated and interpreted political discourse have identified a rich repertoire of discursive strategies and their linguistic realisations which may result in ideological shifts in target texts. These strategies are evaluated in Papers 2 and 3 of this thesis. However, across a variety of national, institutional and ideological contexts, no single approach to ideologically loaded language emerges. When ideological shifts are observed, two major explanations are those of translators’/interpreters’ alignment with institutional (hegemonic) ideological positioning and of alignment with translators’/interpreters’ own ideological orientation, followed by the admission that the shifts may also result from standard translation and interpreting practices. It must be noted that many of these studies attempt to make conclusions about the intentionality of translators’ and interpreters’ choices when the data analysed do not allow for it with any degree of certainty. As virtually all of the analyses are based on discourse-analytical approaches to authentic texts, with no inclusion of the interpreters who delivered the interpretations, the distinction between ideological processes (intentional or non-intentional and caused by prior ideological priming) and those stemming from learned and practiced problem-solving interpreting strategies (with no basis in interpreters’ own or institutional ideological orientation) might be impossible to make. Paper 3 of this thesis attempts to fill this research gap by measuring the political orientation of participating professional interpreters, while

also evaluating the ideological shifts between source texts and target texts produced by them in a controlled experimental environment.

Still, the work conducted on ideological shift thus far is significant for its exploration of the meaning potential that instances of ideological shifts in translation and interpreting may carry. Regardless of the reasons for changes between source texts and target texts, the recipients of mediated political discourse may experience texts that differ in terms of ideological load from what the source text producer intended – be it through mitigation or intensification. The inventory of discursive strategies leading to ideological shifts constructed across the existing studies allows for deeper explorations of the issue, ones that account for the characteristics of the linguistic processes taking place and the broader socio-historical contexts in which they occur.

1.3.2.3. Ideological shift and radical discourse mitigation

Notably, ideological shift bears similarities to the discursive shift framework developed by Krzyżanowski (2018; 2020) and outlined in Section 1.2.3. which extend beyond the nominal. The parallels in social functions and research methodologies employed to investigate the two phenomena appear to align them for greater synthesis in further study. Both concepts involve processes of change and re-mediation of radical discourses which influence the perception of social issues and ideologically loaded language; they illustrate how parties outside of the immediate text producers alter the shape of discourses and, more or less strategically, lead to their de-toxification/mitigation and eventual adoption into the mainstream. To analyse these developments, the vast majority of existing research on ideological shift in translation and interpreting employs methods of various approaches within Critical Discourse Studies (e.g. Munday 2007; Gumul 2010; Gumul 2011; Beaton 2007; Beaton-Thome 2013; Bartłomiejczyk 2020; 2021), in which the discursive shift framework is likewise firmly grounded.

In this thesis, ideological shift in interpreting is proposed as a contributing factor to the gradation/perpetuation of radical discourses – the intermediary step of discursive shift – leading to their normalisation. Although the occurrence of ideological shifts in everyday life, and consequently their impact on societies, may at first appear to be limited when compared to the discourse-normalising potential of monolingual media outlets as

analysed in the context of discursive shifts, studies such as Gumul's (2010; 2011) analyses of republished translated articles and Bartłomiejczyk's (2020) account of controversy surrounding the interpreting of racist language indicate that the effect of ideological shifts in translation and interpreting reaches outside of the immediate recipients of translated and interpreted texts. At the same time, the broader processes of globalisation and multilingualization are likely to continue increasing the prominence of ideological shifts in translation and interpreting in the near future.

1.4. Methodology

The present thesis synthesises theoretical frameworks rooted in Critical Discourse Studies, studies of social media and Interpreting Studies. The principal methods of analysis employed in the three papers which make up this thesis stem from CDS: the Discourse-Historical Approach is the shared basis of analyses in all three articles, supplemented by principles derived from visual grammar (Kress and van Leeuwen 2006) in Paper 1, and by experimental methods and statistical analysis typical of Interpreting Studies in Paper 3. This section outlines the general methodological approaches, while the specific methods of analyses are described in the papers themselves.

1.4.1. Critical Discourse Studies – methodological principles

The overarching methodological approach which connects the three papers in this thesis is rooted in Critical Discourse Studies (CDS). Rather than being a single methodology, CDS could be seen as a set of diverse “theories, methods, analyses, applications and other practices” (van Dijk 2013) related through their shared goals of “deconstructing ideologies and power through systematic and reproducible³ investigation of semiotic data” (Wodak and Meyer 2016: 4). As a basic principle, CDS approaches are problem-oriented – instead of taking “a purely formalist and context-abstract view of language” (Reisigl 2018: 49), CDS research focuses on concrete social issues, typically ones resulting from

³ “transparent so that any reader can trace and understand the detailed in-depth textual analysis” (Kendall 2007)

and representing inequalities and discrimination. This naturally causes CDS scholars to gravitate towards studies of political discourse, as in the cases of research on normalisation and ideological shift presented in earlier sections of this Introduction. With the Frankfurt School, Hallidayan grammar and Critical Linguistics among its inspirations, CDS considers language use, and by extension the use of other semiotic modes, to be not just central to social practices and the human experience, but also intrinsically ideological and purpose-driven – the use of language is not “objective” or “value-less” but indicative of the text producer’s views and opinions about social issues, actors and phenomena. At the same time, such use of language further reinforces and disseminates the same ideologies that it expresses. Or, as Wodak (2001b: 66) puts it: “discourses as linguistic social practices can be seen as constituting non-discursive and discursive social practices and, at the same time, as being constituted by them”. The central role of semiosis in all facets of social life make it possible to analyse how specific forms of language and other meaning-making practices allow ideologies to be “expressed, signalled, constituted, legitimized” (Wodak 2001a: 2).

In terms of actual analysis, the different approaches in Critical Discourse Studies share an interest in authentic, “naturally occurring” language use situated in its various narrower and broader contexts, in units of language larger than single words or sentences, and various linguistic phenomena, from discursive strategies such as politeness to the use of specific grammatical features (Wodak and Meyer 2016: 2). As both the social issues themselves and the textual features, modalities and genres of texts studied by CDS researchers are particularly diverse, methodological heterogeneity and interdisciplinarity are emphasised in order to perform successful analysis. Accordingly, all three articles that constitute this thesis employ methods of the Discourse-Historical Approach, a methodology within CDS, which is supplemented by concepts and analytical categories of visual grammar (Kress and van Leeuwen 2006) and studies of social media communication in the Paper 1, insights from Interpreting Studies in Papers 2 and 3, as well as statistical analysis in Paper 3.

1.4.2. Analytical tools of the Discourse-Historical Approach

The Discourse-Historical Approach, which has its origins in Ruth Wodak's studies analysing antisemitic stereotyping in Austrian public discourse (Wodak et al. 1990) and the country's processing of its Nazi past (Wodak et al. 1994), "has developed over the last 30 years as a main version of Critical Discourse Studies" (Reisigl 2018: 44). DHA is oriented towards social critique through textual analysis, meaning an ethics-based evaluation of "the status quo, e.g., a specific discourse (...), against the background of an alternative (ideal) state and preferred values, norms, standards or criteria" (Reisigl 2018: 50) which points to "biases in representations (especially media coverage) and to contradictory and manipulative relationships" (Reisigl and Wodak 2009: 119) observable in discourses.

Thematically, DHA is therefore primarily concerned with discourses of discrimination, identity, institutional language barriers, the language of politics in a broad sense (in recent years, especially of far-right and populist politicians), and the dissemination of these discourses in the media (Reisigl 2018: 47), which makes DHA an approach perfectly suited for the analysis of the phenomena explored in this thesis. Although since its inception the applications of DHA have extended to texts of various modalities, the approach is logocentric in its design and typical use. The following outline of its analytical tools is likewise centred around language.

At its basis, DHA is a three-level process (Reisigl and Wodak 2016: 32). The initial step is the identification of discourse topics in the set of texts being analysed. At this point, the thematic contents of the texts are identified. For instance, a parliamentary speech, a televised interview and a party manifesto are instances of texts of different genres and different modalities which all contribute towards a larger "political discourse". The three texts may all touch upon subjects such as taxation reform, national security or environmental protection – various discourse topics which connect the individual texts into an intertextual discursive network. The identification of discourse topics is followed by the analysis of discursive strategies – "a more or less intentional plan of practices" employed in the texts "adopted to achieve a particular social, political, psychological or linguistic goal" (Reisigl and Wodak 2009: 94). These typically relate to strategies of self- and other-presentation and indicate the text producer's views and attitudes towards the persons and issues that are being referred to. For example, a negative presentation of environmental activists may be desired by the text producer in order to dissuade

prospective voters from supporting a green tax initiative. Discursive strategies are realised in texts by specific linguistic means (types) and their individual linguistic realisations (tokens). The use of the word “theft” to refer to taxation, for instance, would be a linguistic realisation of a nomination strategy which constructs a negative image of the hypothetical green tax proposal. Table 1 below, adapted from Reisigl and Wodak (2016: 33), presents the five discursive strategies analysed in DHA, the aims which their use serves, and the linguistic means which realise the strategies.

Table 1. Discursive strategies, their objectives and selected linguistic means, adapted from Reisigl and Wodak 2016: 33.

Discursive strategy	Objectives	Selected linguistic means
nomination	discursive construction of social actors, objects, phenomena, events, processes and actions	nouns used to denote actors, objects, etc.; membership categorisation devices, e.g. anthroponyms; tropes such as metaphors, metonymies and synecdoches
predication	discursive qualification (positively or negatively) of social actors, objects, phenomena, events, processes and actions	predicates or predicative nouns/adjectives/pronouns; collocations; similes
argumentation	justification and questioning of claims of truth and normative rightness	topoi; fallacies
perspectivisation	positioning of the text producer’s point of view, expressing involvement or distance	deictics; direct or indirect speech; discourse markers; quotations
intensification and mitigation	modifying (strengthening or weakening) the illocutionary force of utterances	diminutives and augmentatives; modal verbs; hesitation; the subjunctive; hyperboles and litotes

In this thesis, nomination and predication are assigned special importance, since naming strategies are primary means of self- and other-presentation which “encode important information about the writer’s attitude to the individual referred to in a text” (Simpson 1993: 141). In Paper 1, self- and other-presentation and perspectivisation are analysed primarily in the visual mode, supplemented by the analysis of the language used in captions attached to the images. In Papers 2 and 3, the strategies are evaluated exclusively in language. Additionally, in the latter two studies intensification and mitigation are adapted as intertextual, rather than intratextual, strategies – between interpreted source and target texts.

As the contexts in which texts are produced and received are crucial to the very notion of “discourse” (Reisigl and Wodak 2016: 30-31; Reisigl 2018: 53), discursive strategies and their realisations are always analysed with close attention to context in an attempt to grasp the full implications of their use by text producers. The most immediate level of context as understood in DHA is text-internal – the thematic and lexical organisation, the collocations and connotations within texts which dictate their internal coherence. The second level is intertextual and interdiscursive context – the relationships between analysed texts and groups of texts. A broader level is the “context of situation”, which includes the social and institutional frames in which the analysed text was produced, the place and time, the intended audience, as well as the social characteristics of involved parties: their ethnicities, national and religious identities, as well as their ideological orientations. The broadest level is the socio-political and historical context in which the analysed text is embedded – its relations to social processes and textual precedents which contribute to the creation and reception of a given text, and with which the text interacts. This last level of context includes the historical dimension, which contributes to the name of DHA, but “not all analyses carried out within the theoretical and methodical framework of the DHA show a clear historical orientation” (Reisigl 2018: 44) in the sense of tracking the evolution of discourses across history, especially in smaller-scale research projects.

A final element of the analytical framework of DHA is the emphasis on triangulation of different research methods, data sources, theories and background information (Reisigl and Wodak 2016: 31; Reisigl 2018: 45). As shown in this sub-section, DHA is concerned with complex social phenomena which constitute and are constituted by various semiotic processes and a multitude of (linguistic) means. Their successful critical analysis requires an appropriately multifaceted and interdisciplinary perspective which is always adjusted to the individual research project. A triangulated approach should also alleviate the potential impact of biases that could surface in the case of qualitative analyses of textual data. This thesis implements the principle of triangulation across the three articles – the issues of self- and other-presentation by far-right political actors and the occurrence of ideological shifts in interpreted parliamentary speeches are analysed in texts produced by various actors, using a variety of qualitative and quantitative methods derived from diverse theories, and in texts of multiple modalities. The following sub-

section outlines the theoretical framework employed to assist in the analysis of multimodal texts published on social media.

1.4.3. Visual grammar and political discourse

Although approaches under the umbrella of Critical Discourse Studies are typically language-oriented, visual communication is just as capable of “articulation of ideological positions” (Kress and van Leeuwen 2006: 14). The use of the visual medium in politics naturally has a long history, from the power-affirming idealised portraits of Renaissance kings to the modern social media-competent politician posting selfies from the campaign trail (Lilleker et al. 2019). The multimodality of communication is indeed one of the key aspects of the modern online media landscape (Flew 2008), one that has been increasingly integrated into political campaigning (Small 2018: 327).

Instagram, the image- and video-based social media platform, has emerged as a leading channel of political communication alongside X (formerly Twitter) and Facebook. However, its significance in political discourse remains understudied in comparison to the volume of research on the two primarily text-based platforms (Hu et al. 2014: 596; Bast 2021: 214). Early studies of Instagram use by politicians and political parties included its evaluation as a platform for maintaining contact with established supporters and winning over new voters (Glantz 2014), a study of self-presentation and campaigning by political parties before the 2014 election in Sweden (Filimonov et al. 2016), comparing the use of X and Instagram during the 2015 Norwegian elections (Larsson 2017), presidential candidates’ self-presentation and user engagement in the USA (Muñoz and Towner 2017), personal image management by a freshly-elected Prime Minister of Canada (Lalancette and Raynauld 2019), and analysing the differences between the use of the platform by established and newer parties in Spain (Turnbull-Dugarte 2019). In rare bottom-up studies of political discourse on social media, Feltwell et al. (2015) tracked the use of the “#IndyRef” hashtag on Instagram in the run-up to the Scottish Independence Referendum of 2014, while Schmidbauer et al. (2017) analysed Instagram activity of Donald Trump’s and Hillary Clinton’s supporters before the 2016 presidential election.

Following this early wave of research on Instagram use in political discourse, Bast (2021) has conducted a review of 37 existing studies and found that the platform is

typically used by political actors “to create a favourable, positive image rather than to reflect on policy issues, engage in direct interaction with citizens, or mobilise voters” (Bast 2021: 213), whereas on text-based X positive self-presentation appears to be of lesser importance (Jungherr 2016). Moffitt (2022) has extended this line of research by investigating how populist politicians visually represent not themselves but “the people” in their Instagram posts and found differences in terms of inclusivity between populists on the left and on the right of the political spectrum. An image-based social media platform such as Instagram appears to stimulate a style of political communication that differs considerably from that which can be observed elsewhere, even on other new media outlets. A critical analysis of political discourse on Instagram would therefore similarly require an appropriately adjusted set of analytical methods.

Kress and van Leeuwen (2006: 14) point out that up to the moment of the publication of their work, critical approaches to discourse had largely been “confined to language, realised as verbal texts, or to verbal parts of texts which also use other semiotic modes to realise meaning”. The “visual grammar” which they developed was designed specifically to provide Critical Discourse Studies approaches with the tools for systematic analysis of visual and multimodal texts. Heavily inspired by Halliday’s Systemic-Functional Linguistics, the approach recognises the visual medium as carrying meanings motivated by the image-makers’ social aims and influenced by the social context – both in isolation and when accompanied by written text, with which the image forms a cohesive, multimodal whole (Kress and van Leeuwen 2006: 177). By analysing regularities in the representation of actors in images, the relationships between represented participants, as well as between them and the image-viewer, and in the overall composition of an image, Kress and van Leeuwen point to a “language” of visual communication which is specific to Western cultures. The theoretical section of Paper 1 in this thesis presents the implications of various realisations of these categories on image-based communication, such as the spatial distribution or salience of elements in a frame. The present thesis employs principles of visual grammar in tandem with tools of the Discourse-Historical Approach to analyse the visual communication via Instagram by Donald Trump, a populist far-right politician, during his 2016 presidential campaign.

1.4.4. Product-oriented research in Interpreting Studies

While this article-based PhD thesis takes Critical Discourse Studies as its primary methodological framework, the concepts related to interpreters' performance in Papers 2 and 3, as well as the quantitative analysis in Paper 3, are directly informed by research and methods in Translation and Interpreting Studies.

Although experimental methods are not typically associated with Critical Discourse Studies, calls have been made for greater involvement of such methods in discourse-analytical research to improve its reliability (Hart 2020). As pointed out by Hart (2018: 403-404), the scarcity of such studies may be due to several factors, including the fact that approaches of this kind unavoidably reduce complex social phenomena to experimentally testable pieces of text. The accompanying, at least partial, decontextualization of texts seemingly contradicts some of the fundamental principles of (Critical) Discourse Studies (Meyer 2001: 15). Experimental approaches may, however, provide insight into the immediate cognitive effects of texts on those who interact with them and may provide validation to specific interpretations of discursive phenomena which analysts within CDS arrive at in the course of more traditional analyses. Consequently, experimental approaches, as pointed out by Hart (2018: 404), fit the principle of methodological triangulation in Critical Discourse Studies generally, and the Discourse-Historical Approach specifically – combining “various interdisciplinary, methodical and source-specific approaches to investigate a particular discourse phenomenon” and ensure internal validity (Reisigl and Wodak 2001: 40).

The studies conducted in Papers 2 and 3 exemplify product-oriented, discourse-analytical research as introduced to Translation and Interpreting Studies by Hatim and Mason (1997) and Wadensjö (1998). While approaches comparatively analysing transcripts of source and target texts cannot claim to directly access the cognitive processes of study participants at the moment of interpreting, they do offer “evidence of translators' decision making, which allows some insight into the translation process” and into the engagement of “our extralinguistic reality” in this process (Saldanha and O'Brien 2013: 50). The papers take as their starting points qualitative analyses of linguistic phenomena indicating ideological shifts observed in the collected data (parallel datasets of source and target texts) followed by quantitative analyses which indicate overall trends in the datasets. While Paper 2, which closely follows similar studies of interpreter-mediated

political discourse conducted, among others by Beaton-Thome (2013) and Bartłomiejczyk (2020, 2021), relies in its methods of analysis primarily on the Discourse-Historical approach within Critical Discourse Studies, Paper 3 directly involves professional interpreters in a controlled environment. However, the ideological load of interpreted texts and participants' political orientations, which are measured in Paper 3 to provide further insight into the results of previous studies, may be considered as sensitive extralinguistic variables highly susceptible to the observer effect (Saldanha and O'Brien 2013: 31). Consequently, retrospective protocols of the kind adopted in Cognitive Translation and Interpreting Studies (Xiao and Muñoz Martín 2021: 13) are rejected in favour of analysing the relationships between the results of quantitative analysis of the datasets and the results of post-task questionnaires. Over the two interpreting-oriented papers, a triangulated combination of methods "suitable for studies that seek to provide both detailed and holistic descriptions" (Vargas-Urpi 2017: 96) is therefore used.

1.5. Mediation of political discourse – overview of the papers

The main body of the present thesis comprises three articles, presented here in their published or accepted for publication forms. The three papers are followed by a conclusion which synthesises their findings.

Paper 1, "Instagram narratives in Trump's America: Multimodal social media and mitigation of right-wing populism" (Dobkiewicz 2019), evaluates the applicability of DHA methods to mediated political discourse in an image-based social media context. The case study of 2016 election campaign posts on Donald Trump's Instagram account explores positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation by radical populist political actors through the analysis of discourse topics and visual composition.

In Paper 2, "Ideological shift in interpreted parliamentary speeches: Conference interpreter as meaning co-constructor" (Dobkiewicz, in press), strategies of self- and other-presentation in political discourse are evaluated in plenary debate speeches delivered in the European Parliament in English and simultaneously interpreted into Polish. A dataset of debate contributions from speakers across the political spectrum are analysed for the occurrence of ideological shifts between source and target texts, with a focus on

noun and verb phrases used to reference social actors and phenomena typical of populist far-right discourse.

The findings of the study above are directly extended in Paper 3, “Source text ideological load modulates ideological shifts in interpreting right-wing and left-wing political discourse, but interpreters’ political orientation does not” (Dobkiewicz et al. 2023). The ideologically loaded phrases collected from the European Parliament in the previous article serve as the basis for stimuli speeches controlled for ideological orientation which are interpreted by experienced, professional interpreters working in the English-Polish language pair. The source and target texts are later comparatively analysed for the occurrence of mitigating and intensifying linguistic phenomena. In the first study of its kind, the political orientation of the participating interpreters is measured using a valid and reliable questionnaire, allowing for a quantitative analysis of the influence of interpreters’ and texts’ ideological orientation on the presence of ideological shifts. The thesis concludes with a synthesis of the findings of the three papers and presents suggestions of avenues for further research.

Paper 1. Instagram narratives in Trump's America: Multimodal social media and mitigation of right-wing populism (Dobkiewicz 2019)

Dobkiewicz, Patryk. 2019. "Instagram narratives in Trump's America: Multimodal social media and mitigation of right-wing populism", *Journal of Language and Politics* 18, 6: 826-847.

Instagram narratives in Trump's America

Multimodal social media and mitigation of right-wing populism

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This study investigates the ideological composition of Donald Trump's 2016 presidential campaign on Instagram, a popular but little researched platform, and attempts to situate it within his broader campaign. To account for the multimodality of Instagram posts, an analytical framework combining methods of the discourse-historical approach and visual grammar is proposed. 330 posts were subjected to a semantic analysis, resulting in a network of discourse topics which defined the Instagram campaign. Trump's Instagram posts, in contrast to his tweets, are shown to be mostly positive, refraining from nativist attacks on minorities and limiting personal attacks on Hillary Clinton. Trump methodically constructed the positive, populist 'Man of the People' image, although in-depth analysis of selected posts reveals his populism to be only superficially inclusive. These findings prompt a reflection on the existence of an *internal cordon sanitaire* in social media campaigns, a possibly detrimental phenomenon for right-wing populists.

Keywords: social media, right-wing populism, multimodality, narrative, critical discourse studies, political discourse

1. Introduction

Donald Trump's victory in the 2016 presidential election shocked much of the American and global commentariat and academia. The Republican candidate's numerous lies, *post-truths* and otherwise morally objectionable, offensive claims (Lakoff 2017; Montgomery 2017) seemed to stand against the values of an open, democratic society which the United States has prided itself in being since the country's founding.

Trump's controversial statements were insufficient to deter voters – even though he broke norms of civility, he remained authentic in the eyes of his supporters (Montgomery 2017, 635). Seen as a straight-talking, charismatic outsider, Trump managed to echo the feelings of resentment present in American society (Lakoff 2017, 602) while promoting his idea of “Making America Great Again”. His electoral success has been ascribed in no small part to effective campaigning on social media, especially on Twitter (Wodak and Krzyżanowski 2017, 474), with Trump himself composing many of the tweets (Kreis 2017, 608).

Although political communication on Twitter has been studied extensively (e.g. Bennett 2016; Kreis 2017; Littler and Feldman 2017; Krzyżanowski 2018; Small 2018), politics on other social media platforms has so far remained largely neglected. Especially, the use of Instagram for political communication remains rather understudied. Although there is a steadily growing body of research on Instagram use in politics in the fields of social media studies, political and social science (e.g. Filimonov et al. 2016; Larsson 2017; Lalancette and Raynauld 2017; Turnbull-Dugarte 2019), the scarcity of discourse-focused approaches to this issue is somewhat surprising. As a primarily image-based social media platform, Instagram continues the shift in communication in general (Kress and van Leeuwen 2006, 14), and in political communication in particular (Small 2018, 327), towards online multimodal discourse. This study is an attempt to fill this research gap from a linguistic and semiotic perspective.

The principal aims of this study are threefold. First, to gain an understanding of what Trump's promise to “Make America Great Again” entails, as evidenced in his Instagram posts. Second, to investigate whether Trump's Instagram narrative, and by extension his vision for America, exhibits characteristics of right-wing populist (RWP) ideology. Third, to situate the Instagram campaign narrative within Trump's broader campaign.

2. Populism, social media and political narratives

Donald Trump's politics has been given a variety of labels, with right-wing populism becoming the *de facto* accepted term in academia, and Trump as one of the prime subjects of the new wave of populism research. However, as the term “populism” is often overused (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2012, 1), it is necessary to establish the precise characteristics of a populist right wing politician.

I follow Mudde (2004, 544) in defining populism as a “thin ideology” attached to a more fully-fledged political ideology, resulting in, for example, left-wing or right-wing populism (RWP). It is the latter that has recently attracted much academic attention. Mudde's (2017, 4) definition of RWP focuses on three basic

features shared by all RWP politicians and parties: nativism, authoritarianism, and the division of society into “the pure people” and “the corrupt elite”.

Nativism is defined as the belief that states should be inhabited by homogenous, native populations, and that non-native inhabitants and foreign ideas pose a threat to the well-being of the nation. Islamophobia, perhaps the most common realisation of nativist sentiment in recent RWP discourse, combines elements of racial, ethnic and religious prejudice, as well as economic factors. Nativism is complemented by authoritarianism, the belief that societies should be strictly ordered and that violation of this order deserves severe punishment. It is often realised by RWP politicians in their calls for stricter law and order policies. Apart from such legal concerns, authoritarians often focus on discipline in the family. Finally, RWP politicians share the belief in a society divided into “the pure people” and “the corrupt elite”. They identify with “the People”, understood as a monolithic and homogenous group, and claim to represent their interests. As noted by Canovan (1999, 5), populists take pride in the directness and simplicity of their rhetoric, which stands in stark contrast to the bureaucratic jargon of established politicians. They argue that “the common man” has been abandoned or betrayed by the elites and consequently postulate a shift of power from the elites to the *volonté générale*. Both the People and the elite are notably unspecified groups. This ambiguity allows for much freedom in in-group construction and othering within populist discourses, as Wodak (2015, 8) points out, as well as for “scapegoating” of those whom right-wing populists deem undesirable (Wodak 2017, 553). In order to shift the power from the elite to the People, right-wing populists turn to their saviour, the often self-styled “charismatic leader (...) who oscillates between the roles of Robin Hood and ‘strict father’” (Wodak 2017, 555) and promises unspecified radical change (Wodak 2017, 561).

Rises in illiberal tendencies, such as the one recently manifesting in improving electoral performance of far-right and RWP parties and politicians, have been widely described as resulting from social and economic crises. As established politicians lose credibility, populations turn their attention, and votes, towards “anti-systemic” candidates (e.g. Betz 1998; Decker 2008; Wodak 2017). Wodak (2017) sees the right-wing populist shift as the rise of “the politics of resentment”, with RWP actors mobilising the xenophobic anxieties of the so-called “globalisation losers” on the one hand, and the general anger and dissatisfaction with politics on the other. Such views have been recently given an unprecedented platform in the mass media. Especially, the use of social media by RWP actors has played a crucial part in the normalisation of RWP views.

Krzyżanowski and Tucker (2018, 146) point to the important role of social media as “powerful agents of political transformation”, rather than merely as objective tools of communication. Even though the emergence of social media was met with

initial enthusiastic predictions of new, democratic and interactive communication between politicians and the wider public (e.g. Eisenlauer and Hoffmann 2010; Fuchs 2014), limited interaction has been shown between top-down political communication and bottom-up democratisation of political participation despite technological affordances. Indeed, in a study of Twitter accounts of the European Commission's Spokespeople, Krzyżanowski (2018) has shown a tendency among political actors to maintain the elitist, "few to many" style of communication characteristic of offline political communication.

In the absence of the predicted democratisation and improvement in quality of online political discourse, Krzyżanowski and Ledin (2017) describe "the rise of uncivil society", the widespread right-wing populist technique of disguising illiberal, exclusionary and anti-pluralist beliefs as "facts", "objective opinions" or "free speech". Such practices, though resembling bottom-up political communication, actually propagate the top-down agendas of RWP politicians, thus normalising and disseminating radical views. As a result, right-wing populists have been able to breach the *cordon sanitaire* (Littler and Feldman 2017) and receive attention from mainstream media. Even the most controversial and radical views expressed by Donald Trump, for example, either offline or online on Twitter (Kreis 2017), have been taken up and debated by mainstream news outlets following their initial dissemination online, resulting in the normalisation of such beliefs. Likewise, Bennett (2016) has shown the furthering of historically racist topoi in tweets by the leader of the right-wing populist UKIP, which framed the broader British public debate on the refugee crisis.

One way in which the spreading and normalization of RWP views may be understood is through narratives. In her account of the growing divide between the right and left in American politics, Hochschild (2016) described what she called the "deep story" – a set of beliefs of the disenfranchised right-wing voter that takes the shape of an internalised narrative in which they are at a disadvantage waiting for the American Dream because of "line-cutters" (immigrants, refugees, minorities) and their own elected officials.¹ The powerful emotive and legitimising potential of narratives has been studied as an important factor in developing national identities (e.g. Shenhav 2009; Forchtner and Kølvråa 2012; Montessori and López 2015). Especially in times of crisis, such narratives challenge the status quo by presenting an alternative and calling for its support.

In fact, Somers (1994) has argued that the entirety of social life is "storied", and that our agency is dictated by our expectations and memories derived from social narratives. Somers introduced a model of narrativity composed of three dimensions. "Ontological narratives" dictate our perception of our own status quo, such

1. On the selective nature of narrative cf. Labov (1997, 2006).

as the disadvantaged American in Hochschild's story above. "Public narratives" relate to cultural and institutional stories, such as those of the family, the church, or the nation whose government's policies seemingly value immigrants above "true Americans". Finally, "metanarratives" are grand stories in which "we are embedded as contemporary actors in society". This model has been successfully employed in such studies as Montessori and López's (2015) analysis of multimodal political texts, placards, songs and slogans, displayed by the Spanish 15M movement.

An additional important contribution to research on narrative comes from studies of social media discourses, where Eisenlauer and Hoffmann (2010) have pointed to a number of crucial technological factors which influence the production and perception of online narratives, such as their frequent multimodality, fragmentation across multiple texts, non-linearity and interactivity.

The critical review of research on populism and politics on social media presented above leads to the formulation of this study's three predictions. (1) Trump's public Instagram narrative of a "great America" should include a nativist advocacy for closed borders, possibly as a major element. His repeated promises to build a wall on the border with Mexico, among others, suggest that anti-immigrant sentiment should be prevalent in Trump's Instagram posts (Kreis 2017, 611; Nixon and Qiu 2018). (2) Trump's often belligerent rhetoric would suggest an authoritarian emphasis on domestic security, law enforcement and maintaining a strong army (Mudde 2017, 4). (3) Trump's ontological narrative on Instagram should focus on his populist appeal, present him as a leader of the common people and emphasise his political outsider status (Wodak 2015, 11), while attacking Hillary Clinton for her position within the Washington establishment (Lakoff 2017, 597).

If these three elements appeared in Trump's Instagram posts, they would fulfil Mudde's (2007, 22–23) criteria of right-wing populism: nativism, authoritarianism and a dichotomous view of society as divided between "the People" and "the elite". Additionally, Trump may support the above by relying on his fame and success as a celebrity entrepreneur (Wodak 2015, 21).

The characteristics of Instagram as a medium carry their own implications for the content of Trump's campaign posts. Although in principle the platform is similar to the much-researched Twitter, with users following one another and posting content, Instagram is primarily a photo-sharing smartphone app with little focus on written text. This is evident in the application's user interface, where a large image taking up the majority of the screen is supplemented by a small caption below it. Considering these factors, the three features of RWP should surface primarily in the visual, rather than the textual mode. Lengthy passages of text outlining concrete policies are unlikely to appear, replaced instead by slogans, keywords and hashtags focused on positive self-presentation.

3. Triangulation of methods: DHA and visual grammar

As noted by Krzyżanowski and Tucker (2018, 145), the characteristics of social media communication, namely the brevity, volume and linguistic irregularity of messages, challenges established theories and analytical approaches. This challenge is very much true for a language-oriented platform like Twitter, but its scale becomes all the more evident when studying an image-based platform such as Instagram. Although Krzyżanowski and Tucker emphasise that the role of language is central to political communication on social media, the visual element may take precedence on platforms such as Instagram. Traditionally logocentric approaches within CDS may offer insufficient analytical tools if the full impact of a multimodal text is to be grasped: on the one hand, in-depth analysis of language may be impossible; on the other, the prominence of the visual element in Instagram posts requires a set of tools designed specifically for the analysis of images. To alleviate these issues, the present analysis employs tools of the discourse-historical approach (DHA) supplemented by visual grammar developed by Kress and van Leeuwen (2006). The following section outlines the key concepts of this methodology.

Critical Discourse Studies is understood as an inherently interdisciplinary approach which investigates discursive practices situated in a socio-political context. Specifically, its focus is often on institutional, political and media discourses which express the relations of power that underlie the society. Rather than propose a single methodology suitable for the analysis of diverse discursive phenomena, scholars within CDS emphasise the need for methodological heterogeneity (Wodak 2001; Wodak and Meyer 2009).

Out of the range of critical methodologies, the discourse-historical approach is prominent for having been successfully employed in studies of political communication. DHA draws special attention to the four levels of context in which texts are situated: the text-internal co-text; intertextual relationships; institutional and sociological context of the situation; and the broad socio-political and historical context. Such an approach reveals interdiscursive allusions and implications, all of which reflect the discursive intentions of social actors (Reisigl and Wodak 2009; Reisigl 2018). DHA studies involve considerable background research on the processes and actors involved, which shapes a more complete picture of the issue at hand.

In the initial semantic analysis which employs this approach, it is possible to group individual texts into intertextual networks of semantic themes: broad macro-topics and specific discourse topics which serve as a starting point to more

in-depth analysis (Reisigl 2018, 52; Krzyżanowski 2018, 289).² The three features of RWP described earlier are expected to be realised in the corpus as specific discourse topics. In this study, the in-depth analysis employs concepts from Kress and van Leeuwen's (2006) 'visual grammar'.

Although language is undoubtedly the dominant vehicle for ideology in political communication, images are just as capable of promoting an ideology. Visual grammar shifts Critical Discourse Studies towards a multimodal perspective. This social semiotic approach informed by Hallidayan systemic-functional principles recognises images as carrying a meaning of their own, one that is motivated by the image-maker's goals and influenced by social conventions. Kress and van Leeuwen (2006, 177) stress that this applies not only to images in isolation, but also to multimodal texts which comprise images and written text. Co-existing verbal and visual elements are more than simply a description attached to a photo or an illustration attached to a text; rather, these elements form an integrated, multimodal whole.

Visual grammar focuses on the relationship between 'represented' and 'interactive participants'. The former are subjects of images, while the latter include the producers and viewers of images. These two groups are subject to relations which are interconnected to a degree: by depicting the represented participant in a given way, the image-maker imposes on the viewer their own attitude towards the represented participant.

The relationship between the image-maker and the viewer, as mediated by the represented participant, is shaped by a number of dimensions. These are the coding categories used in the present paper in the in-depth analysis of Instagram posts. One of such categories is *gaze*. If the represented participant looks the viewer in the eye, direct contact is established. Depending on elements accompanying the gaze, such as gestures or facial expressions, a different *demand* is made of the viewer. A friendly smile demands a friendly reaction; a look of disdain demands a feeling of inferiority. If, on the other hand, no eye contact is made, the represented participant is *offered* to the viewer as an object to contemplate. Another category is the *size of the frame*. The image-maker may choose to represent participants as being closer to or further away from the viewer. This literal distance translates to social distance – the smaller the distance, the friendlier the relationship. The relationship is also shaped by *perspective*, realised on two planes: *horizontal* and *vertical*. On the horizontal plane, the viewer and represented participant may either face each other or be angled away from each other. This distinction decides whether the intention was to present a relation of involvement or detachment; being part of the in-group or being the "other". The vertical plane, on the other

2. Krzyżanowski (2018) uses the terms *thematic thread/area* and *theme/topic* which I consider to be equivalent to Reisigl's (2018) *macro-topic* and *discourse topic*.

hand, represents power relations. Viewing the represented participant from a high angle puts the viewer in a position of power. Should the positions be reversed, the represented participant would be shown as having power over the viewer. The two could also be situated at eye level, prompting a relation of equality.

Apart from the representation and interaction of participants, the composition of an image can also influence its meaning. Specifically, composition in visual grammar is realised in three coding categories: *spatial distribution*, *saliency*, and *framing*. On the horizontal plane, elements placed on the left are *given*, while those on the right are *new*. The given is to be understood as the commonsensical starting point, while the new is unknown and requires greater focus from the viewer. On the vertical plane, the elements situated at the top are *ideal*, the general essence of information, and those at the bottom are *real*, specific and practical. If images occur with text, the positioning of the text above the image suggests that the image serves as evidence for the dominant text. In a reversed composition, the primary ideological function is served by the image, with the text specifying or supporting it. Spatial distribution refers also to the *centre – margin* relationship, with elements in the margins seen as dependent on the crucial information in the centre.

Another category of composition is saliency, which creates a hierarchy of importance. It cannot be objectively measured, but is rather perceived intuitively by the viewer on the basis of multiple factors: size, focus, tonal and colour contrast, placement, perspective, as well as cultural preference. The final category which defines composition, framing, is best described as the degree to which the different elements represented in a multimodal text are separated. A group of people, for example, may be represented in a single group photo, which focuses on their close relationship, or as a collection of individual photos, stressing the differences between them.

The triangulation of methods of DHA and coding categories of visual grammar results in a method of analysis which may be summarised in five steps (Table 1).

Table 1. Method of analysis

Step 1	Collection of Instagram data.
Step 2	Semantic analysis of macro-topics and discourse topics (Reisigl 2018; Krzyzanowski 2018).
Step 3	Coding of gaze, size of frame, perspective, spatial distribution, saliency, framing (Kress and van Leeuwen 2006).
Step 4	Analysis of visual and textual layer of selected posts.
Step 5	Drawing of conclusions from the two analyses regarding the whole of the Instagram narrative.

4. Data collection and analysis

This study employs qualitative critical analysis of multimodal Instagram posts. The initial semantic analysis reveals general discourse topics present in the corpus, while the in-depth analysis which follows allows for a detailed deconstruction of selected individual posts representing these topics. The primary focus is on the composition of images, which are the key ideological carriers in Instagram posts, rather than on a thorough linguistic analysis, as the word count characteristic of most Instagram posts is rather small – ranging from 12 to 53 words per post in the examples presented here.

The Instagram posts analysed in this study belong to the timeframe of the 2016 presidential campaign in its narrow sense – from Donald Trump's official acceptance of the Republican nomination on July 21 to Election Day on November 8. During this period, 381 posts appeared on Trump's official Instagram account. This study focuses on still images and written text, hence the 51 posts which included videos were excluded from analysis. Therefore, the analysed corpus consisted of 330 posts. They were collected manually on the official Instagram smartphone app to ensure that the corpus is an authentic reflection of the posts as they would be seen by a typical Instagram user. For better legibility, elements of the app's user interface, identical for all collected posts and with no impact on the analysis, were trimmed in the reproductions below.

Table 2. Macro-topics and discourse topics of the analysed corpus of Instagram posts

Macro-topic	Discourse topic	Number of tokens
Self-presentation	Man of the People	173
	Patriotism	111
	Campaign trail	93
	Family	65
	Election polls	49
	Attack on Hillary Clinton	32
	Business success	4
Policy	Security	61
	Economy	26
	Anti-immigration	5

The initial semantic analysis validated predictions outlined at the end of Section 2 to a varying degree (see Table 2; number of tokens, appearances of a discourse topic in the visual or verbal layer, amounts to more than 330 because of cross-tagging). As predicted based on characteristics of Instagram as a platform, the 'Self-presentation'

macro-topic dominates in the corpus, at the expense of the 'Policy' macro-topic. The two broad macro-topics include ten specific discourse topics.

The seven discourse topics within the 'Self-presentation' macro-topic clearly point to a candidate-oriented campaign, rather than a party-oriented one (Karlsson and Åström 2018, 309–310). Trump made only a single reference to the Republican Party in all 330 posts, thus constructing the attractive myth of a self-made man. Such a portrayal complements the most common discourse topic in the corpus, 'Man of the People' (Figure 1, cf. also Lakoff 2017, 599). Trump repeatedly took on the role of the leader of the People in their struggle to take power away from the establishment. He often displayed the scale of this movement and emphasised its grassroots character, while overtly or implicitly contrasting it with Clinton's establishment candidacy. All the while, Trump claimed to be the voice of those Americans who had been suffering while the elites abused the system. Trump's idea of the People appeared to be an inclusive one, with a number of posts dedicated to female, Black or Latino supporters. This inclusive populism spread across many of the other discourse topics, most notably 'Family' and 'Economy', where blue-collar workers were promised an improvement of their social standing.

Although the small number of posts emphasising Trump's success as an entrepreneur may come as a surprise, it should be interpreted against the 173 posts building Trump's populist persona. This appears to be a sensible attempt at avoiding the self-contradictory ontological narrative of a wealthy businessman claiming to represent the common American. Quite surprising, too, was the relatively low number of posts attacking Hillary Clinton. 13 of these can be found in close proximity to the three Trump-Clinton debates or the vice-presidential debate, suggesting that the Trump campaign attacked Clinton when she was in direct contact with the Republican candidate but refrained from doing so regularly. When criticism was directed at Clinton, it focused on her policies but also, as expected, used her political experience, voting record, and relationship to former president Bill Clinton against her. Within Trump's anti-establishment narrative, experience is effectively construed as a disadvantage.

A number of the discourse topics within the corpus may be interpreted as realisations of the features of RWP. The 'Campaign trail' (Figure 1) and 'Election polls' discourse topics were used as a means of legitimising Trump's populist appeal. Although these posts appear repetitive and straightforward at first glance, they serve the very important purpose of building the ontological narrative of Trump as a candidate who reaches out to voters across the nation, by almost literally marking his presence on the map via Instagram's location tagging feature. He is also presented as a candidate who has an actual chance of winning the election despite his outsider status. There was an additional, clear attempt during the campaign at bolstering the positivity of Trump's narrative by depicting him as a loving, and loved, family man.

The 65 posts in the 'Family' discourse topic, which were often reposted on Trump's account from the accounts of his family members, constructed a network of familial relationships and extended Trump's reach on social media (Figure 3).

The second of the key features of right-wing populism, authoritarianism, found its manifestation in the 'Patriotism' (Figure 2) and 'Security' discourse topics. Within the latter, Trump was favourably compared to Clinton as a trustworthy future Commander-in-Chief and generous defence spender. Between promises to defeat ISIS, meetings with national security advisers and endorsements from law enforcement officers, Trump attempted to create a "tough" image of himself as president-to-be. At the same time, 111 posts emphasised his patriotism, which was often visually expressed by Trump being set against, or standing next to, an American flag. The use of national symbols and the concept of patriotism, though ubiquitous in political campaigning, may be assigned specific values to achieve given aims with regards to a chosen audience, as Stoenner and Wodak (2016) have shown. In Trump's case, special attention was given to commemorating military-related anniversaries and former Republican presidents. The resulting narrative attempted to balance Trump's outsider position with admiration for persons and institutions which shaped the very establishment that Trump claimed to oppose.

Trump's nativist rhetoric, though prevalent in his public appearances, was not reflected in his campaign posts on Instagram, of which only 5 involved anti-immigrant sentiment. They expressed the need for building a wall on the border with Mexico and stricter immigration control in relation to radical Islam, as well as to Syrian refugees. Threats of terrorism and threats to "American values" in general would increase unless Trump was elected, the posts suggested. Although these posts do exhibit a nativist sentiment, their small number gives only partial support to the prediction that all three key elements of right-wing populist ideology would be deployed in Trump's posts. This may be interpreted as an attempt at mitigating Trump's negative and often criticised position on immigration. By largely avoiding this controversial subject, the dominant public narrative of Trump's inclusive populist movement can develop unencumbered.

In sum, Trump's Instagram campaign posts communicate a distinctly positive message. Rather than attack Hillary Clinton or immigrants, the posts emphasise Trump's positive qualities. The dominant ontological narrative of Trump as the leader of a populist movement is realised consistently – other discourse topics are employed in a way and to the degree in which they can support it. Hence, the possibly alienating 'Business success' topic is a minor one, the 'Economy' topic expresses support for blue-collar workers, 'Patriotism' balances on the thin line between admiration for the nation and admiration for the establishment, and 'Man of the People' mitigates Trump's nativist rhetoric in other media outlets, in an attempt to unite American voters of all social backgrounds.

Having established how discourse topics shaped the narratives of Trump's Instagram campaign, it is now possible to investigate whether the positivity of the campaign endures closer scrutiny. Three posts were selected for in-depth qualitative analysis. They represent the typical features of four discourse topics that appeared in the corpus most frequently: 'Man of the People', 'Patriotism', 'Campaign trail' and 'Family'.




Figure 1. 'Man of the People' and 'Campaign trail' discourse topic³

The post representing the 'Man of the People' and 'Campaign trail' discourse topics (Figure 1) shows a sea of people in which Trump is not immediately recognisable. In this case however, apart from the 'Trump-in-the-flesh' in the centre of the photo, visible if the photo were enlarged, there is also a representation of Trump on the screens above the crowd. While the first Trump is shown from the side, the other is shown from the front; the first can be observed from head to toe,

3. See: <https://www.instagram.com/p/BK6bYAnDsWd/?taken-by=realdonaldtrump>

the other from the waist up. Neither of the two Trumps, however, looks directly at the viewer of the image, the Instagram user. Rather, both closely observe from above the crowd gathered in the arena, the role model inspecting the ranks of his supporters. The screens, especially, serve a double purpose. Although they show Trump in closer framing in an attempt to decrease the social distance between him and the supporters, they also grant Trump the illusion of a near-Panoptical gaze. While such screens are typical of large sporting arenas, the omnidirectional display of Trump, the self-styled leader of his supporters, results in a position of dominance – not only over those around him in the arena, but also over the viewer.⁴ Additionally, the circular display below the four screens exhibits the ‘Make America Great Again’ slogan for everyone in the arena to see. Trump’s imposing presence demands attention, certainly from those attending the rally, if not necessarily from the viewer of the image.

The viewer appears to be left out of the Trump-People relationship – there is no attempt in the visual layer of the post at including the Instagram user as one of the People. We may observe the scale of Trump’s support but we are not encouraged to join it. Another salient element of the photo, the walkway extending from the bottom right corner to the central stage, acts as a dividing line between Trump and his supporters, a prominent reminder that Trump is the People’s leader, *primus inter pares* at best and autocrat at worst.

Unlike the photo, however, the caption does invite the viewer to support Trump: “This is a massive MOVEMENT! Join us today: www.DonaldJTrump.com #TrumpTrain #USA”. The reference to supporters as a movement is typically populist, it indicates the ‘grassroots’ nature of Trump’s candidacy, as opposed to the ‘corrupt elites’ supporting Clinton, the establishment candidate. The hashtag #TrumpTrain likens the movement to a near-unstoppable force capable of crushing its opponents. The hyperlink to Trump’s personal website would have been an excellent example of the intertextual nature of social media discourse; however, in the Instagram app it is impossible to click or copy hyperlinks included in captions. This oversight, repeated multiple times in the data collected, exhibits a lack of experience with the platform and consequently a distance from the young adult voter demographic which dominates Instagram’s user base (Smith and Anderson 2018).

The post in Figure 2, an example of Trump’s patriotic appeals to voters, includes a heavily edited image which contrasts with the candid snapshot of Figure 1. In this image, Trump is shown from the chest up and at eye level, facing the viewer, indicating personal distance and a friendly, inclusive attitude. Again, however, he does not make eye contact with the viewer. The vector beginning at his eyes is

4. I would like to thank the anonymous Reviewer 2 for drawing my attention to the physical context of the arena in the analysis of this example.

directed to the right of the viewer, towards the crowd he was presumably addressing. Another vector, his outstretched arm and the thumbs-up gesture, is aimed to the left of the viewer, also towards his supporters. The result constructs a mixed message: Trump is presented as open to potential voters viewing his Instagram posts, who may not share all of his beliefs, but prioritises the fervent supporters who attend his rallies.



Figure 2. 'Patriotism' discourse topic⁵

5. See: <https://www.instagram.com/p/BLRrMU8jRKJ/?taken-by=realdonaldtrump>

It is not the figure of Donald Trump, however, but the quote above him that is the most salient element. The white words, partly in bold, on distinctive blue stripes, the red line and the stars around the words “the United States” echo the American flag in the background. In the top-bottom composition, the words are *ideal*, while Trump is *real*. He figures as the physical representation of the words and the person who can fulfil the promise within them.

The caption underneath echoes the quote in the photo. Trump, set against the American flag, is presented as a devoted patriot. His sole motivation for running for office, the viewer is told, is his love for America and Americans, not personal gain. This is supported by the two hashtags, the second of which, #ImWithYou is a play on Hillary Clinton's own slogan, “I'm With Her”. In shifting the slogan so that it focuses on the People, Trump's motives for running for office are contrasted as honourable against Clinton's own, supposedly corrupt ones.

As is typical of populist discourse, the “citizens” and “American people” in the caption are unspecified groups (cf. Wodak 2017). The direction of Trump's gaze and gesture may suggest that only those who support him are included in this group, rather than, for example, children of immigrants or the, perhaps critical, viewer. Following that, it is possible to interpret “upholding the Constitution” as protecting those elements of it which are dearest to those whom Trump addresses. The thumbs-up, the look at the audience, the smile, all suggest that Trump is communicating to his supporters that it is specifically their well-being and their constitutional priorities that will be protected after his election, rather than those of the Other.

The last example is a ‘Family’ post (Figure 3). In this case, the image had been reposted from Donald Trump Jr.'s account, as indicated by the black bar in the bottom left corner and the caption “#Repost @donaldtrumpjr”. The Trump campaign made use of the intertextuality characteristic of social media and extended Trump's reach by spreading his message across multiple Instagram accounts belonging to his family or staff. At a number of occasions, such as here, posts from those accounts were shared on Trump's own official account and their contents can thus be interpreted as endorsed by him.

In the photo, Trump Jr. is surrounded by a distinctly diverse group of campaign volunteers (at least in comparison to the stereotypical “white middle-aged male” Trump supporter). The group is presented approximately from the waist up, at far personal distance from the viewer. They are at eye level, facing the viewer and making direct eye contact. Although Trump Jr. is at the centre, surrounded by supporters of his father he is no more salient than any other represented participant. The individuals are not separated from one another in any way, they resemble a band of friends. All these factors create a close relationship between the group in the photo and the viewer. The Instagram user is positioned as equal to

the group and invited to join the ranks of Trump supporters; their gaze demands of the viewer to feel sympathetic toward the volunteers and their cause. In this way, the post is different from those hitherto analysed. While Figure 2, at first sight at least, presented Trump in a friendly manner, there was a clear distance between him and the viewer. In Figure 3, there is no such distance. The difference, of course, is that Donald Trump himself is not present in the photo. Although Trump Jr. is a proxy for his father, he is not the ‘Man of the People’ himself, and so he is able to establish a closer relation with the viewer. In the absence of the distant authoritarian leader, as seen in the previous posts, the group invites the viewer in.



Figure 3. ‘Family’ discourse topic⁶

6. See: <https://www.instagram.com/p/BLt44wUj7xA/?taken-by=realdonaldtrump>

The Donald Trump account had the possibility of commenting on Trump Jr.'s original caption but chose not to – the only additions are the default “#Repost” hashtag and original poster's username. The noticeable differences between the two men's styles in the textual mode are consistent with the visual differences described above. The references to Colorado are a way of marking the campaign trail and appealing to supporters from that state, but in Trump Jr.'s post they are much more elaborate and personalized than similar attempts in Trump's original posts. The personal reference “It always feels like home going back to Colorado” is especially effective, much more so than the generic greetings of Trump's posts (e.g. “THANK YOU #COLORADO! Get out & #VOTE”). In addition, the use of multiple place-specific hashtags suggests a better understanding of social media in general.

5. Discussion and conclusion

The analysis above offers a relatively new perspective on RWP discourse. The triangulation of methods of DHA and visual grammar has produced a multi-level analysis which leads to a deeper understanding of the semantic potential of multimodal political narratives. The thematic composition of Trump's multimodal Instagram campaign suggests which areas were considered to be crucial to “restoring American greatness”. In the dominant ‘Self-presentation’ macro-topic, these areas emerged as specific discourse topics underlining the positive personal characteristics of Trump as prospective president, and as broad policy statements in the ‘Policy’ macro-topic. The overall positivity of the Instagram campaign was unexpectedly strengthened by the relative scarcity of posts attacking Hillary Clinton. Fundamental to Trump's public narrative was his populism, expressed as a desire to transfer power from the elites to the People. Trump was presented as the leader of an inclusive grassroots movement aiming to introduce positive change in the US. Other discourse topics, such as ‘Campaign trail’ or ‘Economy’ legitimised Trump as a populist, anti-establishment politician bringing about radical change and resolving the most pressing issues of common Americans. Closer analysis revealed, however, the superficial inclusivity of Trump's populism as represented in Instagram posts – his lack of authentic connection with the viewer both in the visual and the verbal mode.

Another important element of Trump's vision for America was the self-contradictory authoritarianism – Trump's ontological narrative balanced his meticulously constructed populism against an admiration for institutions of the establishment, such as law enforcement agencies. The ‘Security’ and ‘Patriotism’ discourse topics constructed a public narrative of a rigidly ordered society adhering to “American values”, further undermining the supposed inclusivity of Trump's “movement”.

The two elements of Trump's campaign narrative summarised above cover two key elements of right-wing populist ideology: authoritarianism and the populist, dichotomous view of society. The remaining element, nativism, realised in the 'Anti-immigration' discourse topic, was notably underrepresented in the data analysed. Against predictions, Trump's populism was presented as inclusive of different ethnicities and races, with few expressions of nativist sentiment. The uncivility characteristic of online discourses (Krzyzanowski and Ledin 2017) was largely absent in Trump's Instagram posts.

These findings stand in partial contrast with Trump's activity on Twitter, another social media platform, as analysed in Kreis's (2017) study of Trump's tweets in the first weeks of his presidency. Both accounts continued the general trend of top-down political communication on social media, treating the platforms as another unidirectional outlet, rather than as a means of dialogic communication with the public. The sole instances of Trump's account taking advantage of the technological affordances of Instagram were the 61 reposts from members of the Trump family or high-profile supporters, never from common Instagram users. Although both accounts employed strategies of positive self-presentation, only the Twitter account did so by outwardly othering groups such as immigrants. Finally, while the language of Trump's Instagram posts was not analysed in detail, the overall style of his communication on this platform was found to be less vernacular, simple or direct than it was on Twitter, resulting in greater social distance between the candidate and Instagram users.

Why should Trump's social media presence be so different on these two platforms? Perhaps this stems from the nature of right-wing populist discourse, which "always combines and integrates form and content, targets specific audiences and adapts to specific contexts" (Wodak and Krzyzanowski 2017, 476). However, as there are no significant demographic differences between the userbases of Instagram and Twitter (Smith and Anderson 2018), it might be the characteristics of the platforms that influence the messages, as proposed by Small (2018) in her analysis of Canadian political tweets which, unlike the politicians' websites, showed little negativity. It might well be the case that the multimodal form of Instagram posts is better-suited to positive campaigning, or that visual elements illustrating nativist arguments would appear as too alienating for Instagram users.

Alternatively, the overwhelming positivity of Trump's Instagram campaign may be neither the result of adjusting the content to the audience, nor of adjusting it to the medium, but of Trump's staff upholding an *internal cordon sanitaire*. Although RWP discourse in general has breached the *cordon sanitaire* (Littler and Feldman 2017) and entered mainstream media discourses, perhaps members of Trump's staff succeeded in "taking the phone out of his hand" and mitigating the nativism of his broader public narrative. While Trump is known for composing his

tweets himself, the higher level of technological competence required of Instagram users, as well as the professional nature of many photographs posted during the campaign, suggest that Trump did not personally manage his Instagram account in the time period subjected to analysis. Further research is needed to determine how successful such a mitigating approach to RWP discourse is in terms of electoral results. Although Trump's ontological narrative on Instagram presented a candidate more palatable to the non-radical voter, some of the authenticity that attracted Americans to Trump may have been lost in the process. If the appeal of (right-wing) populists rests on their direct, "uncensored" communication, then employing public relations officers to run polite, positive campaigns on social media might in fact be counterproductive.

Instagram as a platform for political communication certainly deserves further study. As it continues adding further features (such as "Stories" and livestreaming) and growing in terms of active users – at a faster rate than Facebook or Twitter (Smith and Anderson 2018) – Instagram may see an increase in relevance in political discourse. Perhaps the hitherto unfulfilled promise of greater democratisation and interactivity between top-down and bottom-up political communication is not merely a matter of what social media allow us to do and how we use them, but also of who uses them. Soon after being elected in late 2018, the Democratic Congresswoman Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez showcased her social media fluency by livestreaming herself cooking in her kitchen while chatting and discussing policy issues with other users, who commented on the livestream in real time. Such authentic engagement has earned her much praise, and possibly signalled an approaching shift in how social media are employed by politicians. Perhaps the full potential of social media, and especially of heavily multimodal platforms such as Instagram, may yet be realised by Millennial politicians.

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Paper 2. Ideological shift in interpreted parliamentary speeches: Conference interpreter as meaning co-constructor (Dobkiewicz, in press)

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Ideological shift in interpreted parliamentary speeches: Conference interpreter as meaning co-constructor

Abstract:

Studies of interpreted political discourses in multiple contexts and language combinations have shown interpreters mitigating or intensifying ideologically loaded source texts. This article employs methods of the Discourse-Historical Approach to analyse ideological shifts between source texts and target texts across the left-right political spectrum. Qualitative analysis of a set of English-language European Parliament speeches and their interpretations into Polish identifies a variety of linguistic means through which the ideological load of source text references to political actors and phenomena may be weakened or strengthened. The results of a quantitative analysis point towards verb phrases being more susceptible to ideological shift than noun phrases, while the relationship between ideological shift and political orientation of the speaker requires further study. This paper contributes to the growing body of research highlighting the ideological and discourse-constructive potential of interpreters.

Keywords: ideological shift, conference interpreting, political discourse, European Parliament, Critical Discourse Studies

1. Introduction

The crucial role that written translation and interpreting play in global, multilingual societies is perhaps most evident in the world of politics. In international organisations such as the European Union, real-time debates between participants speaking in their different native languages are made possible by simultaneous interpretation. The interpreters themselves have been traditionally perceived as “clear conduits”, almost machine-like beings who switch the linguistic code between source text (ST) and target text (TT) but alter nothing in the meaning of the interpreted speech (e.g. Jones 2002: 4; Gile 2009: 53).

Although this view of the profession persists in interpreter training (e.g. Gile 2009), institutional guidelines (Seeber & Zelger 2007) and the public perception (Diriker 2011), an increasing number of researchers has been exploring ideas of interpreter agency (e.g. Diriker 2004; Monacelli 2009), understood as the (self-)awareness of interpreters’ active participation in meaning-making, as opposed to mere “recoding” of messages. More recent

studies have drawn attention to a possible direct influence of interpreters on the meaning of the TT and, by extension, to their co-constructive role in political discourses. In studies of interpreted European Parliament discourse, Beaton-Thome (2013) has shown examples of “ideological negotiation of lexical labels”, while Bartłomiejczyk (2016; 2020) has pointed out interpreters’ tendencies to mitigate face-threatening speeches delivered by Members of the European Parliament (MEPs). Meanwhile, Gu and Tipton (2020) and Gao (2021) observed an opposite trend, of ideological intensification, in analyses of Chinese Premiers’ press conferences and their interpretations into English.

While the studies listed above examined individual speakers, debates or ideological positions, this paper builds on them by analysing source texts and target texts across the ideological spectrum in multiple European Parliament plenary debates. The analysis, rooted in the Discourse-Historical Approach (Reisigl & Wodak 2009; Reisigl 2018), investigates whether ideological shifts can be observed between ideologically loaded nomination and predication tokens (linguistic realisations of nomination and predication strategies in the form of noun and verb phrases) in English ST speeches and Polish TT interpretations, and whether there is a correlation between the shift and the ideological orientation of the ST speaker. In particular, the focus is on two interrelated research questions:

(1) Do interpreters reproduce the meaning of ideologically salient ST tokens without any ideological shift, or do they mitigate or intensify them in the TT?

(2) Is there any systematic correlation between the ideological shift and the ideological orientation of the ST speakers?

2. Conference interpreting and interpreter agency

The notion that interpretation is not performed in a contextless void by contextless interpreters has been explored since at least the 1970s. The *theorie du sens* developed by Danica Seleskovitch expanded the integration between interpreting and cognitive science, and in doing so replaced machine-like, linguistic transcoding with deverbilized meaning transfer as the widely-accepted primary process in interpreting (Pöchhacker 2004). If communication between two parties is understood as transmission and interpretation of subjective mental models (van Dijk 2018), the inclusion of a third party, the interpreter,

between them introduces an intermediate stage at which meanings can be altered. This assumption has opened up avenues of exploring interpreters as meaning (co-)constructors, not just conduits. However, despite the paradigm shift in Interpreting Studies and our growing understanding of human communication in general, interpreter agency remains an understudied issue. Even if the meaning-constructing potential of interpreters is acknowledged by researchers, such as in Seeber's and Zelger's (2007) exploration of the ethics of conference interpreting and alteration of source text meaning in the target text, interpreters still tend to be perceived as primarily "transmitters, not holders of information" (Seeber & Zelger 2007: 297).

This view of interpreting remains influential in interpreter training, where Gile (2009: 53) establishes that the "'neutral', 'transparent' or 'conduit' role" of the conference interpreter, although "somewhat idealized", "still deserves to be taught". Similarly, in institutional guidelines and professional codes, the role of the interpreter has been described as "neutral", "unobtrusive" and "invisible" (Setton & Dawrant 2016: 382), while faithfulness to the speaker is taken to be a matter of ethical conduct (Seeber & Zelger 2007: 291). This extends to the public perception of the profession. Schäffner and Bassnett (2010: 7-8) point out that when newspapers report interpreted or translated statements by politicians, any mention of the interpreter or translator is usually avoided. When the work of interpreters is acknowledged, the media "propagate a very rigid and restricted view of interpreting that foregrounds 'loyalty to the words of the speakers'" with praise and criticism of interpreters dependant on this "highly subjective yardstick" Diriker (2011: 34).

Such views appear to be at odds with how interpreters see their own work. Ethnographic studies such as Angelelli's (2004) and Duflou's (2016) explorations of interpreters' self-perception point to a growing awareness of agency among professionals working in the field. Monacelli (2009) investigated the issue of interpreter agency by focusing on the face-threatening nature of the activity. The characteristics of the profession demand from those who practise it constant negotiation of their own footing, with Monacelli (2009: 82) going so far as to claim that interpreters' "main loyalty (...) is ultimately to themselves and to the furthering of their professional capacity". In an experimental study that appears to support this claim, Warchał et al. (2011) found that trainee interpreters showed in-group loyalty in mitigating source text praise and criticism directed at the group to which the interpreters belonged.

Seeber's and Zelger's (2007) conclusion that interpreters do not serve as holders of information echoes the position of the European Parliament, displayed in the disclaimer on its multimedia archive website. Although the official position of the Parliament is that the "interpretation does not constitute an authentic record of proceedings" and that "only the original speech or the revised written translation of that speech is authentic"¹, the interpreting performed during plenary sessions must be recognised as part of the political debate in a broad sense. It is those interpretations that other MEPs react to during sittings, they are made publicly available to European voters, and they may be relayed further by the mass media, as pointed out by Bartłomiejczyk (2020: 9-10) in her analysis of mitigated racist language in the European Parliament.

3. Interpreting as discourse co-construction: Mitigation of radical political discourses

Building up on the initial explorations of the issue, a number of studies have continued to question the traditional model of the interpreter by analysing authentic interpreted political discourses. Among the earliest of such studies were Beaton-Thome's (2007; 2013) papers on European Parliament debates, the first of which focused on self-referentiality and lexical repetition in speeches interpreted from German into English. The author described examples of foregrounding, backgrounding, and repetition of key terms such as "the European Union", as well as extension of metaphor strings in the interpreted target texts, which she interpreted as strengthening of EU institutional discursive hegemony by interpreters. In the latter of the two studies, Beaton-Thome (2013) analysed lexical choices made in interpretations of plenary debates on the Guantanamo Bay camp. Her analysis of the online negotiation of ideologically loaded terms by interpreters suggested a hybrid ideological positioning – interpreters appeared to balance between the views expressed in the source text, the context of the wider debate and their personal positions.

European Parliament plenary debates were also analysed by Bartłomiejczyk (2016) in her extensive study of face-threatening acts. She found a variety of strategies that interpreters employed when source texts posed a threat to the recipients' face, with mitigation as the most common reaction to ST impoliteness. In two later case studies,

¹ <https://multimedia.europarl.europa.eu/>

Bartłomiejczyk (2020; 2021) focused specifically on racist and Eurosceptic discourses. In both, various approaches were observed when ideologically loaded language was interpreted, ranging from mitigation of the ST sentiment, through its preservation, to strengthening. Mitigation via omission of discriminatory terms, euphemisation and addition of hedges appears to be the most common approach among EU interpreters. While the degree to which such strategies are employed by interpreters deliberately is near impossible to determine when analysing records of authentic data, the resulting target texts may be noticeably altered in terms of ideological load.

Outside of the European Parliament, Gu and Tipton (2020) analysed press conferences of Chinese Premiers interpreted into English and found evidence of ideological intensification between ST and TT through increased self-referentiality. These results, which stand in opposition to those of Bartłomiejczyk's studies but share similarities with Beaton-Thome's (2007), may be strengthened by the specificity of the Chinese context, where government interpreters "are usually communist party members and are recruited into China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs" (Gu & Tipton 2020: 406). This appears to be further supported by Gao's (2021) analysis of interpreting at the 2016 "Summer Davos", where Chinese interpreters engaged in overt mitigation of anti-Chinese and intensification of pro-Chinese statements by foreign speakers.

Taken together, the findings of these studies underline the extent to which interpreters may co-construct discourses, the complexity of ideological processes that take place during interpreting and the critical role of the interpreter as an agent in mediated political discourse. The picture of the interpreter that emerges here is far from the "clear conduit" of traditional models, a position that is not without consequence in the area of politics. The following sections describe the collection of data and methods of their analysis to answer the question whether ideological shifts can be observed between ideologically loaded nominations and predications in English ST speeches and Polish TT speeches across the political spectrum, and whether there is a correlation between the shift and the ideological orientation of the ST speaker.

4. Dataset description and selection criteria

The parallel dataset analysed in this study comprises 49 plenary debate interventions in English and their 49 interpretations into Polish. The speeches and interpretations amount

to a total of 19,512 words, or 146 minutes and 5 seconds, of analysed speech: 11,320 words, or 72 minutes and 48 seconds, of source text speech in English, and 8,192 words, or 73 minutes and 17 seconds, of target text speech in Polish. Earlier studies of ideological shift in simultaneously interpreted political discourse involved datasets of oftentimes underspecified sizes: 74 minutes of interpreted contributions from 21 MEPs (Beaton-Thome 2007); unspecified volume of contributions and interpretations in two languages sourced from a single debate (Beaton-Thome 2013); unspecified volume of text from one speaker across three years (Beaton-Thome 2020); around 21,000 words of ST and unknown number of words of corresponding TT sourced from contributions of a single speaker over four years (Bartłomiejczyk 2020; 2021). While the datasets analysed in the earlier studies and in the present study are noticeably smaller than EPIC and related corpora of interpreted European Parliament discourse (Monti et al. 2005; Russo et al. 2012), they are all purpose-built in order to focus on specific linguistic phenomena (ideologically salient language) and time-sensitive discursive phenomena (e.g. Euroscepticism, contested discursive labels, far-right discourse), which considerably limits the possible volume of the datasets.

The speeches and their interpretations were obtained from the publicly available European Parliament multimedia archives as video files and transcribed by the author. The source text transcripts were based on the verbatim reports published in the archives while the target texts were transcribed directly from the video files. Transcription markers were only applied for phenomena which are of interest to this study as potential markers of interpreting problems, e.g. pauses and their duration, silent and voiced hesitations, false starts, self-corrections. The interpretations had been performed and recorded at the time of the plenary sittings and are the actual interpretations that were available to MEPs participating in the debates. Although the European Parliament multimedia archive does not supply any information about the interpreters providing their services during the published debates, they are understood to be experienced professionals who have undergone a demanding accreditation process and whose performance is periodically assessed (Duflou 2016).

The dataset includes 19 speeches that have been identified as delivered *impromptu* by the speakers, 26 identified as *read out* and 4 best described as *half-read* (cf. Defrancq et al. 2015: 201 on rarity of *impromptu* speeches in the European Parliament). Reading out a prepared text is considered to be one of the primary sources of problem triggers for interpreters due to the greater information density, grammatical and lexical complexity,

and, especially, the faster rate of delivery in comparison to impromptu speeches (Gile 2009: 192–193; Seeber 2017). While the average speech rate of 156.86 words per minute (wpm) in the dataset is above the threshold of 100-120 wpm historically cited as “comfortable” for simultaneous interpreting, it is within the boundaries of 150-160 wpm that recent studies have found to be the moderately challenging norm for interpreters in international organisations (cf. Seeber 2017: 78–80 for an overview of previous studies). The ST speech rate in the dataset should therefore not be considered as a major problem trigger for experienced interpreters.

Debates which could serve as potential sources of speeches to be analysed were selected on the basis of thematic criteria – all of them represented broad macro-topics (cf. Reisigl & Wodak 2009; Krzyżanowski 2018) characteristic of populist far-right discourse: migration, rule of law, and EU – Member State relations. The choice of topics was dictated by the high probability of MEPs across the political spectrum using ideologically loaded lexis when referring to key social actors and phenomena related to these topics. To ensure discursive relevance of the analysed speeches at the time of the compilation of the dataset, the speeches were sourced from the 2014-2019 European Parliament term.

The topics of all plenary debates in this term, as listed in the European Parliament multimedia archives, were examined to select debates within the macro-topics listed above. 384 such debates were identified, which was confirmed by a cursory reading of English-language speeches within the pre-selected debates. Debates with no contributions in English were discarded. The final selection of 49 speeches from 25 debates followed the principles of avoiding the repetition of speakers to avoid an undue influence of individual speaking style on the results of the analysis, as well as including a comparable number of native and non-native speakers. 23 of the speeches were delivered by native English speakers and 26 by non-native speakers of English.²

Crucially, a comparable number of speeches was selected for inclusion in the dataset from each political group active in the European Parliament during the 2014-2019 term (Table 1). This reflects the typical procedure in EP plenary debates, where a representative of each political group takes the floor at the beginning of every debate. Although the placement of European Parliament political groups on a left-right spectrum

² The status of native or non-native speaker of English was assigned based on the official languages of the speaker’s country of origin. While each of the non-native speeches was delivered by a different MEP, the native English speeches include two contributions from one speaker, for a total of 48 speakers.

has been noted as challenging due to their internal heterogeneity and dynamicity (McElroy & Benoit 2012: 151), studies of roll call votes (Hix & Noury 2009; Cherepnalkoski et al. 2016) as well as expert surveys of groups' policy positions (McElroy & Benoit 2012; Lo et al. 2014; Lefkofridi & Katsanidou 2018) have indicated clear ideological positioning of the groups on the left-right spectrum, as well as their high internal coherence. Table 1 reflects the typical left-right placement of political groups in the 2014-2019 European Parliament.

Table 1. Source texts and target texts in the analysed dataset. Political groups ordered from furthest left through centre to furthest right on the political spectrum.

Political group	Number of contributions	ST duration (min:sec)	ST number of words	TT duration (min:sec)	TT number of words	ST and TT duration (min:sec)	ST and TT number of words
GUE/NGL	7	8:15	1,227	8:17	934	16:32	2,161
Verts/ALE	7	10:56	1,711	10:57	1,178	21:53	2,889
S&D	6	8:38	1,363	8:45	960	17:23	2,323
ALDE	7	11:40	1,810	11:44	1,320	23:24	3,130
EPP	7	10:39	1,659	10:40	1,189	21:19	2,848
ECR	6	9:09	1,380	9:09	1,051	18:18	2,431
EFDD	7	11:33	1,833	11:45	1,351	23:18	3,184
ENF	2	1:58	337	2:00	209	3:58	546
Total	49	72:48	11,320	73:17	8,192	146:05	19,512

At least one contribution from each of the major groups on each macro-topic was included, thus allowing an analysis of ideologically loaded language typical of debates on these topics across the political spectrum. Europe of Nations and Freedom (ENF), the smallest political group in the analysed timeframe, with few English speakers, is underrepresented in the dataset. The two ENF speeches represent two of three of the macro-topics of interest: migration and EU – Member State relations. However, as a group

affiliating far-right, Eurosceptic and right-wing populist parties, ENF should be regarded as ideologically aligned with the larger Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD) group (Kantola & Miller 2021: 785). In further analysis, the contributions by members of ENF are therefore taken together with those of EFDD MEPs.

Non-Inscrits (NI) in the European Parliament, MEPs unattached to any of the political groups, have been excluded from the analysis. As a small, informal group whose composition fluctuated throughout the parliamentary term, NI are ideologically incohesive (Cherepnalkoski et al. 2016: 13) – their contributions to plenary debates may be more suitable for case studies of individual MEPs. NI have also been shown to have the highest rates of non-attendance and voting abstention (Cherepnalkoski et al. 2016: 25), and so may be considered as having less impact on the overall proceedings of plenary debates than MEPs attached to political groups.

5. Methodology and data coding

Within the heterogeneous discipline of Critical Discourse Studies, the Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA) has been successfully employed in analyses of political discourse. Its principles stem from the understanding of discourse as “text in context” which is both socially constituted and constitutive – it both shapes and is shaped by social practices (Reisigl 2018: 51). The primary focus of DHA analysis are discursive strategies and their linguistic realisations in texts – ways of self- and other-presentation and argument-building “adopted to achieve a particular social, political, psychological or linguistic goal” (Reisigl & Wodak 2009: 94). As such, the use of language by text producers is seen within DHA as intrinsically ideological. This study takes as its focal point the strategies of nomination and predication of social actors and phenomena that are central to the selected discourse macro-topics. Nominations and predications, as parts of “a more or less intentional plan of [discursive] practices” (Reisigl & Wodak 2009: 94), carry a salient ideological load – they express the underlying positioning of the text producer towards the social actor that they refer to. As two of the major loci of ideology in language, they have been examined over the last 30 years in studies of various social issues such as racist treatment of migrants, construction of national identities or European integration (see Reisigl 2018 for historical overview).

Nomination indicates how social actors, objects, events and processes are referred to linguistically – the realisations of this strategy usually take the form of noun phrases. The European Union, as a central actor in the dataset analysed here, may be referred to as “the EU”, “our shared space”, or “your already failed project”³. Predication indicates the characteristics assigned to social actors, objects, events and processes – in this study, verb phrases are analysed as linguistic realisations of this strategy. The European Union may be assigned such predications as “it has to use the means available”, “it is founded on human rights, civil liberties and freedoms”, or “it is not going to solve this issue”.

While DHA was not explicitly designed for comparative analyses of translated or interpreted texts, the basic principles of discourse-analytical approaches render them suitable for such purposes, as evidenced by the studies reported on in section 3 above. This extends to the analysis of two other discursive strategies, mitigation and intensification, or the modification of the illocutionary force of texts (Reisigl 2018: 52). Originally these strategies were analysed within-text; I analyse their execution between (versions of) texts – the source text and target text in an interpreted debate. The use of a parallel English – Polish dataset allows for a comprehensive, systematic analysis not only of the ideological load of ST and TT nominations and predications, but also of the possible ideological shift between them caused by mitigation and intensification.

This analysis follows a top-down approach, wherein an initial exploration of the dataset, informed by existing research of populist far-right discourse, led to the establishment of 13 categories of analysis. They reflect the key social actors and phenomena in populist far-right discourse topics: nominations (n_) and predications (p_) of the European Union (EU), EU policies (EUpol), European citizens (EUcit), Member States of the EU (MS), Members of the European Parliament (MEP) and migrants, as well as nominations of migration. Initially, the category p_migration was also included; however, only one linguistic realisation of this category was found in the entirety of the dataset. It was therefore excluded from the analysis.

Having established the 13 categories, the ST part of the parallel dataset was analysed for their linguistic realisations. A total of 1,054 tokens (linguistic realisations) were identified, 688 nominations and 366 predications. The TT part of the dataset was then

³ All examples are taken from the dataset analysed in the present paper. Square brackets indicate the author’s literal translation.

analysed for interpreted equivalents of the ST tokens. The comparative analysis of their ideological loads indicates whether the ideological load of a token is maintained (ST ideological load is realised without any ideological shift in the TT), mitigated (ST ideological load is weakened or removed in the TT) or intensified (ST ideological load is made more prominent or introduced in the TT). In practical terms, all three results may emerge from a variety of linguistic processes. A comprehensive overview of typical neutral, mitigated and intensified TT realisations may be found in Bartłomiejczyk's (2016) study of facework, later adopted to ideological shift (2021).

When deciding whether a token had been realised neutrally, mitigated or intensified, all tokens were analysed in the context of the speaker's entire contribution to the debate, the intertextual and institutional context of the given plenary debate, as well as the broader socio-political context (cf. Reisigl 2018: 53), with the starting point being the analysis of the linguistic expression itself, whose meaning and potential ideological implications are then situated in these broader contexts. This is especially important in the case of omissions and additions. The analysis of ideological shifts in the present paper takes as its primary focus the language of political speeches and their interpretations, not non-verbal performance aspects of either the ST or the TT. While modulation of pitch, volume or speech tempo may mitigate or intensify the rhetorical impact of a text (Reisigl & Wodak 2001: 83-84), the interpretation of phenomena such as extended pauses or false-starts in the TT is limited in this study to their role as indicators of TT production difficulties (Gile 2009: 163). In the examples analysed in the following sections, the ST transcript and TT transcript are followed by the author's literal back-translation of the TT into English in square brackets. The central analysed token is underlined. Phenomena such as pauses and hesitations are marked with angle brackets.

5.1. Qualitative analysis: Neutral TT renditions

In example (1) of a neutral TT rendition, the interpreter produces a close translation of the ST nomination of Member States. The ST speaker reads out a list of perceived faults of the EU counter-terrorism framework; the fragment quoted below comes at the end of this list. As indicated by the 3-second pause and the false start before producing the names of countries given by the ST speaker, the interpreter appears to be struggling with the

relatively rapidly delivered list of arguments. After the pause, the interpreter does reproduce the names accurately, and so does not alter the salience of this nomination.

(1) **n_MS ST** “lack of properly monitoring and defending EU external borders, especially not including countries like Romania, Bulgaria and Croatia, which defend the external borders, mainly, of the European Union”

n_MS TT “brak właściwego monitorowania i ochrony granic unijnych, szczególnie <pause 3s> nie, nie mówiąc o tych państwach takich jak Rumunia, Bułgaria czy Chorwacja, które bronią granic zewnętrznych Unii”

[lack of proper monitoring and protection of Union borders, especially [pause 3s] not, not to mention these countries like Romania, Bulgaria or Croatia, which mainly defend the external borders of the Union]

Similarly, in example (2), the TT realisation of a Member State predication is neutral. The fragment below sees a Eurosceptic MEP criticising the proposed border control regulation system by claiming that biometric data collected from EU citizens could be mishandled by the EU. Using strongly negative language, he refers to unspecified Member States as being corrupt and unworthy of EU citizens’ trust. The rhetorical force and ideological load of modifiers used by him in the underlined passage is maintained in the TT.

(2) **p_MS ST** “the biometric data can be accessed by all EU countries, as well as those crime agencies. Now some of those countries are deeply and institutionally corrupt and untrustworthy. and the EU has been building its legal institutions and crime agencies for some years”

p_MS TT “dane biometryczne będą mogły być wykorzystane przez wszystkie kraje unijne i ich organy ścigania, niektóre z tych krajów są głęboko, instytucjonalnie skorumpowane i niewiarygodne. I Unia Europejska buduje swoje instytucje prawne i organy ścigania od kilku lat”

[the biometric data will be able to be used by all union countries and their law enforcement agencies, some of those countries are deeply, institutionally corrupt and untrustworthy. and the European Union has

been building its legal institutions and law enforcement agencies for some years]

5.2. Qualitative analysis: Mitigated TT renditions

In example (3) below, two mitigations may be observed in one short fragment of text. The speaker, a populist far-right MEP, took the floor during a debate on radical right-wing violence in Europe but referred also to violent actions of far-left groups, while pointing to the EU as the cause of all extremist violence in Europe. In the quoted fragment, the speaker stated that parties like his own UKIP had warned European institutions about the consequences of migration from third countries into the EU. He refers to incoming migrants using a hyperbolic phrase which appears to have the aims of inflating the scale of the issue being discussed and the associated threats, thus strengthening the speaker's negative evaluation of migrants. In the TT, the negative modifier "unlimited number of" is omitted, thus mitigating the ideological load of the phrase, and of the larger text. Omission has been widely described as a typical coping tactic employed in interpreting (Jones 2002: 102; Gile 2009: 210). Under the intense cognitive load that accompanies the process of interpreting, fragments of the source text may remain unrealised in the target text. The first in line for omission will be those elements which could be considered as "illustrative or in some other way accessory" (Jones 2002: 102) for the communication of the primary ST argument: modifiers, adjectives, adverbs, repetition – potential signifiers of ideological load, as is the case in this example.

Another mitigation in this fragment concerns the nomination of EU citizens which is semantically generalised in the TT, with the result being a removal of positive characterisation assigned in the ST. The speaker makes reference to the possible competition between incoming migrants and "ordinary working people" for workplaces. This nomination of European citizens, characteristically for populist politicians, assigns positive characteristics to "the common people" and pits them against "the other" (Mudde 2017: 4). In the TT, however, the nomination is generalised to "the locals". Although the referents are the same as in the ST, they are stripped of the positive traits assigned by the original speaker.

(3) **n_migrant; n_EUcit ST** “the EU has ignored so-called populist parties like UKIP, Five Star and the Swedish Democrats, and they leave the doors open to unlimited number of people competing for jobs with ordinary working people”

n_migrant; n_Eucit TT “Unia ignoruje tak zwane partie populistyczne jak UKIP, Pięć Gwiazd, Szwedzcy Demokraci, i to były [sic] otwarta furka do tego, że ludzie mogli konkurować o miejsca pracy z miejscowymi”

[the Union has ignored so-called populist parties like UKIP, Five Star, Swedish Democrats and it were an open wicket gate for people being able to compete for workplaces with the locals]

Figurative language has been shown to be a significant problem trigger for interpreters. Studies of its use in the European Parliament show a tendency among interpreters of greater hesitation, hedging and paraphrasing when encountering metaphorical expressions (Spinolo & Garwood 2010). This may result in mitigation of ideologically salient language, as in example (4). The underlined nomination used during a debate on Brexit reveals the speaker’s intensely negative opinion of the European Union. Through the use of a metaphorical expression, “your already failed project”, the speaker is able to produce a rhetorically impactful statement. Although the source text is delivered at a pace that is average for the dataset, the interpreter appears to struggle with the production of the TT, pauses for 4 seconds and introduces hedging before producing a demetaphorised EU nomination – the formal name, “European Union”. The resulting TT token is, therefore, mitigated in relation to the ST due to a total loss of ideological load. The second underlined token follows immediately and is a predication of the European Union. The speaker states that the lack of a post-Brexit trade deal with the United Kingdom would be disastrous for the EU – it “will certainly go bankrupt”. In the TT, the modifier “certainly” is omitted, while the modal verb is realised as “may”. These two changes weaken the negative evaluation of the European Union and its actions – the ideological load of the token is visibly mitigated.

(4) **n_EU; p_EU ST** “therefore, Mr Juncker, back off and start working on a decent trade deal. A deal without trade, without trade with the UK, your already failed project will certainly go bankrupt”

n_EU; p_EU TT “trzeba popracować nad przyzwoitym porozumieniem handlowym. <pause 4s> no, bez handlu z Wielką Brytanią, Unia Europejska może zbankrutować.>”

[a decent trade agreement must be worked on <pause 4s> well, without trade with Great Britain, the European Union may go bankrupt.]

5.3. Qualitative analysis: Intensified TT renditions

Intensification, although less common in the analysed dataset than mitigation, can also be observed in a variety of linguistic phenomena. In example (5), a left-wing speaker’s contribution to a debate on the rule of law in EU Member States is closely translated by the interpreter up to the underlined predication of EU citizens. The speaker attempts to position herself as a direct link between Europeans and the European Parliament by calling on other MEPs to act in cases of abuse of the rule of law. However, while the ST token assigns the verb “want” to Europeans, the interpreter uses “expect” in the TT token. The shift from a wish to an expectation strengthens the rhetorical force of the predication and may be read as ideological intensification of the token.

(5) **p_EUcit ST** “they’re waving EU flags because they are addressing us, because rule of law and fundamental rights are under attack in many Member States in the European Union, they want to see action from our side”

p_EUcit TT “machają unijnymi flagami, bo zwracają się do nas, bo praworządność i prawa podstawowe są atakowane w wielu państwach członkowskich Unii Europejskiej. Ludzie oczekują od nas działania”

[they’re waving union flags because they are addressing us, because the rule of law and fundamental rights are being attacked in many Member States of the European Union. People expect action from us]

While the EU nomination in example (4) was an instance of ideological mitigation through demetaphorisation, the nominations of migration and migrants in example (6) show how tokens may be ideologically intensified by interpreters' use of figurative language. Below is a fragment of a speech delivered during a debate on EU asylum policy. The first of the underlined nominations, "a free-for-all" is a conventional metaphorical expression which originated in sports – the speaker indicates that migration into the EU under current rules is a chaotic, negative phenomenon and requires stricter control. In the TT realisation of this nomination, the metaphorical target domain is changed from SPORTS to MENTAL HEALTH – the word "madness" assigns to migration more strongly negative characteristics than in the ST and intensifies the anti-migration sentiment of the token. In the second of the underlined tokens below, a metaphorical expression is introduced in the TT where there was none in the ST. In place of the ST nomination "huge amount of people" referring to migrants, the interpreter introduces "such an influx", a phrase employing the dehumanizing WATER metaphor which is among the most stereotypically used in negative representations of migrants in racist discourse (Reisigl & Wodak 2001: 59). By strengthening the anti-migrant sentiment in the first token and introducing it in the second token, the overall ideological load of this fragment is intensified in the TT.⁴

(6) **n_migration; n_migrant** ST "because right now, it's a free-for-all, and all that's happening is that countries that have opened up their borders, like Germany, have realised that they can't cope with this huge amount of people, and are now trying to force these people onto other nations, like Hungary and Poland"

n_migration; n_migrant TT "ponieważ jak na razie, teraz, jest to szaleństwo. I co się dzieje? Kraje, które otworzyły swoje granice, jak Niemcy, nagle zorientowały się, że nie są w stanie sobie poradzić z takim napływem, i teraz chcą zmusić do tego inne kraje, takie jak Węgry i Polskę"

[because for now, currently, it is madness. And what is happening? Countries that have opened up their borders, like Germany, have suddenly

⁴ Few studies have explicitly explored how interpreters approach metaphorical and creative language (e.g. Viaggio 1996; Beaton-Thome 2007; Spinolo & Garwood 2010; Spinolo 2018). Since metaphor is a crucial tool in political discourse which "activates unconscious emotional associations" and helps politicians "tell the right story" (Charteris-Black 2011: 28), ideological shifts when interpreting metaphorical language carry a high potential of meaning alteration.

realised that they are unable to cope with such an influx, and now they want to force other countries to do it, like Hungary and Poland]

The examples analysed in this section present a variety of linguistic realisations of maintained, mitigated and intensified ideological load between ST and TT tokens. An analysis of authentic texts separated from their producers cannot lead to conclusions about the motivations for ideological shifts with any degree of certainty. However, be they the result of interpreters' coping tactics or more deliberate TT alterations, they carry a discursive potential of altering the text recipient's perception of the text's ideological load.

5.4. Quantitative analysis: Nominations and predications

In total, 1,054 tokens, 688 nominations and 366 predications, were subjected to qualitative analysis (Table 2). A majority of all ST tokens (558, 52.94%) underwent an ideological shift in the TT, with mitigation (425, 40.32%) being more common than intensification (133, 12.62%). A chi-square test of independence showed a significant association between the type of token (nomination or predication) and TT realisation, $\chi^2 = 35.483$, $df = 2$, $p < 0.001$. When only nomination tokens are analysed, positive correlation is observed with the neutral realisation, with 369 neutral tokens (53.63%), and 319 shifted tokens: 248 mitigated (36.04%) and 71 intensified (10.32%). This general tendency in interpreted nominations stands in contrast to the TT realisations of predications. Positive correlation is observed with mitigation (177, 48.36%) and intensification (62, 16.94%), while the correlation with neutral realisation (127, 34.70%) is negative. The result for predication tokens appears to align with those of previous studies of European Parliament discourse, indicating a tilt towards mitigation in target texts.

Table 2. TT realisations of all tokens.

	Shift			Total
	Neutral	Mitigated	Intensified	
Nomination	369	248	71	688
Predication	127	177	62	366

Total	496	425	133	1,054
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5.5. Quantitative analysis: Far-right, centrist and far-left source texts

As indicated in section 4, the character of European Parliament political groups may complicate their assignment on a left-right political spectrum (see also Mudde 2019 on spreading of far-right national political parties over the EFDD, ENF, ECR and EPP political groups). To allow for a left-centre-right comparison of TT realisations (Table 3), the most radically left-wing (GUE/NGL) and right-wing (EFDD and ENF) political groups (McElroy & Benoit 2012: 156; Kantola & Miller 2021: 785) were selected for inclusion here. While establishing a political centre in the European Parliament is similarly challenging, the political group ALDE is taken to be the most typically liberal-centrist of the groups included in the analysed dataset (McElroy & Benoit 2012: 156; Lo et al. 2014: 216).

Table 3: TT realisations of far-left, centrist and far-right tokens.

	Shift			Total
	Neutral	Mitigated	Intensified	
Far left (GUE/NGL)	61	67	16	144
Centre (ALDE)	62	41	13	116
Far right (EFDD and ENF)	105	97	43	245
Total	228	205	72	505

Compared with the results for all 1,054 tokens (Table 2), far-right tokens appear to be interpreted less neutrally: 140, 57.14%, were ideologically shifted, against 558, 52.94% for all tokens. When far-right tokens were shifted, mitigation remained the more common

realisation, as was the case with the results for all tokens, but the percentage of intensified tokens was higher in comparison (43, 17.55% for far-right tokens; 133, 12.62% for all tokens). In the case of far-left tokens, the results show them to be ideologically shifted similarly frequently to the far-right tokens (83, 57.64%), with mitigation again the more common realisation. While the far-left and the far-right were similar in the distribution of neutral and ideologically shifted TT tokens, the centre appears to diverge. 46.55% of the centrist tokens, 54 tokens, were ideologically shifted in the TT dataset – less than in the case of either the far-left or the far-right tokens, and less than the 52.94% of ideologically shifted TT tokens in the entire analysed dataset. However, a chi-square test of independence showed that these associations of ideological orientation and TT realisation are not statistically significant, $\chi^2 = 8.0206$, $df = 4$, $p < 0.0908$.

6. Discussion of the results and conclusion

This paper aimed to answer two research questions: whether ideological shifts are present between the ideologically salient nomination and predication tokens in the source text and target text datasets, and whether there is correlation between the ideological shift and the ideological orientation of the source text speaker. The analysis of a parallel English – Polish dataset of European Parliament plenary debate speeches from across the political spectrum, grounded in the Discourse-Historical Approach and with a focus on references to key social actors and phenomena of contested populist far-right discourse topics, reveals intriguing patterns of ideological shifts. Such an approach to word- and phrase-level shifts in multilingual political discourse, although labour-intensive and time-consuming, affords the researcher an insight into semantic processes embedded in multiple levels of context that automated analyses would likely be unable to capture. Additionally, the inclusion of Interpreting Studies paradigms in the analytical framework enriches the analysis with insights based not solely on ideological processes, but also on the specificity of the task performed by interpreters – something that has arguably not been sufficiently accounted for in previous CDS studies of interpreted political discourse.

The qualitative analysis revealed a range of target text realisations of ideologically loaded language: neutral renditions, mitigation and intensification of source text nominations and predications, thus granting further support to the possible impact of linguistic phenomena observed by Bartłomiejczyk (2016; 2020; 2021). As in her studies,

mitigation emerges as the more common type of ideological shift, stemming from such TT processes as partial or total omission of a token, choice of less ideologically salient lexis, demetaphorisation or change of metaphorical domains.

Although ideological intensification on the scale observed in Gu and Tipton's (2020) or Gao's (2021) studies was not expected due to the considerable differences in the interpreting context and interpreters' positioning within it, a number of tokens were ideologically intensified in the TT dataset, caused by such changes between ST and TT as choice of more ideologically salient verbs, metaphorization or change of metaphorical domains.

Ideological shifts between source text and target text observed in a critical discourse study such as this should not be impulsively understood as intentional ideological work by interpreters. Factors specific to simultaneous interpreting, such as the near-unavoidable errors and constant high cognitive effort required for the task, render such a conclusion untenable. The results should, however, be evaluated for the meaning potential that a large volume of ideological shifts could carry with regards to the target text audience.

In the quantitative part of the analysis, a comparison of TT realisations of nominations and predications demonstrates that the former were rendered neutrally more often than the latter. The immediate explanation of this result appears to be that the interpretation of nominations posed a lesser challenge to the interpreters. A considerable portion of the nominations were proper names: names of Member States, various references to the European Union and its institutions. Although proper names are typically listed among problem triggers for interpreters (e.g. Gile 2009: 171), the proper names used in European Parliament debates are often repetitive, well known to the EP interpreters and available in supplementary documents. Be they names of countries, of pieces of legislation, or of Members of Parliament, interpreters are likely to encounter them repeatedly throughout their work, allowing for accurate, and neutral, interpretation.

In contrast to nominations, predications were ideologically shifted more often. This statistically significant result can be attributed to their relative interpreting difficulty. Where nominations were typical, familiar to the interpreter from experience and available in working documents, predications (verb phrases) were necessarily more unique, unexpected and creative – therefore more difficult to interpret. The increased difficulty was accompanied by a higher likelihood of interpreters resorting to coping tactics such as

omissions and generalisations, resulting in the ideological load of predications being shifted in the target text. The large number of ideologically shifted tokens is especially striking considering that the interpreters whose output was analysed are experienced professionals.

Although no statistically significant relation between TT rendition and ST ideological orientation was found in this study, the numerical trends evident in the analysed data suggest that the issue should be explored further using larger samples of data from various political groups. When TT renditions of far-left, centrist and far-right tokens were compared, the proportions of neutrally realised and ideologically shifted tokens were remarkably similar for the groups on either end of the ideological spectrum, while proportionally more of the centrist tokens were realised neutrally. The higher proportion of ideologically shifted left- and right-wing tokens may be explained by the salience of the ST ideological load. The political centre, as the nominally balanced option expressing measured views, appears to employ language that is less emotive or figurative, and therefore less difficult to interpret and less susceptible to ideological shifts. Far-left and far-right discourse appears to be more highly ideologically loaded, more creative, more figurative, more linguistically complex, more surprising for the interpreter – and therefore more prone to being ideologically shifted.

The results of this study demonstrate that ideological shifts due to interpreting are common across the political spectrum, regardless of the ideological orientation of the ST speaker. The findings are, however, limited by the relatively small size of the analysed dataset. Considering the wide range of contexts and linguistic means through which ideological shifts in interpreted political discourse occur, it is nonetheless safe to conclude that the role of interpreting in the co-construction of discourses is worthy of further study.

As Duflou (2016: 121) rightly points out, in the age of online streaming, the audience of EP plenaries has grown from the (often largely empty) rooms in Brussels and Strasbourg to potentially much larger audiences online. Interpreting at the EP has itself shifted from being “for the moment” to “for the ages” – of which both MEPs and interpreters must be acutely aware. After systematic, polished written translation of plenary debates was stopped by the European Parliament in 2012, the recordings of interpretations archived online have become the sole means of accessing parliamentary proceeding by international audiences. This has further increased the potential broader impact of

ideological shifts in interpreting, as the formerly ephemeral interpretations may now easily be accessed, dissected and reported on in the mass media.

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
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Paper 3. Source text ideological load modulates ideological shifts in interpreting right-wing and left-wing political discourse, but interpreters' political orientation does not (Dobkiewicz et al. 2023)

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Source text ideological load modulates ideological shifts in interpreting right-wing and left-wing political discourse, but interpreters' political orientation does not

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ABSTRACT

As the public sphere is undergoing a process of ideological radicalization, simultaneous interpreting has been explored as a potential factor in shaping multilingual political debates. This paper investigates the notion of ideological shift between source texts and target texts in interpreting – the weakening or strengthening of ideologically loaded language in political discourse. Research paradigms from Interpreting Studies and Critical Discourse Studies are combined to conduct an experimental study in which political speeches controlled for their ideological orientation are interpreted by experienced interpreters working in the English – Polish language combination. Additionally, the participants' political views are measured using the euandi 2019 questionnaire – a valid and reliable tool situating interpreters on the political spectrum. Initial assessment of linguistic strategies employed in target text renditions using tools of the Discourse-Historical Approach is followed by a quantitative analysis. The results indicate that highly ideologically loaded source texts, regardless of their ideological orientation, are shifted more often than those with a less salient ideological load. The political orientation of the interpreters themselves appears to have no significant effect on the presence of ideological shifts in target texts. These results contribute to the growing body of knowledge on interpreter agency and the pivotal role of the process of interpreting on discourse co-construction.

1. Introduction

Both institutional guidelines (Setton and Dawrant, 2016) and interpreter training resources (Setton and Dawrant, 2016; Jones, 2002; Gile, 2009) promote the vision of interpreters as clear conduits who transfer the meaning and the associated intentions and emotions of the source language text to target language text in a one-to-one manner. While this is the ideal that both practitioners and interpreter training programmes aspire to, there is a growing body of research showing that in political discourse, where interpreting is a necessary part of communication in multinational institutions, interpreters are not just clear conduits but conscious agents in a communicative act (see section 2.1). Considering that the political discourse is deemed to have been undergoing radicalization in recent years (as we show below in section 2.2), it is interesting to look at the interpreter's role and agency when confronted with ideologically loaded right-wing and left-wing source texts. Hence, the aim of the present paper is to investigate whether and how the ideological load of the source text and the interpreters' own political views

modulate the process of interpreting ideologically loaded phrases. This study creates a synergistic effect between Interpreting Studies and Critical Discourse Studies, a field that focuses on the study of discourse and language as a social practice. In this article, we use the tools of a critical approach to discourse to analyse interpreting. The novelty of our approach is twofold: first, it is based on an experiment in which ideological load is carefully manipulated and controlled; second, it is the first study to date that also includes the interpreters' own political views as a potential modulating factor. Thus, in the present study we focus on two variables that may influence the faithfulness of interpreting speeches similar to those delivered and interpreted during plenaries at the European Parliament, i.e., the ideological load of the source text and the interpreters' political orientation. In order to explore this issue, we have conducted an experiment in which experienced professional conference interpreters working in the English-Polish language combination interpreted a series of speeches controlled for their ideological load: left-wing, neutral, and right-wing. The resulting target texts were analysed for ideological shifts using the Discourse-Historical Approach

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(DHA) (Reisigl and Wodak, 2009), a set of methods from Critical Discourse Studies. Additionally, the participants' political orientation was measured using the euandi 2019 questionnaire (Michel et al., 2019), which situates their political views on a two-dimensional political spectrum.

This study uses product data (discourse-based analysis of interpreters' renditions) to extend our knowledge about the process of interpreting. The interpreting product is analysed to see if it manifests ideological shifts that occur in the interpreting process, and we hope to shed more light on the nature and sources of these shifts.

The results show that the interpreters' political orientation does not modulate ideological shifts in interpreting right-wing or left-wing discourse, but the source text ideological load does. In the following sections we will first present the theoretical frame for the discussion of the concept of interpreters as clear conduits, present our understanding of the notion of the ideological load derived from Critical Discourse Studies and embed our research in the literature on interpreters' agency. Then we will proceed to the presentation of our study, its design, procedure, results and implications.

1.1. Interpreters as clear conduits or active participants of a communicative event

The traditional view of interpreters as "clear conduits" implies a strictness in recoding the source text (ST) message into the target text (TT) language with virtually no alterations to the content of the interpreted speech (Jones, 2002; Gile, 2009). It prioritises accuracy and neutrality above all other aspects of an interpreter-mediated communicative event and places the interpreter in a position where they are both indispensable and invisible in communication between parties. Such a perception of interpreters "features prominently in most published codes of interpreter ethics" (Setton and Dawrant, 2016), such as those of the ASTM standards organisation in the US, or is "apparently taken for granted" (Setton and Dawrant, 2016) in others, like that of the International Association of Conference Interpreters (AIIC). Interpreters' neutrality dominates the broader public understanding of the profession (Diriker, 2011), to the point that their work usually remains unmentioned in mass media reports of interpreter-mediated events (Schäffner and Bassnett, 2010).

Although acknowledged as "somewhat idealized" (Gile, 2009), the neutral role of the interpreter continues to have an impact on interpreter training as well. Setton and Dawrant (2016) list neutrality and fidelity among their "key (near-)universal principles" of conference interpreting. Apart from contexts such as diplomacy or business, where interpreters are generally accepted as being an extension of the interested parties, the interpreter is expected to provide their services neutrally and accurately to all participants in a mediated communicative event. Withholding personal opinions and viewpoints in interpreting "must be instilled from 'day one' of professional training" (Setton and Dawrant, 2016); at the same time, the rejection of an assignment based on morals or personal preference is considered to be justified (Setton and Dawrant, 2016). Ultimately, then, although the professional neutrality instilled in them and expected of them should ensure the interpreter's impartial performance, "there can be no 'ideal' transparent conduit, despite our best intentions and efforts" (Setton and Dawrant, 2016).

To illustrate the complexity of faithfulness in simultaneous interpreting, Seeber and Zelger (2007) proposed the VSI model of truthful rendition. In it, they posit that all source texts comprise verbal, semantic and intentional information (hence the name of the model); the apparent decision by an interpreter to alter the message they are conveying is, in this model, an ethics-based choice to prioritise one of these three components with the aim of arriving at a "truthful rendition" of the source text. If, for instance, a speaker has produced a turn of phrase that the interpreter considers as potentially, although unintentionally, offensive for the listener, they may make the decision to omit the phrase, thus prioritising the intentional component over the verbal component.

While this might appear to be an inaccurate rendition of the source text at first, the interpreter makes this decision in order to maintain accuracy of the speaker's intention. Such a split-second decision is an instance of the complex mental processing that simultaneous interpreting entails, as well as an example of the greater agency that interpreters have as compared to what has been suggested in traditional models.

Indeed, a number of studies have attempted "to move towards an understanding of the interpreter as an agent who occupies an ideological space of his/her own" (Beaton-Thome, 2015). Monacelli's (2009) analysis of source text and target text transcripts followed by interviews with interpreters indicated a range of self-regulatory behaviours on the part of the interpreters, which modify language that could threaten the face of the parties involved in the communicative event – their positive and unconstrained self-perception in a social context.¹ By omitting or weakening source text language that could be deemed inappropriate in a given context, the resulting target texts can be mitigated by interpreters in terms of illocutionary force. Bartłomiejczyk (2016) has expanded the body of knowledge on interpreters' approaches to face-threatening language with her study of interpreted debates in the European Parliament. She observed multiple examples of mitigation of face-threats, by such means as the addition of hedging to impolite language or the complete omission of directly offensive addresses to listeners. On the other hand, though less commonly, interpreters may also strengthen source text face-threats, for instance by adding upgraders like "of course". Such interventions should not automatically be seen as intentional, however: whether a face-threat is mitigated, intensified or rendered unaltered could depend on interpreters' deliberate modification, but it could also be an unintentional effect of specific word choices or, crucially, an unintended result of interpreting tactics which lessen the cognitive load affecting interpreters.

The apparent tendency of interpreters to distance themselves from face-threatening texts was also shown to affect the output of trainee interpreters in an experimental study by Warchal et al. (2011), where participants mitigated source texts which praised or criticised the group to which the interpreters belonged. Also, in contrast with the clear conduit model, ethnographic research has attempted to position interpreters within the communicative event as co-participants and co-creators of discourse. Angelelli (2004) urges acceptance of the socially situated nature of interpreting, as well as the social and power relations that stem from this fact. Practitioners in all settings have been shown to take on active roles as agents, siding with parties whose communication they enable and expressing emotions, "making it almost implausible to state that they can be value-neutral or impartial" (Angelelli, 2004). These conclusions were strengthened by Dufrou's (2016) survey of interpreters working in European Union institutions, whose performance is embedded not just in the context of the immediate interpreting task, but also in broader institutional and discursive contexts. As professionals working within a community that adheres to specific guidelines and standards, the range of interpreting tactics which they employ is guided by historical precedent in the EU, as well as by their cooperation with other interpreters.

Taken together, these studies paint a picture of the interpreter that is far more complex than the "clear conduit" metaphor suggests. As active participants in communicative events, interpreters find themselves in a unique position that allows them to alter the shape of a debate, even if their training and professional expectations imply otherwise. Whether

¹ The notion of "face" as understood in this article is derived from Brown and Levinson's (Brown and Levinson, 1987) theory of politeness, inspired by the work of Erving Goffman and originating in Chinese culture. Brown and Levinson define face as "the public self-image that every member [of a society] wants to claim for himself" and distinguish two types of face: positive and negative. The first type refers to the desire for others' approval in social interactions while the second to the desire for one's actions to be unimpeded by others.

such interventions are intentional or not, they may have far-reaching consequences on broader discourses, for instance in a political context.

1.2. Radicalization of political discourse

The process of interpreting of political discourse does not take place in a vacuum. It is rather embedded in the public sphere, which, in recent years, has been undergoing radicalization (Krzyżanowski, 2020; Lamour, 2022). Populism viewed as a “mode of political expression” (Rydgren, 2017; Moffitt, 2016) promotes distrust in the elites (Hawkins, 2009), for example in the European Union institutions (Glencross, 2020; Reiser and Hebenstreit, 2020). Linguistically, it is often expressed through the Manichaean dichotomy between “us” and “them”, which in populist discourse may be specified as an antithesis between “the people” and “the elites”, “one described as good, innocent, and hard-working, the other as bad, corrupt, criminal, lazy and unjustly privileged” (Wodak, 2017). Populist right-wing parties stand in opposition to the values of liberal democracy, such as the rule of law, minority rights, and separation of powers (Mudde, 2007, 2019). They foster ethnonationalism and xenophobia through highly ideologically loaded discourse as has been shown, among others, for Hungary (Barát, 2017), and the USA (Kreis, 2017; Montgomery, 2017; Dobkiewicz, 2019).

To give an example, Pauline Hanson, the founder and leader of the Australian right-wing populist party One Nation, in constructing the dangerous “Other” used intensification strategies by referring to “indiscriminate immigration” and “aggressive multiculturalism”. The adjectives “indiscriminate” and “aggressive” intensify the feeling of threat allegedly created by the newcomers (Sengul, 2020). The presence of such radical right views and linguistic strategies contributes to the development of what Krzyżanowski and Ledin (2017) call “uncivil society”, which they see as “‘borderline discourse’ at the border of civil and uncivil ideas, ideologies and views”. All these studies look at politicians, journalists and web commentators as the producers of this highly ideologically loaded discourse. Our study focuses on what interpreters do when they are faced with the challenge of translating such incendiary texts. Do they remain faithful to the source text both in its information and stylistic value, or do they mitigate or intensify the message? Studies concerning interpreters’ agency and the strategies they use when interpreting highly ideologically loaded texts are discussed in the next section.

1.3. Ideological shift in interpreted political discourse

Against the backdrop of the ongoing normalization of radical discourses and the growing body of research on interpreter agency, existing studies of interpreted political discourse may be reassessed as exploring the concept of ideological shift. The term has been broadly used in translation studies to refer to patterns of linguistic interventions which impact the texts’ explicit and implicit ideologies [32, for a review]. Unlike a translation shift, which is a departure “from formal correspondence in the process of going from the source language to the target language” (Catford, 1965), an ideological shift is specified in the present study as the mitigation or intensification of a (fragment of a) source text by employing, deliberately or not, various linguistic strategies which modulate the ideological salience of a target text.

Beaton-Thome’s (2007) early discourse-analytical study of interpreted European Parliament debates investigated self-referentiality, lexical repetition and metaphor strings. She observed an increased number of references to the European Union in the analysed target texts compared to source texts, which may be seen as having a stabilising and strengthening role in the wider discourse. Likewise, the higher repetition of the term “European Union” and the extensions of metaphorical references to the EU are seen as pointing towards interpreters’ strengthening of EU ideological hegemony in discourse. Such intensification resulted from discursive phenomena such as the foregrounding of

key ideological terms and extension of metaphors in target texts. In a later study, Beaton-Thome (2013) analysed lexical choices in interpreted speeches in European Parliament debates on the Guantanamo Bay detention camp. She identified omissions of highly ideologically loaded terms as a factor that contributes to the overall mitigation of analysed speeches.

Speeches delivered in the European Parliament have also been the subject of Bartłomiejczyk’s research, whose initial focus on face-threatening language established an extensive range of linguistic devices which result in the mitigation or intensification of target texts, such as omission, addition, personal deictic shifts or use of impersonal constructions (Bartłomiejczyk, 2016). These strategies were later adapted for her case studies of racist and Eurosceptic discourses (Bartłomiejczyk, 2020, 2021), both of which provided further evidence of interpreters’ tendencies to mitigate highly ideologically loaded language. In a broader analysis of plenary debate contributions from speakers across the political spectrum which attempted to test the correlation of ideological shift and source text ideological orientation, Dobkiewicz (forthcoming) found further examples of interpreters’ use of typical strategies which mitigate or intensify political speeches. While ideologically loaded verb phrases were shown to be more susceptible to ideological shift than noun phrases due to their greater relative complexity and novelty, no statistically significant relation was found between the occurrence of ideological shifts and the ideological orientation of the interpreted source text.

Although much of the research on ideological shifts takes the European Parliament as the source of its data, the issue has also been explored in the context of Chinese government discourse. Studies based on a large corpus of consecutively interpreted Chinese Premiers’ press conferences point towards intensification of the ideological load in the target text through the use of the Present Perfect Continuous tense (Gu, 2018), the weakening of journalists’ questions (Gu, 2019) and increased self-referentiality (Gu and Tipton, 2020). This overarching strategy remains true in other communicative contexts involving China’s self-presentation on the international stage, where Chinese interpreters mitigated anti-Chinese and intensified pro-Chinese statements by foreign speakers (Gao, 2020). As Gu and Tipton (2020) note, these results were likely affected by the specific role of Chinese government interpreters, who “are usually communist party members and are recruited into China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs”.

Ideological shifts in interpreted political discourse can therefore be observed across a broad variety of institutional and cultural contexts, in texts aligned with diverse political orientations and involving interpreters with varying degrees of professional attachment to the parties participating in the communicative event. We distinguish between mitigation and intensification as types of ideological shift – the strengthening or weakening of ideological load in a target text. The absence of ideological shift is classified as a neutral rendition of the source text. Table 1, adapted from Bartłomiejczyk, 2016, 2020, 2021, and Dobkiewicz (forthcoming), presents examples of typical linguistic phenomena which indicate ideological mitigation and intensification in target texts. The existing studies of ideological shifts have been primarily based on a linguistic analysis of existing transcripts of authentic political speeches. In the present study, real political speeches from the European Parliament serve as a basis for constructing experimental stimuli controlled for the ideological positioning of source texts. Unlike previous studies, we additionally measure the ideological orientation of interpreters who produce the target texts analysed for ideological shifts. In this way, our study integrates the experimental paradigm of Interpreting Studies with that of Critical Discourse Studies.

2. The present study

The aim of this study was to investigate whether and to what extent interpretations of political discourse are modulated by the ideological load of the source texts and the interpreters’ own political views. More

Table 1

Examples of linguistic realisations of mitigation and intensification in target texts, sourced from data analysed in the present study. Square brackets contain the authors' back-translations.

Mitigation		
Linguistic phenomenon	Source Text	Target Text
euphemization	you lot	moje koleżanki i koledzy [my colleagues <female> and colleagues <male>]
generalization	the great success of European integration	współpracę w Unii Europejskiej [cooperation in the European Union]
partial omission	the wrong directives of Brussels given from above	własne dyrektywy Brukseli [Brussels' own directives]
complete omission	you will certainly go bankrupt	0
deictic distancing	we in this parliament need your support and friendship	członkowie tej izby potrzebują pana wsparcia i przyjaźni [members of this house need your <V> support and friendship]
addition of hedging	they are now trying to force these people onto other nations	teraz próbują niejako zepchnąć ich do innych krajów [they are now trying in a way to push these people into other countries]
demetaphorization	the European Union is trying to dig its way out of the hole it dug itself	Unia Europejska próbuje wydostać się z tarapatów które sama wywołała [the European Union is trying to get out of the trouble it has caused itself]
Intensification		
Linguistic phenomenon	Source Text	Target Text
specification addition of upgraders	people a community of values	uchodźców [refugees] prawdziwą społeczność wartości [a true community of values]
deictic approximation metaphorization	you will certainly go bankrupt some of the Member States are deeply and institutionally corrupt and untrustworthy	zbankrutujemy [we will go bankrupt] niektóre państwa członkowskie są toczono głęboko sięgającą korupcją [some of the Member States are ravaged by deep corruption]
repetition	migrants are security threats	imigranci stanowią niebezpieczeństwo zagrożenie [immigrants pose a danger a threat]

specifically, we asked the following three research questions:

1. Are target texts neutral, mitigated or intensified as compared to source texts in terms of ideologically loaded lexis used?
2. Are ideological shifts present in the target texts dependent on the political orientation of the source texts?
3. Are ideological shifts present in the target texts dependent on interpreters' own political orientation?

The first research question focuses on the impact of ideological load on the interpreters' renditions in general. The second research question zooms in on the potential effect of the political orientation of the source text (right-wing, neutral, left-wing) on ideological shifts performed by interpreters. The third question looks at another potential factor influencing ideological shifts in interpretation, i.e. the interpreters' own beliefs and views.

We predicted that there will be ideological shifts in interpreting ideologically loaded texts in line with previous studies (Bartłomiejczyk, 2020, 2021; Beaton-Thome, 2013) and that mitigation would be used

more frequently, especially when interpreting right-wing discourse.

We had no clear prediction as to the third research question as it was exploratory rather than confirmatory in nature. Since ours is the first study to include such a variable in the research on interpreting, we can only speculate about the potential outcome. On the one hand, interpreters are professionals and tend to observe the impartiality principle in interpreting. This might mean that their renditions would not be influenced by their own political views. However, as we have seen from literature, ideological shifts are frequent in interpreting political discourse and we do not know if and to what extent they result from coping strategies, strategic behaviour of interpreters who want to mitigate face-threatening acts or – subconsciously rather than deliberately – from the interpreters' own political views. The potential effect of the interpreters' political views on interpreting ideologically loaded discourse might be related to their own mental models. As van Dijk (2018) claims: “[t]he direct communicative intention of much discourse is the transmission of the mental model of speakers/writers. Hearers/readers, however, construe their own, possibly (quite) different ‘interpretation’ of such discourse in terms of their own mental model”. Similarly, interpreters construe their own mental model of the text and produce a target text through the lens of that model with certain shifts visible when the ideological load of the source text does not align with their own political views. To juxtapose the two meanings of the word interpretation, the interpreters produce interpretation (oral translation) of the source text already interpreted (explained) through the creation of the mental model. Thanks to our design, this study will make it possible to confirm the modulatory effect of the interpreters' political orientation in interpreting, if such an effect exists.

To answer the research questions presented above and test the predictions, we designed an experimental study involving professional conference interpreters with a within-subject design. Each interpreter interpreted a short, simulated debate that included three texts with a manipulated ideological load: a left-wing text, a neutral text and a right-wing text. We also collected data on the interpreters' own political views to see if and how such views might influence interpreting. Our independent variables thus included interpreting accuracy and interpreting shifts (categorised as mitigation, intensification or no shift). Dependent variables included ideological load of the source text and interpreter's political orientation. We also controlled for the interpreters' L2 proficiency and fatigue (by including text sequence as a dependent variable).

2.1. Participants

The original sample of participants included 24 professional interpreters, three of whom were excluded from the analysis due to low general accuracy in the experimental task (below 50%). The final sample consisted of 21 participants (12 females, 9 males; $M_{age} = 41.19$; $SD = 9.35$) who had at least 3 years of professional experience in interpreting between English and Polish ($M_{experience} = 14.80$; $SD = 7.97$; $M_{days/year} = 66.00$; $SD = 52.30$; range: 15–200 days/year; $Mdn_{days/year} = 40$). All of the participants identified Polish as their native language and English as their L2. Their mean self-reported proficiency in L1 and L2 is presented in Table 2. Their proficiency in English was also confirmed with the Lextale test (Lemhöfer and Broersma, 2012) ($M_{Lextale} = 94.05$; $SD = 5.15$). For their participation, the interpreters received financial remuneration.

Table 2

Mean self-reported linguistic proficiency in L1 and L2, 7-point scale.

	Listening	Speaking	Reading	Writing
L1 (Polish)	6.71	6.77	6.77	6.38
L2 (English)	6.05	6.05	6.38	6.09

2.2. Materials

The primary task in this study was the simultaneous interpretation of a series of short political speeches controlled for their ideological orientation: left-wing, pro-EU; right-wing, anti-EU; and neutral. As part of a larger project exploring ideological shift in interpreting, the stimuli speeches were based on ideologically loaded noun and verb phrases extracted from authentic speeches delivered in the European Parliament and analysed in a previous study (Dobkiewicz, forthcoming). To ensure high ideological salience and unambiguous ideological orientation of the source texts, 547 unique ideologically loaded noun and verb phrases were selected from the previous study's dataset and subjected to two rounds of assessment, with the aim of selecting those which are unambiguously left-wing, right-wing, and neutral. In line with the principle of triangulation in critical analyses of political discourse (Reisigl and Wodak, 2009), the two-stage assessment represents two diverse points of view, those of the informed researcher and of the general public.

In the first round, the 547 phrases were assessed separately by three informed researchers, the co-authors of this paper. The phrases were assigned one of three nominal values: left-wing, pro-EU (L); neutral (N); right-wing, anti-EU (R). The assessment was consistent for 236 of the phrases between the three analysts. In the second round of assessment, the 236 phrases were rated by 98 proficient speakers of English as a foreign language recruited from third-, fourth-, and fifth-year students at the Faculty of English, Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań (71 females, 24 males, 3 other; $M_{age} = 22.28$; $SD = 1.53$). Respondents completed an online survey and received course credit as compensation. To avoid inter-rater inconsistencies due to the widely reported ambiguous nature of ideological labels in the eyes of the general public (Hawkins and Nosek, 2012), the assignment of nominal values was replaced with content-specific questions about the assessed phrases. The questions had the form, "In your opinion, what is the speaker's attitude towards X?", with X being the relevant social actor or phenomenon referenced by the assessed noun or verb phrase. Each phrase was assigned a score on a 7-point Likert scale by the respondents; the possible answers ranged from "very negative" to "very positive". Mean scores were calculated for all phrases, with scores below 3 being classified as right-wing, anti-EU, those above 5 as left-wing, pro-EU, and the intermediate scores as neutral. The first- and second-round assessments were in agreement for 158 of the phrases. Those with the lowest standard deviation ($SD < 1.4$) in each of the three ideological groups were taken to be the most ideologically unambiguous and selected for inclusion in the source texts serving as stimuli in the study. The final selection comprised 89 phrases: 29 left-wing, pro-EU; 30 neutral; 30 right-wing, anti-EU.

The transcripts to be recorded as source texts for interpretation were composed by the authors of this paper. They were designed around the selected noun and verb phrases, and constructed in a way that closely emulates the structure and content of a typical speech delivered during a plenary session of the European Parliament.² Readability scores for 10 randomly selected debate contributions from the European Parliament were calculated as guidelines for the textual complexity of the source texts in the present study. Two measures were used: the Flesch-Kincaid readability index (Kincaid et al., 1975) ($M_{EUFK} = 57.31$; $SD = 8.52$; higher is easier) and the Gunning Fog index (Gunning, 1952) ($M_{EUGF} = 12.47$; $SD = 3.04$; lower is easier). The results for the three final source text speeches in this study are comparable to those in the European Parliament speech dataset ($M_{STFK} = 56.87$; $SD = 0.94$; $M_{STGF} = 11.87$; $SD = 0.30$). While the source texts used in this study are therefore not "authentic discourse" in the CDS understanding of this term, they are informed by a preceding study of authentic speeches and serve as "near-authentic" stimuli (Hart, 2018).

² The full source texts are attached in the Appendix. The key ideologically loaded phrases are underlined.

The three source text speeches were recorded in three voice versions each by three male proficient speakers of English as L2, to account for the possible effects of individual differences in speech production on the participants' performance. The mean duration of a single recording was 5 min 28 s. Debate contributions in the European Parliament are noted for their rapid delivery rate, often exceeding the 160 words per minute (wpm) threshold beyond which simultaneous interpreting is considered to be too difficult to perform successfully ((Seeber, 2017), for a review). As participants in the present study approached the source texts with no prior preparation, the rate of delivery in the recordings used here is slower than in actual European Parliament debates ($M_{wpm} = 127.13$; $SD = 6.14$) to ensure participants' completion of the interpreting task and avoid excessive omissions in the target texts. The order in which the source texts were presented to the participants and their voice versions were counterbalanced between participants to account for the possible effects of individual differences in source text speech production on the participants' overall performance.

Additionally, short introductory and concluding speeches were recorded by a female proficient speaker of English as L2, to serve as warmup and cooldown stimuli in the study, and as contextual bookends for the simulated debate. Their interpretations by the participants were not analysed in this study.

The source texts were played for the participants via headphones, while the target texts were recorded with a microphone placed in the interpreting booth and later transcribed using minimal transcription markers, accounting for only those non-verbal phenomena which are of interest to this study as potential indications of interpreting problems, such as pauses, hesitations, false starts and self-corrections.

This research project employs the euandi 2019 questionnaire (Michel et al., 2019; Gagatke, 2018) as a tool for measuring the interpreters' ideological orientation. Developed by an international team of researchers centred around the European University Institute and the University of Lucerne, euandi 2019 was made publicly available before the 2019 European Parliament elections. It was originally designed as the third version of a voting advice application – a tool with which respondents, by answering a series of questions, could compare their personal views with those represented by political parties in all EU Member States (Reiljan et al., 2020a, 2020b). At the core of the questionnaire lie 22 statements about current socio-political issues, organized in 7 thematic dimensions such as EU integration, migration, taxation or renewable energy. The full set of questions is included in Appendix E to this paper. Respondents' answers on a five-point Likert scale correspond to the level of their agreement with the statements. The numerical values of the answers are later calculated using an algorithm to situate the respondent on a two-dimensional political spectrum: economically left–right and culturally liberal (pro-EU)–conservative (anti-EU). In the present study, euandi 2019 is employed to identify the ideological orientation of interpreters participating in the study.

In Fig. 1, the x axis represents the distribution with regards to economic left-right polarization, while the y axis represents the differentiation along the liberal (pro-EU)–conservative (anti-EU) line. As can be seen from the graph above the majority of the interpreters that took part in the study ($N = 14$) were placed in the upper left quadrant and represent left-wing economic views and liberal (pro-EU) cultural views; 5 interpreters have right-wing economic views and are liberal and pro-EU; 3 interpreters have right-wing economic views and conservative views on social issues and are anti-EU; 2 interpreters were placed at the exact same spot on the y axis, which means that their economic views are centrist, while their social views are pro-EU.

2.3. Procedure

The study was conducted in the interpreting laboratory at the Faculty of English, Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań. The session began with instructions about the experimental procedure, after which the participants were asked to sign an informed consent form which




Fig. 1. Distribution of interpreters with respect to their political orientation as identified with the euandi 2019 tool. All scores on x axis <35 coded as left-wing, all scores >65 coded as right-wing, in-between scores coded as centrist. All scores on y axis <35 coded as anti-EU, all scores >65 coded as pro-EU, in-between scores coded as neutral.

specified that the study involved the interpretation of political speeches followed by the completion of questionnaires. Once the participants were seated in the interpreting booth, they received a written interpreter’s brief which provided general contextual information for the simulated plenary debate that they would be interpreting. The principal part of the experiment began with participants interpreting a series of five speeches from English into Polish: an introductory filler speech, three experimental stimuli speeches, and a concluding filler speech. The participants were not informed about the nature of the initial and final speeches. The interpreters had no access to additional resources which could aid their interpreting. After the completion of the interpreting task, the participants were presented with the euandi 2019 questionnaire, a demographic questionnaire, and the LexTale lexical test. The entire session lasted approximately 45 min, followed by an informal debriefing session during which the participants were informed about the motivation and aims of the study.

3. Data analysis and results

The initial steps of data analysis in this study employed methods of the Discourse-Historical Approach within CDS. This methodology has been successfully used to analyse political discourses, especially those which explicitly (re-)produce social injustice, or discriminatory, racist and xenophobic sentiments (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001), for historical overview. Its main focus is on discursive strategies in texts and the specific linguistic means through which they are achieved. Discursive strategies are understood as “a more or less intentional plan” of self- and other-presentation, as well as argument building, “adopted to achieve a particular social, political, psychological or linguistic goal” (Reisigl and Wodak, 2009). Therefore, DHA considers language use to be inherently ideological, and the ways in which text producers reference themselves and others to be ideologically loaded. The analysis in the present study focuses on the discursive strategies of nomination and predication – the use of noun phrases to refer to social actors, objects, events and processes, and the use of verb phrases to indicate characteristics assigned to them. As ideological carriers, these specific phrases convey the ideological positioning of text producers towards the actors and phenomena which they reference.

Traditionally, mitigation and intensification figure in DHA as further types of discursive strategies within texts. Here, they are adapted as types of ideological shift between texts – the weakening or strengthening of ideological load between source texts and target texts in interpreted discourse. Source text and target text transcripts were analysed comparatively for the presence of linguistic phenomena, such as those listed in Table 1 in section 2.3, which impact the salience of ideological load in target texts. The target text realisations by 21 participants of three ideologically loaded source texts (neutral; left-wing; right-wing, anti-EU) including 89 key phrases resulted in a total of 63 target texts and 1869 phrases analysed against their source text counterparts. The target text data was marked for interpreting accuracy (whether or not the target text realisation of a phrase communicates the semantic essence of the source text phrase), the presence or absence of ideological shift, the type of ideological shift (mitigation or intensification), and the specific linguistic means which resulted in the shift (see Table 1 in section 2.3). Although non-verbal phenomena such as modulation of voice pitch, volume or speech tempo may also mitigate or intensify the rhetorical impact of a political speech (Reisigl, 2018), this study focuses exclusively on lexical phenomena. Following the initial evaluation of ideological shifts for all TT phrases, its outcomes were subjected to statistical analysis.

We first looked at accuracy rates both for each participant and for each item. We removed data for 3 interpreters because their general accuracy rate was below 50%. We then focused on examining general accuracy as a function of the ideological content of the source text. We fitted a generalized linear mixed effects model with accuracy as a dependent variable and ideological content as a fixed factor. We also controlled for task sequence and the interpreters’ L2 proficiency. In line with the procedures suggested in Kliegl et al. (2011) and Matuschek et al. (2017), we first fitted a model with the full random structure, i.e. with random intercepts for participant and item and random slopes for all within-subject factors. We then kept reducing the random structure to prevent overparameterization and to arrive at the most parsimonious model. It turned out that the minimal model (with only random intercepts for participant and item) was the optimal one and it is reported below. We found a statistically significant difference in accuracy between right-wing discourse text and neutral text ($SE = 0.28, z = -1.92, p = .05$) and between right-wing discourse text and left-wing discourse text ($SE = 0.28, z = 1.96, p = .05$). The accuracy for the right-wing discourse text was the lowest (69%), followed by the neutral text (78%) and the left-wing text (79%).

We then moved to conduct an analysis to answer the first research questions about the impact of ideological load on the interpreters’ renditions (Are target texts neutral, mitigated or intensified as compared to source texts in terms of ideologically loaded lexis used?). The results are presented in Fig. 2. We performed a Chi square test and found that the




Fig. 2. Ideological shifts present in interpreting in neutral, right-wing and left-wing texts. Y axis represents the number of shifts in interpretations.

renditions applied by the interpreters differed depending on the source text ideological load, $X^2(4, N = 24) = 84.46, p < .001$). This effect was mainly driven by less numerous shifts in the neutral condition.

The second research question focused on the potential effect of the political orientation of the source text on ideological shifts performed by interpreters. (Are ideological shifts present in the target texts dependent on the political orientation of the source texts?). We decided to fit two models to answer this question. First, we used the whole dataset to look at whether interpreters performed shifts or not, regardless of the direction of the shift (whether the ideological load was mitigated or intensified). Second, we only used datapoints with shifts and looked at whether the ideological load of the source text modulated the type of shift. For clarity, we explicitly differentiate here between the ideological load of the text (whether the text is neutral or ideologically loaded) and the ideological orientation of the text (whether the ideological load of the text is left-wing or right-wing).

The first model was a generalized linear mixed effects model with ideological content, task sequence and L2 proficiency as fixed factors. As previously, we followed the model selection procedures suggested in Kliegl et al. (2011) and Matuschek et al. (2017). As in the previous analysis, the minimal model with random intercepts for participants and items turned out to be optimal. We found an effect of the ideological load on the interpreters' renditions. Interpreters' renditions included more shifts when interpreting ideologically loaded texts as compared to neutral source texts. The difference between left-wing and neutral texts was significant ($SE = 0.30, z = -3.29, p < .001$), as was the difference between right-wing and neutral texts ($SE.30, z = 3.79, p < .001$). The percentage of shifts applied in interpretation was 49% for neutral texts, 68% for left-wing texts and 70% for right-wing texts.

The second model had a slightly different structure because it was also used to answer the third research question (Are ideological shifts present in the target texts dependent on interpreters' own political orientation?).

It was again a generalized linear mixed effects model with terms similar to the previous one (source text ideological load, task sequence and L2 proficiency as fixed factors). Additionally, we included terms specifying the interpreters' political orientation.

For that purpose, we recoded numerical data from euandi 2019 results for two axes so that we arrive at a categorical variable. All scores on the x axis below 35 percent were recoded as left, all scores above 65 percent were recoded as right. All scores in-between were recoded as centre. Similarly, all scores below 35 on the y axis were labelled anti-EU, all scores above 65 were recoded as pro-EU, and all scores in-between as neutral.

Thus, we also included two variables for the two axes (x and y) as fixed factors. Since we were also interested in whether the interpreters' political orientation makes them introduce different shifts depending on the ideological load of the source text, we enriched the model with an interaction between political orientation on the x axis (left-centre-right) and ideological load and political orientation on the y axis (pro-vs anti-EU) and ideological load.

We followed a previously applied procedure to identify the most parsimonious model. As before, the optimal model included random intercepts for participant and item. This time, we found no effect of ideological load on the type of shift applied by the interpreter. All texts, regardless of their ideological load, triggered a similar proportion of intensifying and mitigating shifts, despite numerical differences in means based on raw data.

We found no effect of interpreters' own political orientation on ideological shifts (all $p > .05$), which suggests that interpreters do not let their political views limit the impartiality required from them in the professional setting. Detailed parameters of the model are included in Table 1 in Appendix D.

4. Discussion

The aim of this experimental study was to investigate how interpreters cope with ideologically loaded texts and whether the interpreters' political beliefs influence the interpretations. We first looked at accuracy and found that right-wing texts were interpreted with a lower accuracy than left-wing and neutral texts. This result might be explained by our analysis and the characteristics of the right-wing discourse. We naturally qualified omissions as inaccurate interpretations. However, omissions might be a strategic choice made by the interpreter (Korpala et al., 2012) and might in fact represent an extreme case of mitigation (Bartłomiejczyk, 2016). Since it is not feasible to investigate motivations behind each omission occurring in the interpretation, we can only speculate to what extent these omissions are strategic and offer this as a potential explanation of our result. Since our interpreters were predominantly left-wing in their political views, they may have seen the right-wing texts as more face-threatening and resorted to more omissions.

4.1. Interpreters use different shifts in their interpretations depending on the ideological load of the source text

Our analysis shows that the ideological load of source texts (i.e. whether the text is neutral or included ideologically loaded phrases regardless of their left-wing or right-wing orientation) does impact interpreting. Interpreters seem to introduce fewer shifts in neutral texts and mitigate both left-wing and right-wing discourse. This is in line with our prediction and previous studies (Bartłomiejczyk, 2020, 2021; Beaton-Thome, 2013).

What is it, then, in ideologically loaded texts that makes interpreters introduce shifts? We second the reason given by Bartłomiejczyk in her analysis of the interpretation of populist discourse as "simply the desire to reduce face-threat to all the parties concerned, including the interpreter" (Bartłomiejczyk, 2016). The idea of toning-down explicit content is also present in training literature: Setton and Dawrant (2016) repeatedly mention softening offensive language. This is also brought up by Gile (2009), who identifies omission as a strategy for interpreting "something grossly inappropriate" and attenuation of offending words or ideas. The same authors contextualise such agency on the part of the interpreter within the ethics of interpreting. Gile (2009) underlines the saliency of the ethical problem that occurs when interpreters omit content of inappropriate nature. Nolan (2005) writes: "when there is any doubt about the speaker's meaning or intent, it is wise to err on the side of caution and choose the more neutral or inoffensive word from those that are possible in the context", which is also in accordance with the VSI model of truthful rendition by Seeber and Zelger (2007). As our findings suggest, shifts are not introduced by interpreters in association to their political orientation: both left-wing and right-wing texts are generally mitigated, regardless of the interpreters' views. This attests to the fact that shifts are introduced to tone down face-threatening phrases within interpreters' agency as participants of a communicative act and not as proponents of any political views.

4.2. Ideological shifts in interpreting do not depend on the political orientation of the source text

We found that ideological shifts are introduced similarly when interpreting right-wing and left-wing texts, with mitigations more numerous than intensifications. This result was partially in line with our predictions. We expected more mitigating than intensifying shifts, especially in right-wing texts. Our analysis showed that mitigations were indeed more frequent – but this was true for both right-wing and left-wing texts. A mitigating tendency is in line with previous research based on case studies of far-right Eurosceptic discourse (Bartłomiejczyk, 2020, 2021). Our study extends these case-study-based results by showing a regular pattern in a well-controlled experimental study and

by generalising the findings from right-wing discourse only to more generally ideologically loaded discourse (both right- and left-wing). It seems that it is not only the far-right discourse that undergoes mitigation in interpreting. It is ideological load in general. Previous studies showed the toning-down patterns for right-wing discourse probably because the researchers focused on radical discourse only and it was more pronounced in the European Union in the case of right-wing political parties.

The lack of difference in ideological shifts between right-wing and left-wing discourse might also stem, as previously mentioned, from our exclusion of omissions from the category of mitigating shifts (as explained above when discussing the accuracy analysis). Since omissions were more numerous in right-wing rather than left-wing source texts, we might speculate that some of these omissions were strategic mitigations and could potentially influence the result, were we able to differentiate between omissions introduced by interpreters as a toning-down strategy and omissions used as a strategy to cope with excessive cognitive load or prolonged ear-voice span. The inability to correctly interpret omissions is an insurmountable limitation of this type of research, identified previously also by other scholars (Bartomiejczyk, 2016).

4.3. Ideological shifts in interpreting do not depend on the interpreter's political orientation

Our analysis showed no modulatory effect of the interpreters' political views on the shifts introduced when interpreting ideologically loaded texts. The related research question was exploratory and we did not favour any specific answer to this question. Our results brought no evidence attesting to the fact that interpreters' political views are responsible for ideological shifts produced when interpreting right-wing or left-wing political discourse. This shows professionalism on the part of the interpreters as they respect the principle of impartiality and strive to facilitate communication faithfully, without any distortion (Jones, 2002; Diriker, 2011). Such behaviour observes both professional standards and codes of ethics as well as training guidelines (Setton and Dawrant, 2016). It seems that the mental model created by interpreters when comprehending a source text with an ideological load not aligned with their own political beliefs does not shift the ideological load manifested in the target text. This is a novel result as no other previous study has investigated the interpreters' political orientation as a potential factor influencing interpretation.

Our study generated a synergistic effect by implementing an interdisciplinary approach. We created a well-controlled experimental study and used analytical methods from Critical Discourse Studies to investigate ideological load in interpreting. We also benefitted from Political Science by using a questionnaire to measure the interpreters' political orientation. The study was based on the product of interpreting – we analysed ideological shifts introduced into target texts. However, its findings contribute to our understanding of the process of interpreting political discourse.

As any type of research, this study has had some limitations. First, the sample of 24 participants could always be bigger – although we did try to increase the power of the experiment by introducing 30 experimental items for each level of our ideological load variable. Second, the data on the interpreters' political views could have been subject to a whitecoat effect – as in political polls, respondents might not want to admit their political views, especially when these views are extreme, rather than mainstream. This is despite the fact that the questionnaire was fully anonymous, and the data was collected in line with best experimental

Appendix A. Neutral source text

Madam President, I'd like to thank the Portuguese Prime Minister for his clear commitment to the future of Europe. My party shares the ambitions

practices. Third, the distribution of political views presented by the interpreters was uneven, with the majority of interpreters placing themselves as pro-EU. However, political orientation data could only have been obtained post hoc. If the interpreters had been asked to complete the questionnaire before the study (to ensure a politically balanced sample of participants), this could have skewed the results of the study by directing the participants' focus on the ideological load in the source texts.

The current research project was conducted from the point of view of a linguistic researcher with training in discourse analysis. Such a skillset makes one more sensitive to certain cues in the text. We thus might ask the following question: would the ideological shifts introduced by the interpreters in our experiment be equally salient in the eyes, or rather ears, of non-specialised recipients – the general public? Further research we are planning to conduct should provide an answer to this question. Our further research includes a reception study in which bilingual participants recruited from the general public will use an adapted version of the euandi 2019 questionnaire to rate the political orientation of source texts and target texts analysed in this study. Their placement of source texts and the equivalent target texts on a two-dimensional political spectrum should reveal whether the ideological shifts observed in the present study are also apparent to recipients untrained in the methods employed here, thus extending the body of knowledge on the effects of interpreting on the reception of political discourse and on the normalization of radical discourses in the public sphere.

5. Conclusions

This study integrates the methods of analysis of Interpreting Studies and Critical Discourse Studies in an attempt to shed light on the factors influencing the process of interpreting in political institutions. Our study has shown that ideologically loaded texts lead to a higher degree of mitigation on the part of the interpreters than texts neutral with respect to the ideological load. This means that both left-leaning and right-leaning texts undergo ideological shifts (mitigation, and more rarely intensification) in interpreting, regardless of their political orientation. When it comes to the political orientation of the interpreters, no significant effects were found for its influence on the target texts. These results provide an insight into the interaction between ideological load of the text, interpreters' political orientation and the process of interpreting, an area of research so far rather understudied in Interpreting Studies (but see Schäffner, 2012 and Zheng and Ren, 2018). Our findings also contribute to Critical Discourse Studies in that they firmly place the interpreters as agents in the process of political communication, who do not only facilitate the understanding between different languages and cultures but also shape this understanding through the mitigation of face-threatening linguistic strategies.

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Declaration of competing interest

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to deliver on key issues, such as green energy, a strong European economy, and maintaining the role of the EU itself in a turbulent world.

A Presidency in the Council comes with celebrations and joy but also with Union-wide obligations and opportunities, especially where Member States are divided and are not willing to achieve progress. The rule of law remains an issue, a number of countries not abiding by the rules. The European Union must stand by its treaty obligations. We must not forget to respect and defend the fundamental rights of Europeans, to protect democracy in these countries that have millions and millions of people. We think the European Union has to use the means available in cases where the rule of law is violated and I count on you, Prime Minister, to raise that in the Council very soon. The EU has to establish pan-European legislation against those phenomena, otherwise we are risking the values which unite us.

There are still weaknesses in the Union. The effects of migration have not been solved. Millions of refugees have arrived here in the past 6 years and there still seems to be no common policy in place. No common approach to third country nationals travelling to Europe. I believe we now have an opportunity to find an efficient and practical EU asylum and migration policy. Look at the situation of countries like Malta, which has the highest number of refugees per capita. We need to have good solid partnerships with countries of origin to address the illegal and, above all, dangerous routes of migration to the European Union. Both for the sake of these people and for ours. We should be very careful when designing a system with such a broad scope. Looking internally at the challenges we face, but crucially, also with an external focus.

There are challenges also outside the structures of the EU. One of our priorities should be maintaining a relationship with the United Kingdom post-Brexit. After all, European citizens still reside in the UK. It is my belief, and it is the belief of my party, that this relationship should not be unfriendly. On our eastern borders, we have seen the worrying developments in Turkey and we now know that the European Union needs a more balanced approach to the status of human rights in Turkey. This Presidency would need to emulate the best practices to solve our most pressing problems. Historically, the approach of the Council and this Parliament have not always been the same. We can think of some cases in the European institutions where the Parliament swiftly adopted a proposal only for it to be blocked in the Council.

But we have also managed to make some important decisions here in this Parliament regarding EU internal and external actions. Last December we agreed on the budget of the European Union for the next seven years, and we agreed on the biggest economy rescue package that the European Union has ever seen. But now, Prime Minister, it's time that we make this work, we should have some movement. We only have a three-month window to refine this legislation. In three months' time we are going to vote on amendments here in the plenary session of Parliament, and I'm calling upon you, Prime Minister, to work with the Member States to also take the last steps at the national level. All of the Member States need to focus on strategic priorities. Let me be clear: all Member States need to contribute in some way, the playing field must be level for Europeans who live in our own countries and for those who live elsewhere in the EU. Europeans want to see action from our side, the money needs to arrive to people in need, to enterprises in need, to regions, very soon.

Thank you very much, and good luck with your Presidency.

Appendix B. Left-wing, pro-EU oriented source text

Madam President, dear Prime Minister. The people of your country, Portugal, took to the streets almost 50 years ago to speak up for democracy and freedom. You peacefully removed an oppressive regime and swiftly joined our Union soon after. Today, we are proud partners in what the European Union has achieved and will achieve. But we are now seeing authoritarian governments grabbing power in our shared space again, and again we need a strong Portuguese voice in the struggle for democracy. The many tasks and challenges awaiting the new Council Presidency are clear, but let me just highlight those which require special attention and apply to the fundamental values of our house.

The rule of law remains a crucial issue. Look at the attacks on the freedom of press in countries like Hungary. We need to have a determined European reaction to breaches of the rule of law and EU citizens' fundamental rights. They deserve our continued solidarity. The European Union has always been a beacon for many around the world who live under oppression, and it must continue in that role. We mustn't turn our backs on our fellow Europeans. It's clear that those governments need a reminder: the European Union is founded on human rights, civil liberties and freedoms, and we refuse to give up these foundations. We should continue our cooperation with NGOs in these countries that do amazing work for fundamental rights. This Parliament has strongly supported an enabling environment for non-governmental organisations and human rights defenders, and that is something that we should continue to do.

Another issue that needs our attention is migration. I have visited, with members of my party, the border camps where vulnerable persons are held after they reach Europe. As a leading global proponent of the promotion and protection of human rights, the European Union cannot justify the dreadful conditions in which these human beings are forced to live. Yes, we've seen better and worse examples among our Member States. Some countries have done everything they could so they wouldn't have to help the people in need, while Malta opens the door to everyone and seeks a strong cooperation. But we need a common, European approach that shows that we stand up for our values. We need an approach that reflects the values of Europe and Europeans, and Europeans will defend free movement. They are prepared to talk, in open terms, about why they are proud of what the European Union has achieved and will achieve – this very much includes open borders. The European Union must stand by its human rights commitments.

Finally, we need to focus on solidarity and economic cooperation of all Member States. We agreed on the budget and on the economic package last December and I am proud to say, dear colleagues, that we have improved the text proposed by the Commission. I believe that we succeeded in strengthening the social pillar of what is an important and truly European project. My party welcomes the focus on public investments, on healthcare and housing. We believe that with this programme, the EU reaffirms its role as a leading global proponent of the promotion and protection of human rights. But there is still much work to be done to close the gaps between Member States, to prove that this really is a community of values. We have seen a rise in Eurosceptic rhetoric from Member State governments – what better way to remind ourselves of the great success of European integration than a strong economic recovery? We just cannot afford to have winners and losers of European cooperation. All of the Member States are in this together.

So, Prime Minister, I urge you to use the six months of your Presidency to stand up for our human rights commitments and for our shared European values. Let us have a successful cooperation between the Council and the Parliament, even if we sometimes disagree. Prime Minister, we in this Parliament need your support and friendship, for the benefit of the whole Union. After all, Europe is united in diversity. On our part, I can assure you that we are not going to give up our identity nor lose our compass. My party is looking forward to working with you on this important project. Good luck.

Appendix C. Right-wing, anti-EU oriented source text

Madam President, Mr Prime Minister. The Portuguese Presidency in the Council begins with the European Union in a crisis without precedent. We have a global economy that's shrinking, a disastrous common currency and Member States finally speaking up against broken promises. Quite frankly, I can't believe that some of you here are still ecstatic to be on this ship that's sinking.

My party is exhausted with your hypocrite when it comes to the rule of law. The unelected Commission criticises countries like Hungary but we saw no reaction from the EU when other Member States did whatever they wanted. In Spain, the conservative, national party has been removed from social media completely and you offer nothing but ridiculous measures. There was no reaction when people came out to protest over censorship. You basically looked the other way instead of trying to defend EU's citizens' fundamental rights and Europe's core values. We all know that some of the Member States are deeply and institutionally corrupt and untrustworthy, and still you allow them participate in making decisions that affect all of us. You only find ways of punishing countries when they disagree with your liberal narration. What you're doing is clearly an attack by the majority against minority views in the Parliament. To most Europeans with a little common sense, one thing is perfectly clear: the EU hasn't got a clue. If you think otherwise, you must have been in the European Parliament for too long.

We had long, painful debates in this chamber about the budget of your already failed project. The European Union is trying to dig its way out of the hole it dug itself and it is doing so the only way it knows how: by introducing more regulations, by having more overreaching control. I can't say that I am surprised with this outcome. If you really want to help countries emerge from this crisis, stop being a protectionist racket and take a step back. Or you can continue your over-policing and over-spending and you will certainly go bankrupt. You say we have a few months to amend that filthy mess but Members of this Parliament have refused to debate and take questions from members of my party. How do you expect to get any meaningful work done when you are openly engaging in censorship? You propose new structures, new measures that you say will ensure that everyone benefits fairly from this budget, but your bureaucracy means that Member States lose all say and power over what those structures are. This is unacceptable. Once again, the European Union desperately tries to pass itself off as a state but that is not what you are, don't forget that.

In the meantime, we are still struggling with the effects of mass migration. This deformed version of democracy has forced us to accept over-stayers even when sovereign Member States voiced their disapproval. The fact of the matter is that the European establishment does not permit opposing views, views which disagree with the liberal fantasies you impose on us. You lot simply refuse to listen to our valid criticism of illegal migration, even though it was the wrong directives of Brussels given from above that have brought about chaos in our countries. We have Member States that have taken in too many illegal immigrants and they are now trying to force these people onto other nations. But I have spoken with my constituents, the good people who have elected me as their representative here, and they are firmly against immigration. They don't want their religions or anything else changed, and they're aware that the European Union cannot guarantee that. It is not going to solve this issue, we've seen time and time again that it doesn't even intend to solve it. We must listen to the people, and the people demand solutions. There needs to be a message, loud and clear, from all of our nations: migrants are security threats and they are not welcome here.

Still, I'm not pessimistic. Our citizens will defend their jobs and their homes. Freedom will always find a way, and liberty will always win. You cannot shut us down and we refuse to be silenced.

Appendix D

Parameters for the generalized linear mixed effects model. The dependent variable is the type of shift (mitigation or intensification), fixed factors include ideological load (ideo, where 1 is left-wing, 2 is neutral and 3 is right-wing), interpreters' political orientation on the x axis (xcat, where 1 is centre, 2 is left and 3 is right) and the y axis (ycat, where 1 is anti-EU, 2 is neutral and 3 is pro-EU), L2 proficiency and task sequence. Since we applied sliding contrasts, effects are shown for specific contrasts between two neighbouring levels of the factor.

Predictors	Shift		
	Odds Ratios	CI	p
(Intercept)	1.94	0.10–37.97	0.663
ideo2-1	1.05	0.47–2.35	0.912
ideo3-2	0.88	0.34–2.27	0.784
xcat2-1	0.87	0.54–1.39	0.547
xcat3-2	0.79	0.41–1.52	0.475
ycat2-1	2.06	0.65–6.53	0.220
ycat3-2	0.68	0.42–1.11	0.124
L2 proficiency	1.00	0.97–1.03	0.967
equence2-1	1.30	0.77–2.21	0.326
sequence3-2	1.18	0.72–1.93	0.521
ideo2-1:xcat2-1	1.43	0.55–3.70	0.463
ideo3-2:xcat2-1	1.42	0.52–3.86	0.490
ideo2-1:xcat3-2	0.85	0.23–3.12	0.804
ideo3-2:xcat3-2	1.39	0.34–5.66	0.648
ideo2-1:ycat2-1	0.91	0.11–7.36	0.927
ideo3-2:ycat2-1	0.38	0.03–5.23	0.472
ideo2-1:ycat3-2	0.87	0.29–2.58	0.799
ideo3-2:ycat3-2	0.77	0.25–2.38	0.648
Random Effects			
σ^2	3.29		
τ_{00} item	0.90		
τ_{00} id	0.06		
ICC item	0.21		
ICC id	0.01		
Observations	715		
Marginal R ² /Conditional R ²	0.058/0.271		

Appendix E. Euandi 2019 questionnaire (Michel et al., 2019)

The questionnaire is made up of 22 questions regarding current social issues. Please answer the questions in accordance with your own views by selecting one of the answers: Completely disagree, Tend to disagree, Difficult to say, Tend to agree, Completely agree, or No opinion.

1. Social programmes should be maintained even at the cost of higher taxes.
2. Asylum seekers should be distributed proportionally among EU Member States through a mandatory relocation system.
3. Immigration into Poland should be made more restrictive.
4. Immigrants from outside Europe should be required to accept our culture and values.
5. The legalisation of same sex marriages is a good thing.
6. The legalisation of the personal use of soft drugs is to be welcomed.
7. Euthanasia should be legalised.
8. Government spending should be reduced in order to lower taxes.
9. The EU should acquire its own tax raising powers.
10. Bank and stock market gains should be taxed more heavily.
11. The state should provide stronger financial support to unemployed workers.
12. The EU should rigorously punish Member States that violate the EU deficit rules.
13. The promotion of public transport should be fostered through green taxes (e.g. road taxing).
14. Renewable sources of energy (e.g. solar or wind energy) should be supported even if this means higher energy costs.
15. Restrictions of personal privacy on the Internet should be accepted for public security reasons.
16. Criminals should be punished more severely.
17. The European Union should strengthen its security and defence policy.
18. On foreign policy issues the EU should speak with one voice.
19. European integration is a good thing.
20. The single European currency (Euro) is a bad thing.
21. Individual member states of the EU should have less veto power.
22. In European Parliament elections, EU citizens should be allowed to cast a vote for a party of candidate from any other Member State.

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Conclusion

The present article-based PhD thesis approached the issue of mediation of radical political discourses in two contexts: multimodal campaign posts on an image-centric social media platform and interpreting of parliamentary speeches.

First, a case study of Donald Trump's 2016 presidential campaign Instagram posts (Dobkiewicz 2019) revealed how populist far-right discourse could be strategically mitigated on social media. The analysis of images accompanied by captions as multimodal texts used tools of the Discourse-Historical Approach and analytical categories of visual grammar. Its results indicated that Trump's Instagram campaign was centred around his positive self-presentation and stressed his desirable characteristics as a prospective president while backgrounding personal attacks on his political opponents, which were very much present in other areas of his campaign. Of the three features of the far-right ideology (Mudde 2007), Trump's populism was shown to be visually prominent, but superficial in its inclusiveness. The authoritarian signalling which was a salient element of the Instagram campaign was shown to be self-contradictory, as the glorification of institutions of American establishment appeared to be at odds with Trump's construction of the "inclusive grassroots movement" rhetoric. Nativism, meanwhile, was notably underrepresented in the analysed dataset. As an ideological feature based on ethnic discrimination, its visual representation could be too alienating for the potential voter. In contrast with the same politician's broader campaign discourse, including on the written text-oriented Twitter (Kreis 2017), the discourse of his Instagram campaign appears to be overwhelmingly positive, and lacking the "uncivil" characteristics of many online discourses (Krzyżanowski and Ledin 2017). This suggests that mediation of radical political discourses may result in strategic mitigation which better suits the characteristics of the medium in which they exist and, possibly, that an *internal cordon sanitaire* may be established by the campaign staff to weaken a radical politician's incendiary rhetoric. While the degree to which such mitigation could translate to improved electoral performance of radical political actors is unknown (seeing how the platform is typically used for communication with established supporters, rather than for mobilising new ones (Bast 2021)), the analysis of Donald Trump's Instagram campaign presents clear evidence of the mitigatory potential of discourse mediation via multimodal social media.

The second paper (Dobkiewicz, in press) shifts the focus towards another “secondary sphere of recontextualization and re/mediation” (Krzyżanowski and Ekström 2022: 721) of political discourse – simultaneous interpreting between English and Polish of plenary debate speeches in the European Parliament. The paper extends the scope of case studies such as Bartłomiejczyk’s (2020, 2021) analysis of racist and Eurosceptic interpreter-mediated discourse, and more firmly grounds research on ideological shift in theoretical frameworks of both the Discourse-Historical Approach and Interpreting Studies. Its findings present a range of linguistic realisations of mitigation and intensification strategies between ideologically loaded source and target texts across the whole ideological spectrum in the European Parliament, thus giving further support to existing studies of ideological shift in interpreting. Quantitative analysis revealed that realisations of nomination strategies were realised more neutrally in target texts than those of predication strategies, but no statistically significant relationship was found between the occurrence of ideological shifts in target texts and the ideological orientation of source texts. Numerical trends observed in the data do, however, invite further study of the impact of source text ideological salience on the occurrence of ideological shifts in target texts, as the proportion of ideologically shifted tokens was higher in far-left and far-right texts than in centrist texts.

This thread is directly followed in the final paper of this article-based thesis (Dobkiewicz et al. 2023), which evaluates the occurrence of ideological shifts in interpretations of source texts controlled for their ideological load. An exploratory element of the study involved the inclusion of interpreters’ political orientation, measured using a reliable questionnaire, as a dependent variable. The results confirm Paper 2’s findings that higher ideological salience of source texts contributes to a higher rate of ideological shifts in interpreter-mediated target texts, with left- and right-wing source text language being mitigated more often than more ideologically neutral source text language. Highly ideologically loaded texts are therefore more likely to be mitigated in their interpretations, which could have a meaningful impact on the rhetorical success of radical political actors in multilingual debates. This further underlines the relevance of studying the role of mediation in its various realisations, including via interpreting, in normalising radical political discourses. However, no significant effect of interpreters’ own political orientation on the presence of ideological shifts was observed. This suggests that interpreters’

professional neutrality is maintained when interpreting highly ideologically loaded texts, and their own political orientation does not seem to contribute to ideological shifts.

Over the three papers, this thesis has attempted to analyse the mediation of political discourses in the two underresearched contexts of image-based social media and simultaneous interpreting. By triangulating theories and methods of Critical Discourse Studies, studies of social media and Interpreting Studies, it aimed to bridge both thematic and methodological research gaps in order to provide a multifaceted perspective on a phenomenon with far-reaching consequences for the shape of the public sphere. The overall results of the thesis suggest that political discourses, especially those most ideologically salient and most radical, are highly susceptible to mitigation through different kinds of mediation – strategic self- and other-presentation on image-based social media and simultaneous interpreting of parliamentary debates. Although this phenomenon requires further study in a variety of contexts and using larger samples of data, the papers which constitute this PhD thesis point to concrete semiotic phenomena which impact the ideological salience of political discourses, their potential effects on text recipients and directions for future research.

As noted in the individual articles, the thesis and its contributing elements come with certain limitations. The analysis of multimodal social media posts in Paper 1 focused on a closed set of texts produced with the specific aim of promoting a political agent in the runup to a presidential election. The strategies of mitigation employed there, although representative of the specific socio-political and technological context in which they were used, might not be representative of broader mediation techniques in political discourse. The discourse-analytical study reported in Paper 2 extends the ideological scope of previous studies of interpreter-mediated political discourse by exploring source and target texts exemplifying the output of all political groups active in the European Parliament at the time of data collection. By doing so, however, the samples of data representing the various ideological orientations are relatively small in comparison with general parallel corpora of interpreter-mediated political discourse or case studies of individual speakers. Larger datasets would allow for results which could be more reliably generalised. The experimental study in Paper 3, besides having access to a restricted number of participants due to highly specific recruitment criteria, may have been limited by the unavoidably sensitive nature of the ideological content of experimental stimuli and of the political orientation questionnaire. Although best practices in experimental research were adhered

to, the collected data may have been affected by the observer effect. This may have also influenced, or been influenced by, the uneven distribution of political orientations among the participants.

As the mediation and normalisation of radical discourses continue to be intensely researched in Critical Discourse Studies, a number of avenues of further study emerge when considering the results of the present thesis. Beyond the ever-present possibility of analysing larger corpora and samples of data in political communication, the actual impact of discursive phenomena on the intended audiences requires greater attention. In studies of political discourse on social media, this should involve research of dialogical discourse, especially in new forms of online communication such as unscripted livestreams. On platforms such as Instagram and TikTok, elite political actors may engage in direct, real-time interactions with potential and established supporters, as well as with opponents. Such more or less formal communicative events fully realise the technological potential offered by social media to politicians, and could greatly contribute to the creation of public personas based on authenticity and direct democracy – both highly important especially for populist politicians. Since modes of communication of this sort are especially favoured by younger audiences, their significance in broader political discourse is only likely to expand. An increasing number of such studies would also indicate a shift towards greater emphasis on bottom-up communication in political discourse research, which continues to be regrettably understudied.

In studies of interpreted political discourse, the reception of ideologically shifted target texts is likewise an unexplored area. The third study in this thesis is an initial step in this direction, which follows the first small-scale experimental work in Critical Discourse Studies (Hart 2018, 2020). The established validity of experimental research motivated by “hypotheses made on the back of qualitative analyses of observed (differences in) discourse data” (Hart 2018: 405) paves the way forward for reception studies of ideological shift in interpreting. These could indicate whether the discursive phenomena of mitigation and intensification observed between source texts and targets texts by researchers attuned to their potential rhetorical impact also affect general audiences and their understanding of radical politicians’ ideological orientation – which would be arguably the most socially consequential result of the phenomenon.

A further study planned by the PhD candidate attempts to bridge these research gaps in Critical Discourse Studies and Interpreting Studies. An experimental interpreter-

mediated discourse reception study will present participants representative of the general population, untrained in discourse-analytical methods or interpreting strategies, with ideologically loaded speeches or their interpreter-mediated, ideologically shifted realisations collected during the study reported in Paper 3. The participants will be tasked with rating the ideological orientation of the texts using a modified version of the euandi2019 questionnaire (Michel et al. 2019) employed in Paper 3, thus situating the source and target texts on a two-dimensional ideological spectrum. The study will therefore attempt to provide greater involvement of bottom-up input in studies of mediated political discourse by analysing audience reception of interpreter-mediated political discourse and, specifically, the perception of and susceptibility to the use of discursive strategies in texts. Its results will indicate whether ideological shifts, and indeed the overall mediation of political discourse via an intermediary, influence the general public's perception of political speeches and, in extension, of the self- and other-presentation of political actors who produce them.

Together, the papers which constitute this PhD thesis serve as stepping stones towards further exploration of the effects of mediation of radical discourses in under-researched areas of the public sphere. As the significance of both visual and multilingual communication in political discourse continues to grow together with wider technological and demographic changes, the mainstreaming of radical discourses requires academic attention beyond the most commonly studied contexts of traditional, monological news outlets and monolingual discourses. The studies propose novel, systematic frameworks of analysis in both studies of image-based social media discourse and in studies of interpreter-mediated political discourse, which in this thesis, to a greater degree than in previous research, involve the interpreter as a discursive agent holding their own worldviews and opinions. It is my hope that the findings of this thesis point not only to the validity of combining methods and theories for the study of mediated political communication in social media and interpreting, but also to the significance that such seemingly minute and niche phenomena carry with regards to our everyday lived experience.

Abstract

In the increasingly mediatised and multilingual public sphere, radical political discourses are undergoing cyclical processes of mitigation which normalise their presence in the broader political debate. The recontextualization of such discourses in various social fields has been shown to lead to changes not only in language but also in patterns of perception of current socio-political issues. On social media, hitherto marginal radical voices have been able to find amplification for their policies, while in interpreter-mediated communication, radical political speeches have been weakened in their target language equivalents.

While the mediation of political discourse has received sizeable academic attention, its specific realisations in multimodal social media posts and in interpreting remain underresearched. This article-based PhD thesis attempts to address this research gap by exploring the self-presentation of radical political actors on image-based Instagram and the simultaneous interpreting of ideologically loaded parliamentary speeches. Over its three constitutive papers, this thesis takes the overarching aim of investigating how different types of discourse mediation may result in radical political texts being mitigated for their target audiences. By triangulating theories and approaches stemming from Critical Discourse Studies, studies of social media and Interpreting Studies, the mediation of political discourse is analysed both in new contexts and using novel methods.

Paper 1 (Dobkiewicz 2019) is a case study of Donald Trump's 2016 presidential campaign on Instagram. The analysis of multimodal texts comprising images and their accompanying captions is performed using tools of the Discourse-Historical Approach and analytical categories of visual grammar. Its results suggest that positive self-presentation of the candidate was foregrounded, while negative other-presentation was limited. The campaign is evaluated for the three features of the populist far-right ideology, of which the populist division of societies between "the people" and "the elites" was visually prominent but superficial, authoritarianism was self-contradictory and nativism was notably underrepresented. It is speculated that visual representation of this final feature, which is based on ethnic discrimination, might have been seen as alienating for potential voters and was thus backgrounded. These conclusions, which stand in partial contrast to analyses of other outlets of the same candidate's campaign, indicate that discourse

mediation via multimodal social media has a highly mitigatory potential in political communication.

Paper 2 (Dobkiewicz, in press) is concerned with mediation of political discourse via simultaneous interpreting between English and Polish in the European Parliament. Specifically, the paper extends the scope of previous case studies of interpreter-mediated, ideologically loaded parliamentary speeches and the phenomenon of “interpreting shift” by analysing debate contributions from political actors across the whole political spectrum in the European Parliament. It also firmly grounds this research in the theoretical frameworks of the Discourse-Historical Approach and Interpreting Studies. The comparative analysis of source text and target text datasets gives further evidence of the wide array of linguistic strategies which contribute to ideological shifts in interpreting, while also indicating that nomination strategies are realised more neutrally in the target texts than predication strategies. However, no statistically significant relationship was found between the presence of ideological shifts and the specific ideological orientation of a source text. That said, numerical trends observed in the data do invite further research of the impact of ideological salience on the occurrence of ideological shifts, as the proportion of ideologically shifted tokens was higher in far-left and far-right texts than in centrist texts.

Paper 3 (Dobkiewicz et al. 2023) is a direct continuation of the previous study, where the occurrence of ideological shifts is analysed in interpretations of source texts controlled for their ideological orientation and produced in an experimental environment. The study includes an exploratory element, where participating interpreters’ political orientations, measured using a reliable questionnaire, are included in the analysis as a dependent variable. The results confirm the numerical trends observed in Paper 2, with higher ideological salience of the left- and right-wing source texts contributing to a higher rate of ideological shifts in the interpreter-mediated target texts than in the case of the ideologically neutral source text. Interpreters’ own political orientations, meanwhile, appears to have no significant effect on the occurrence of ideological shifts. This suggests that while mediation of political discourse via interpreting is overall likely to lead to radical texts’ ideological shift, interpreters’ professional neutrality is maintained when tasked with interpreting highly ideologically loaded speeches.

The findings of the thesis suggest that political texts, especially the most ideologically salient and most radical ones, are highly susceptible to mediation-induced

mitigation through strategic self- and other-presentation on image-based social media, and simultaneous interpreting of parliamentary debates.

Streszczenie

W ramach coraz bardziej zmediatyzowanej i wielojęzycznej sfery publicznej, radykalne dyskursy polityczne przechodzą cykliczne procesy mitygacji, które normalizują ich obecność w szerszej debacie politycznej. Rekontekstualizacja takich dyskursów w różnych obszarach społecznych została powiązana ze zmianami nie tylko w użyciu języka, ale także w sposobach postrzegania bieżących zagadnień społecznych społeczno-politycznych. Dotychczasowo marginalne radykalne głosy znajdują nagłośnienie w mediach społecznościowych, a w ramach komunikacji pośredniczonej przez tłumaczy ustnych, radykalne przemówienia polityczne zostają łagodzone w językach docelowych.

Chociaż mediacja dyskursu politycznego spotkała się ze znaczącą uwagą ze strony naukowców, jej konkretne realizacje w multimodalnych postach na mediach społecznościowych oraz w tłumaczeniu symultanicznym są w dalszym ciągu niedostatecznie zbadane. Niniejsza rozprawa doktorska będąca cyklem publikacji stanowi próbę wypełnienia tej luki w badaniach naukowych poprzez zgłębienie samoprezentacji radykalnych aktorów politycznych na będącym platformą opartą na obrazach Instagramie oraz w tłumaczeniu symultanicznym nacechowanych ideologicznie wystąpień parlamentarnych. Na przestrzeni trzech artykułów, bieżąca rozprawa podejmuje jako nadrzędny cel zbadanie tego, jak różne rodzaje mediacji dyskursów mogą prowadzić do mitygacji radykalnych tekstów politycznych w oczach ich odbiorców. Zagadnienie to analizowane jest zarówno w nowych kontekstach jak i z użyciem nowatorskich metod badawczych poprzez połączenie teorii i podejść wywodzących się z Krytycznej Analizy Dyskursu (Critical Discourse Studies), studiów nad mediami społecznościowymi oraz badań nad tłumaczeniem symultanicznym (Interpreting Studies).

Artykuł 1 (Dobkiewicz 2019) stanowi studium przypadku kampanii prezydenckiej Donalda Trumpa w 2016 roku na platformie Instagram. Analiza multimodalnych tekstów składających się z obrazów i ich podpisów oparta jest na narzędziach podejścia dyskursywno-historycznego (Discourse-Historical Approach) oraz kategoriach analitycznych gramatyki wizualnej. Jej wyniki sugerują, że pozytywna samoprezentacja kandydata została wysunięta na pierwszy plan, podczas gdy negatywna prezentacja innych aktorów społecznych została ograniczona. Kampania została przeanalizowana także w perspektywie trzech kluczowych cech skrajnie prawicowego populizmu, spośród

których populistyczny podział społeczeństw na „lud” i „elity” był wizualnie prominentny, acz powierzchowny, autorytaryzm był samozaprzeczający, a natywizm był wyraźnie niedoreprezentowany. Wysłany zostaje wniosek, że wizualna prezentacja ostatniej z tych cech, która opiera się na dyskryminacji ze względu na pochodzenie etniczne, mogłaby zostać uznana za nazbyt rażąca dla potencjalnych wyborców, w związku z czym została ona odsunięta na dalszy plan. Wnioski te, będące częściowo niezgodnymi z wynikami badań innych obszarów kampanii prezydenckiej tego samego kandydata, wskazują, że mediacja dyskursu poprzez multimodalne media społecznościowe ma wysoki potencjał mitygacji komunikacji politycznej.

Artykuł 2 (Dobkiewicz, w druku) zajmuje się mediacją dyskursu politycznego poprzez tłumaczenie symultaniczne pomiędzy językiem angielskim i polskim w Parlamencie Europejskim. Artykuł poszerza zakres poprzednich badań nacechowanych ideologicznie przemówień parlamentarnych pośredniczonych przez tłumaczy ustnych oraz zjawiska „przesunięcia ideologicznego” poprzez analizowanie wystąpień aktorów politycznych reprezentujących całe spektrum polityczne w Parlamencie Europejskim. Umiejscawia on również takie badania w ramach podejścia dyskursywno-historycznego i badań nad tłumaczeniem symultanicznym. Analiza komparatywna tekstów źródłowych i docelowych dostarcza dalszych dowodów na istnienie szerokiego wachlarza strategii językowych, które przyczyniają się do przesunięć ideologicznych w tłumaczeniu ustnym, a także pokazuje, że strategie nominacji realizowane są w tekstach docelowych bardziej neutralnie niż strategie predykcji. Nie znaleziono jednak statystycznie znaczącego związku pomiędzy obecnością przesunięć ideologicznych a konkretną orientacją ideologiczną danego tekstu źródłowego. Niemniej jednak, tendencje liczbowe zaobserwowane w zebranych danych wskazują, że proporcjonalnie więcej przesuniętych ideologicznie jednostek leksykalnych zaobserwowano w tekstach skrajnie lewicowych i skrajnie prawicowych niż w tekstach centrowych, co wskazuje kierunek dalszych badań.

Artykuł 3 (Dobkiewicz i in. 2023) stanowi bezpośrednie rozwinięcie poprzedniego badania. Występowanie przesunięcia ideologicznego analizowane jest w wyprodukowanych w warunkach eksperymentalnych tłumaczeniach symultanicznych tekstów o kontrolowanym nacechowaniu ideologicznym. Elementem mającym eksploracyjny charakter jest zmierzenie za pomocą rzetelnego kwestionariusza orientacji politycznej uczestniczących w badaniu tłumaczy. Uzyskane w ten sposób dane włączone są do analizy jako zmienna zależna. Wyniki badania potwierdzają tendencje liczbowe

zaobserwowane w Artykule 2, jako że silniejsze nacechowanie ideologiczne lewicowego i prawicowego tekstu źródłowego przekłada się na wyższy współczynnik przesunięć ideologicznych w tekstach docelowych niż w przypadku neutralnych ideologicznie tekstów źródłowych. Orientacja polityczna uczestniczących w badaniu tłumaczy, z kolei, nie ma statycznie znaczącego wpływu na występowanie przesunięć ideologicznych. Wskazuje to na wysokie prawdopodobieństwo tego, że mediacja dyskursu politycznego poprzez tłumaczenie symultaniczne może prowadzić do przesunięcia ideologicznego radykalnych tekstów źródłowych, ale zawodowa neutralność tłumaczy zostaje zachowana w przypadku tłumaczenia wystąpień wysoce nacechowanych ideologicznie.

Całościowe wyniki poniższej rozprawy doktorskiej wskazują na to, że teksty polityczne, zwłaszcza te najbardziej nacechowane ideologicznie i najbardziej radykalne, są wysoce podatne na mitygację w wyniku mediacji w postaci strategicznej samoprezentacji i prezentacji innych aktorów społecznych na mediach społecznościowych opartych na obrazach oraz w postaci tłumaczenia symultanicznego debat parlamentarnych.

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Appendix A: Author contribution statement 1 (Polish)

Oświadczenie o wkładzie autorów i autorek

Dobkiewicz, Patryk. 2019. "Instagram narratives in Trump's America: Multimodal social media and mitigation of right-wing populism", *Journal of Language and Politics* 18, 6: 826-847.

Autor wyżej wymienionego artykułu naukowego deklaruje następujący wkład w powstanie artykułu:

Patryk Dobkiewicz (100%): konceptualizacja, zbieranie danych, analiza danych, przygotowanie manuskryptu, redakcja tekstu

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Appendix B: Author contribution statement 1 (English)

Author contribution statement

Dobkiewicz, Patryk. 2019. "Instagram narratives in Trump's America: Multimodal social media and mitigation of right-wing populism", *Journal of Language and Politics* 18, 6: 826-847.

The author of the research article declares the following contribution to the article:

Patryk Dobkiewicz (100%): conceptualisation, data collection, data analysis, manuscript drafting, manuscript editing

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Appendix C: Author contribution statement 2 (Polish)

Oświadczenie o wkładzie autorów i autorek

Dobkiewicz, Patryk. In press. "Ideological shift in interpreted parliamentary speeches: Conference interpreter as meaning co-constructor", *Studia Anglica Posnaniensia. An International Review of English Studies*.

Autor wyżej wymienionego artykułu naukowego deklaruje następujący wkład w powstanie artykułu:

Patryk Dobkiewicz (100%): konceptualizacja, zbieranie danych, analiza danych, przygotowanie manuskryptu, redakcja tekstu

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Promotorki rozprawy doktorskiej:

dr hab. Agnieszka Chmiel, prof. UAM

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Appendix D: Author contribution statement 2 (English)

Author contribution statement

Dobkiewicz, Patryk. In press. "Ideological shift in interpreted parliamentary speeches: Conference interpreter as meaning co-constructor", *Studia Anglica Posnaniensia. An International Review of English Studies*.

The author of the research article declares the following contribution to the article:

Patryk Dobkiewicz (100%): conceptualisation, data collection, data analysis, manuscript drafting, manuscript editing

Author:

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Appendix E: Author contribution statement 3 (Polish)

Oświadczenie o wkładzie autorów i autorek

Dobkiewicz, Patryk, Agnieszka Chmiel and Małgorzata Fabiszak. 2023. "Source text ideological load modulates ideological shifts in interpreting right-wing and left-wing political discourse, but interpreters' political orientation does not", *Ampersand* 11: 1-12.

Autorzy wyżej wymienionego artykułu naukowego deklarują następujący wkład w powstanie artykułu:

Patryk Dobkiewicz (80%): konceptualizacja, zbieranie danych, analiza danych, przygotowanie manuskryptu, redakcja tekstu

Agnieszka Chmiel (10%): analiza statystyczna, przygotowanie manuskryptu

Małgorzata Fabiszak (10%): konceptualizacja, przygotowanie manuskryptu

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Appendix F: Author contribution statement 3 (English)

Author contribution statement

Dobkiewicz, Patryk, Agnieszka Chmiel and Małgorzata Fabiszak. 2023. “Source text ideological load modulates ideological shifts in interpreting right-wing and left-wing political discourse, but interpreters’ political orientation does not”, *Ampersand* 11: 1-12.

The authors of the research article declare the following contributions to the article:

Patryk Dobkiewicz (80%): conceptualisation, data collection, data analysis, manuscript drafting, manuscript editing

Agnieszka Chmiel (10%): statistical analysis, manuscript drafting

Małgorzata Fabiszak (10%): conceptualisation, manuscript drafting

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Appendix G: Letter of acceptance for publication – Dobkiewicz (in press)

From: Studia Anglica Posnaniensia em@editorialmanager.com
Subject: Your Submission to Studia Anglica Posnaniensia
Date: 22 May 2023 at 19:43
To: Patryk Dobkiewicz patdob1@amu.edu.pl



CC: mkrygier@wa.amu.edu.pl

Ref.: Ms. No. StAP-D-23-00011
Ideological shift in interpreted parliamentary speeches: Conference interpreter as meaning co-constructor
Studia Anglica Posnaniensia: An International Review of English Studies

Dear Mr Dobkiewicz,

I am pleased to tell you that your work has now been accepted for publication in Studia Anglica Posnaniensia: An International Review of English Studies.

Comments from the Editor and Reviewers can be found below.

In the coming days you will be contacted by the editor responsible for preparing your manuscript for publication.

Thank you for submitting your work to our journal.

With kind regards

Marcin Krygier
Editor in Chief
Studia Anglica Posnaniensia: An International Review of English Studies

Comments from the Editors and Reviewers:

Reviewer #1: Some detailed comments are provided in the manuscript.

Reviewer #2: The paper deals within an interesting and in the recent times very important issue of the influence of interpreter on the message included in the interpreted text within the context of politics. The Author presents a broad knowledge of the subject, offers a well-structured introduction to the area. The study - although, as the Author clearly states, limited in scope - has been conducted in a correct manner. The conclusions are clear and convincing although I agree with the Author that the subject matter deserves a further study on a larger corpus.

In compliance with data protection regulations, you may request that we remove your personal registration details at any time. (Use the following URL: <https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.editorialmanager.com%2Fstap%2Flogin.asp%3Fa%3Dr&data=05%7C01%7Cpatdob1%40amu.edu.pl%7C2764bbfa7f4647d7673808db5aec14a0%7C73689ee1b42f4e25a5f666d1f29bc092%7C0%7C0%7C638203742234738705%7CUnknown%7CTWFPbGZsb3d8eyJWljoimc4wLjAwMDAiLCJQljoiv2luMzliLjBtIi6k1haWwILCjXVCi6Mn0%3D%7C3000%7C%7C&sdata=vwN5l%2FFpzx1FTIEVhX%2FC8gAXMlzQFP4Yo9wiol7CE%3D&reserved=0>). Please contact the publication office if you have any questions.