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Thesis for the degree of
"DOCTOR OF SOCIOLOGY"

"Citizens Soldier" Military - The Contribution to Socialization in the Late-Modern Era

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I have studied the history, the processes that have led us to this point, and especially the reality of the past decade. I have studied social networks that today determine the agenda, I learned to observe and listen, read and analyze, and determine what goes on.

Also, I thought of what I have undergone for the past three decades of being an educator for the Israeli society.

During this significant period, I have adopted a new hobby related to my scientific experience, that I could not have envisaged. I published three books on the relationship between the IDF and the Israeli society in various contexts. It was an empowering experience that led me to continue my research and reach the required conclusions.

I had many partners on the long road – friends from my military service, intellectuals, academics, politicians, students and soldiers, people in media – a whole world. During this period my own children have enlisted and finished their army duty. I watched them and tried to determine – to what extent this experience molded them?

I am at the end of another stage in this unique experience with a deep sense of satisfaction. I have conducted the research, but without the help and push of many, I doubt I could maintain the level of energy required along the way.

Research thinking process

The process at the basis of this study started with the publication of the book 'The Israeli reserve army is sinking' by Dov Tamari, 2012. Tamari claims that the model of the 'citizen-soldier military' has lost its operative value. This claim is based on a number of theories over the past decades, dealing with processes taking place in the Israeli society, mainly as a result of post-modernism trends and the processes in Central Europe and the Western World (Ben-Eliezer, 2012; Levy 2014), as well as deep changes in the nature of the battle field (Lutwak, 2002; Lebel, 2011).

What bothered me most was the operative aspect of this claim since between the years 2011-2013 I finished my M.A. studies relating to national security. During this period, I learned about the Gordian knot between national strength and military power, both milestones in the Israeli national concept of security. The 'sinking' metaphor of the citizen-soldier military has a crucial influence on the Israeli ethos, solidarity and willingness to enlist the army, as well as on the army's operative ability to cope with the plethora of threats surrounding our country.

From my personal dissonance resulting from the gap between theories on the dysfunction of the citizen-soldier military in our generation, and the reality, I felt the need for a field study to provide a clear empirical picture. Hence the thinking process and my understanding that a vast comparative study is required to understand the social effect of military service in view of individualistic processes resulting from late-modern concepts. It was essential to understand whether the Israeli society has lost the sentiment of sacrifice for the 'collective', as expressed by the extent of individuals enlisting in the army. It was clear that the study question had to deal with the social effectiveness of service in the national army. The basis of the discussion is the paradigmatic question dealing with functionality of a defense-social mechanism aiming at establishing a milestone for national solidarity.

I was exposed to many theories dealing with these issues but could not detect significant research in this connection. The gap in empirical knowledge about the social effects of service in the citizen-soldier military during the last decades increased my motivation to investigate the subject scientifically.

Another contribution to my motivation was the fact that there is an authentic argument going on in Israel considering the possibility of adopting the western model of a professional army (Arad, 2010). This model is also doubted by some in western countries who think they should turn the wheels back and establish a national army. I saw that this was an extremely relevant issue both scientifically and practically, hence its importance (U.K-M.O.D, 2021).

Figure No. 1 - Research Question Design - Schema

I saw that a unique empirical study could fulfill the gap in knowledge between theory and practice. I learned that during this past generation the Israeli society finds itself in a considerable struggle over the ethos issue (Lewin, 2013). It is affected by inter-generational contexts of military service, even within the family. Moreover, I learned that military service is related to social values but there is an extensive dispute relating to the strength and quality of the connection (Yair, 2011).

I also understood that the issue of gender affects the discourse – the integration of females in the military service, especially in combat units. Some theoreticians view this as a post-modern trend, but also here I had difficulty identifying its essence and strength.

An in-depth study of the theories developed on the subject led me to define the sub-questions of the research: the effect of service on social ethos, the value effect of the service, inter-generational influences and the gender context.

I was exposed to a study by Zvi Barkai (2007) dealing with the political implications of compulsory military service and found that when dealing with the effects of compulsory service one needs to compare youth before enlisting, and 'fresh' citizens after service. When the participants in the study are younger than 17 years, or older than 24 they are distanced from the effects of the military service. Therefore, the study needs to focus on the population for whom military service is highly relevant. Therefore, we need to compare high-school students before service and people no more than four years after their compulsory service.

The conservative research methodology of physical questionnaires or interviews is complicated for the study of this population – access to high-school students requires authorization of the educational system and the school principals, and for those serving in the army or just released one needs the approval of army authorities. The IDF Department of Behavioral Sciences does not provide access to the participants. My application to them would not have provided the extent of data required and there was also a chance that the data provided will be biased because of structured organizational interests.

The main challenge was methodical. During the years I formulated my study I could circumvent these problems through social media which was then developing. The educational and the security establishment do not forbid students and soldiers from participating in social media. Over the past decade they have become the main platform for communication and discussion, containing numerous easily accessible groups, active throughout the day and night, thanks to the extended distribution of smart-phones. This enabled me to connect with the two groups I wanted to compare. Over one year I formulated a pilot of an interactive questionnaire based on Google Forms.

I found that those active in the social services were extremely willing to participate and the data collection platform was very effective- mainly because most of the participants are young, and the actually "live" in social networks most of the day based in their smartphones. I thus developed a semi-structured questionnaire that enabled me to collect the data for statistical analyses related to the core of my research.

I encountered difficulties when I tried to communicate with unique populations, mainly minorities in the Israeli society, as well as the orthodox Jews. These are closed communities with limited access. As the researcher is a former senior officer in the army, the basic suspicions towards me created a methodological challenge. I therefore joined a group of researchers dealing with the liberal-national equilibrium in Israel. This afforded me direct communication with representatives of the above groups, and enabled me to present to them the idea of my study (Itsik, 2014). They approved, and based on the idea of a 'snowball' I reached hundreds of respondents from the above backgrounds.

Figure No. 2 - Research Methodology Design - Schema

The combination of an authentic research issue, of a theoretical and practical importance, and an innovative methodology for data collection were a significant motivational component for me as to the choice of my methodology and for the study participants. I was thus able to sample most groups in Israel without any geographical, ethnic or religious boundaries. The fascinating combination of a very wide sample and innovative methodologies opened a wide study field enabling me to develop my scientific thoughts on the subject, mainly the relation between national institutions, such as the army, and society, and their implications on social values, national strengths and additional social tendencies.

In the process, every sub-question was almost a separate research, hence the study was evolving: every part was published in a peer-reviewed journal, so every part includes a reflection of 2 reviewers – this process granted the research validity, all in all – after Prof. Nowak, my supervisor gave his remarks, every part of this research is improved after taking consideration of 10 more reviewers.

The articles contribution to the research question – analysis and results:

Article	Author	Contribution in %	Description
Israel's Defense Ethos– Military service as a Turning Point	Ronen Itsik	20%	Understanding the trends, and the mental effect during military service
Compulsory military service as a social integrator	Ronen Itsik	30%	Revealing the true value effect, and understanding the differences between the groups
The Inter-Generational Effect of Military Service	Ronen Itsik	25%	Revealing the volunteering motivation in the Israeli society, and it's connection to military service
Military Service and Female empowerment	Ronen Itsik	10%	Revealing the differences between genders in view of military service
Motivation for Reserve Service in Israel	Ronen Itsik	15%	The effect of reserve service concerning the ethos and resource allocation in Israel

Summary

Historically military service in most countries has been a social mechanism in addition to its defense implications (Janowitz, 1964). All over the world citizens have enlisted in the army as part of their contribution to their countries, their solidarity and often as part of their family culture which has become a tradition (Moskos, 2000). The establishment of the IDF was based on the idea that the military will build a new society- from a diverse community of migrants towards a cohesive society. The IDF had two main objectives: to defend Israel's security and to be a powerful socialization platform that educate the youth by compulsory service between the age 18-21, and a strike force based on retired soldiers that are called to reserve service (Tamari, 2012).

In many countries recruitment to the army is based on values of patriotism, and motivation to contribute to the community. Many societies have been built on the ethos of military service, especially in those countries surrounded by enemies and often involved in military confrontations (Janowitz, 1964). These countries adopted the model of 'citizen-soldier army' as serving in the army was a milestone in national security, both from the defensive and social aspects. In this way the military service was assimilated as an ethos, and was educated from elementary school stage (Lebel and Dahan-Caleb, 2004).

Changes in the western world after the Second World War, and especially after the disintegration of the Soviet Union led to different models of military service (Tamari, 2012). The reduction in military threats, developments in technology to replace manpower in the battlefields, the changes in the nature of security threats that became sub-country, terror and subversion-based, led to significant change in the mix of service in various armies (Lutwak, 2002). Also, economic considerations have led many countries to reduce the size of their armies, and base themselves on changes in globalization that enabled international treaties and mutual defense agreements against military threats (Ben-Eliezer, 2014).

The central change in western armies is the shift to professional service model, and abolition of compulsory service, that was the basis for the 'citizen-soldier' model.

The service in the professional army is mainly voluntary, where only a small percentage of society have military roles, mainly for economic reasons and the absence of other employment options. Currently the main reason for serving in the professional army is individualistic, part of the late-modern era where motivation to sacrifice for the collective is eroded (Moskos and Segal, 2000).

Over the past two decades many countries that have undergone change from the citizen-soldier model to the professional model identify a decline in the defense ethos, erosion in the level of patriotism and in general identify an increasing gap in aspects of social solidarity and national stamina (Moskos, 2002). In most of these countries the core of military man-power comes from the low socio-economic echelon, and the death toll that caused by wars and terror incidents became a burden of the weak layer in the population (Elder, Wang, Spence, Adkins and Brown, 2010).

However, in recent years some of these countries have started deliberating the dilemma of returning to the national model. This is mainly apparent in countries where there has been a recent deterioration in defense stability, and they are required to respond to a scenario of a general war that requires the enlisting of many (Persson and Sundevall, 2019): Part of the Baltic states evaluated recently their military power against a possible Russian invasion and found out that they lack in ground forces due to a shortage in man-power as a cause of the professional military model (Häggblom, 2020). Another example is the latest decision in the U.K to empower reserve military service due to the 'Brexit' consequences on alliances with E.U countries (UK-M.O.D, 2021).

Israel has been relying on a 'citizen-soldier' military since its establishment in 1948, after the War of Independence. Since the 1990s there has been a significant improvement in defense stability based on peace agreements signed with different Arab countries, and on advanced technology enabling the reduction of security threats, and improved control of actions challenging peace along the borders (Tamari, 2012). There have been many changes in Israel since its establishment – economic growth, dramatic demographic development, and significant reinforcement of liberal social values. There are those who claim that Israel, with its vast history of military confrontations, has also undergone late-modern phenomena, mainly in relation to individualistic considerations relating to the military service (Lebel, 2011).

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Nearly 70% of the Israeli population currently serve in the IDF based on the national model. This shows reduced motivation for enlisting since the 1990s. Nevertheless, some researchers claim that serving in the national army is vastly important for the conservation of social solidarity and national strength (Stern, 2009). It also helps portray the IDF as a socialization platform for furthering democratic values such as pluralism and multi-culturalism (Tishler and Hadad, 2011). In a society characterized by religious, economic and national rifts such values are crucial in the context of cohesion, hence the importance of serving in the citizen-soldier army (Lebel, 2012).

In view of the possible social contribution of military service there are those who claim that national service has now become a dividing platform based on inter-religious conflicts and divisions between religious and secular people and discussions on gender issues (Levy, 2014; Ben-Eliezer 2012).

These researchers claim that the IDF became dysfunctional in its role as a normative-value mechanism to help cohesion in view of incessant stress among those who serve, pointing to increased polarization in their social concepts that are developed in the text:

1) The national conflict between Jews and non-Jews, especially Arabs – according to some researches the military service in Israel increases the gap due to the fact that minorities conscript in low percentage
2) The socio-economical gap – where according to some of the researches is broaden due to the fact that conscripts from high socio-economical echelon prefer serving in non-combat units.
3) The religious-ideological gap – where religious restriction forbid military service, especially where female serve.

The current study aims to respond the knowledge gaps between concepts relating to the contribution of service in the citizen-soldier army and the conflicts described above. This is a vastly significant issue for countries reconsidering the mix of those serving in the army, and especially for Israel that is in a crucial junction in relation to social conflicts, mainly between national and liberal concepts, not in the view of ethnic nationalism, but a state nationalism, a form that can more reasonably be subsumed under conservatism (Alexander, 2013), than nationalism with its typical sense of the superiority of one's own community over other communities.

In order to respond to this issue we need an in-depth and extensive study combining qualitative and quantitative methodologies, comparatively examining the value-social effects of military service between soldiers who had served in the army and youngsters before military service. Juxtaposing these two populations with issues related to values should show which concepts are changed during military service, to what extent and the reasons for these phenomena.

Between the years 2015-2020, 3400 men and women responded to a semi-structured interactive questionnaire that was passed on the social networks. These participants cultural, demographic and national characteristics was similar to the population serving in the IDF.

Half of the respondents were high-school students (average age 17) and the other half have finished their military service (average age 22). The respondents were asked to state their level of identification with tens of phrases dealing with different conflicts in the Israeli society. The participants had an option to leave out details for an in-depth personal interview at a later date. The questionnaire results were gathered on google sheets enabling analysis of the credibility of the answers and invalidating double or incoherent answers.

The analysis of the findings shows a significance effect of the compulsory military service on concepts and values. They show erosion in the defense ethos and the threats conceived during military service, as well as the reinforcement of liberal and democratic values.

Moreover, the findings show considerable differences in the effect of military service between men and women, and show motivation for service resulting from the need to volunteer for society and integration, beyond the defense motivation that characterized enlisting the army in previous generations. In addition, findings show that the tradition of military service within the Israeli family is conserved, as the more significant the service of the parents, the greater the motivation of their children to volunteer for a stronger community, enlisting in the army and taking greater responsibility as officers in the army.

The vast majority of respondents, both from high-school and after the service prefer the citizen-soldier model over the professional model of service.

The most important findings of the study show increased level of pluralism, emphasizing tolerance for minorities in the comparison between high-school students and those after military service. It was found that tolerance for other religions and cultures increases during military service as well as the level of agreement. This finding is not affected by socio-economic aspects or the respondent's age – it is a significant result of military service of any type, and refutes claims about the dysfunction of serving in the IDF as a mechanism of social solidarity. Moreover, this shows great effectiveness of the mechanism of military service as calming social conflicts and leading to cohesion.

The presentation of the IDF as a test case for the effectiveness of serving in the 'citizen-soldier' military it is claimed that despite social changes since the establishment of the state, the IDF fulfills its social goal as formulated upon its inception, and therefore the national service model is a platform that can provide response to conflicts in different societies, especially those related to migration or socio-economic gaps. Hence, serving in the citizen-soldier army even in these times is a functional platform for social integration, the reinforcement of democratic values and serves as a solid basis for social solidarity and national strength.

Chapter 1:
<u>Introduction and research objectives</u>

1. Background and motivation

In the 20th century, most of the western world's armies were based on compulsory service, with a Citizen-Soldier model[1] of recruitment. Importantly, the military service was used as a socialization platform, in order to strengthen social cohesion as an element of cultural ethos (Janowitz, 1964; Moskos and Segal, 2000; Krebs, 2005). Nowadays, western-world armies are based mainly on the professional model[2], and the service is no longer used for social needs. Indeed, most civilians of western countries do not participate in military service. Some argue that due to this a gap has opened between the civil-society and the national establishment, decreasing the importance of republican values in the general population (Hajjar, 2013).

At the time of the establishment of the state of Israel (1948), it was decided that the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) would be a military based on the Citizen-Soldier model (Ben-Gurion, 1971). One of the reasons for this was the need to build cohesiveness between a society of migrants, in order to straighten the bond between the civilian and the nation (Gal, 2000). The idea of an army that serves cultural ethos was not new; it had been used in countries that were established (or re-established) after a major crisis or a war (Hastings, 1997).

In the 70 years that has passed since the IDF was established, Israeli society experienced major changes: security threats have lessened, and the influx of migrants decreased dramatically (Tamari, 2012). Nowadays 40% of the youth do not join the army due to health conditions[3], and religion restrictions[4] (Tishler and Hadad, 2011).

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[1] A recruitment model where all civilians have to join the army by law
[2] A model that is based on volunteers
[3] Physical standing disabilities, mental difficulties, and chronic disease that requires intensive medication treatment
[4] Especially serving along with females. In the ultra-orthodox community the state provides an exemption.

In addition to that, the Israeli society is facing challenges other than security threats; most of them concern national, economical, religious, and political gaps within its society (Levy, 2007). Nevertheless, the military service model in Israel has not changed.

Despite the major role the IDF plays in Israeli society (Ben-Eliezer, 2012) and the extreme changes Israel has undergone since its establishment, in the last decade just a few empirical studies were conducted about the relationship between civil and the army, military service affects social attitudes, national values, and ethos. Indeed, there is a knowledge gap. Hence, based on the above, it is important to understand the type of society a "Citizen-Soldier" army creates, and to examine if indeed it corresponds with the intentions of the nation's forefathers, and with the new social and national challenges – that is the main goal of this research.

2. Research questions

At present, the IDF is one of few armies in the world that is based on the Citizen-Soldier model. More importantly, the role of the IDF as a social mechanism is still regarded by the country's leadership and many of its citizens as equal in its importance to its strictly military role. From this arises a critical debate: on the one hand, there are doubts about the military service contribution to the civil-society cohesiveness, considering that only 60% of the population serves (Ben-Eliezer, 2012). On the other hand, it is argued that the military service is still Israel's "tribal fire", with a major contribution to the strengthening of patriotism and pluralism values (Stern, 2009).

This debate becomes dramatic considering the fact that 50% of Israel's young population enters the labor market just in the age of 24-25 due to compulsory military service – this fact influences the entire workforce productivity in Israel, causing more economical and sociological challenges (Arad, 2010).

The current research examines the social effect of military service in a Citizen-Soldier army, using the IDF as a case study. In the last 15 years, most studies dealt with military recruit's motivation prior to service but hardly any data exists regarding the effect of the service on their views upon discharge from service.

Main Research Question:

How does the service in a 'citizen soldier' military affect social and national attitudes?

Secondary Research Questions:

1. What kind of ethos is formulated during military service in the IDF?

2. How does compulsory military service in Israel affect social integration?

3. How does parents military service in Israel affects their children's motivation to contribute for the society?

4. What are the differences between genders concerning the social role of military service in the IDF?

3. Research assumptions

The current study has the potential to be an important evidence to the essential contribution of compulsory military service in IDF, to major social democratic processes, by leading to a consensual society, and reducing social polarization:

1. The defense ethos defines mostly teenagers, while discharged soldiers are moderate, with a liberal trend.

2. Compulsory military service in Israel affects social integration by empowering the value "Pluralism", combined with tolerance and acceptance. This contributes social solidarity and cohesion.

3. Parents who served in IDF mediate the service to their children as a community contribution more than a security contribution. Hence, the motivation for military evolved as social.

4. During military service woman are more affected socially then man- the service in rear unites that characterizes women more than men enrich them with inter-personal communication skills and social awareness.

4. Theoretical background

4.1 The Citizen-soldier Military

The Citizen-Soldier model was established long ago, as the main social participation in national tasks, mainly in "new-born" states. Aside of being a security organization, the military was a cultural socialization mechanism, that assimilated national identity and values like patriotism, and solidarity (Janowitz, 1964).

Another aspect of military service effect is generation continuity, as a heritage "from father to son". In this way, norms and values had been assimilated by families, which generated a spiral effect, designing the military service as the most significant cultural achievement (Moskos and Segal, 2000). Aside that, after experiencing a range of security duties, military personnel tend to adapt to an ethos, mostly national. In time, and especially after the 1990's, the ethos could be designed in two forms: republican ethos, or a liberal ethos[5], a trend that accrued in western world states, as a part of the late-modern era (Lewin, 2013) .

There are theoreticians who claim that this kind of service decelerates liberal social processes that are vital to democratic societies (Levy, 2011). Others argue that discharged soldiers are characterized by Islamophobia[6], due to continuous wars against terror organizations (Ben-Eliezer, 2014). Even in the education field, there are arguments that since the 1990's families and schools had been weakened as a socialization platform, hence an erosion of the spiral-generation military cultural effect (Lebel, and Dahan-Caleb, 2004).

In summary, the late modern effects on the Citizen-Soldier military and its cultural impact raise a grand dilemma: Is the service in a Citizen-Soldier military model still relevant to its original social duty, as a socialization platform?

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[5] According to Lewin, a citizen who believes in a national ethos will describe its country as a defending shield against threats. A citizen who believes in a liberal ethos will describe it as a place to live in, not necessarily vital for the survival of the people.
[6] Hatred towards Muslim citizens as an outcome of terror attacks and the war against terror

4.2 Military service and the Late-Modern era

Postmodernism is generally defined by an attitude of skepticism, irony, or rejection toward the meta-narratives and ideologies of modernism (Duignan, 2020). The Citizen-Soldier army was in past, a consensual case; it was narratived as the nation's "tribal fire". In the last decades it became an issue under debate, where high percentage of youths avoided joining the army, because they did not see it as an important cultural values. Hence, nations changed their recruiting and service model to a volunteer and professional army. Nonetheless military researchers describe that the Israeli society faces a 'Late-Modern' trend, meaning that although there are parts or groups in the society that characterized by post-modernism values (Lebel, 2011), the vast majority still view national values as essential for social resilience, mainly the value of service in a citizen-soldier military (Zigdon, 2008).

Since the 1990's there were major changes in military organizations around the world: most of them became professional based on volunteers, a model that replaced the Citizen-Soldier army (Moskos and Segal, 2000). In addition to that, there was a significant transformation in security challenges: wars against states and conventional armies became rare, and military power invested nowadays mainly in wars against terror organizations, peacekeeping missions, and natural disaster challenges (Lutwak, 1996; Mosoks and Segal, 2000).

The liberal economic perception had also a great impact on military structure, changing military force into small and smart, hi-tech orientated organizations, based on computers, robotics, and intelligence (Tishler and Haddad, 2011). Nowadays in most of western world armies, less than 5 percent of the population are participating in military service, a trend that weakened the military effect on societies and cultures, reducing its impact as a "tribal-fire" (Havman and Levy-Zeira, 2014).

Even in the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) that was historically based on the Citizen-Soldier model as a generator of cultural ethos, just 60% of the population is participating nowadays (Tishler and Haddad, 2011). Due to that, there are theoreticians who claim that the IDF ended its part as a cultural socialization platform.

Beyond that, there are researchers who argue that the IDF became an organization in conflict, falling its task to bridge on the main Israeli social gaps: national, economical, and political (Ben-Eliezer, 2004).

4.3 Military service in a paradigmatic turning point

Emile Durkheim, the sociologist who led the Functional Paradigm, followed by Talcott Parsons, saw the civilian community as an organ that seeks for balance. They argued that in any society there are mechanisms that act as a foundation stone in stabilizing, and empowering solidarity and consensus (Durkheim, 1914; Parsons, 1959). Parsons described four mechanisms assimilating beliefs and values through a socialization process in society: cultural, normative, political, and economical.

The military, mainly in newborn states, acted for long years as a cultural mechanism, and after 3-4 generations, it became a normative mechanism[7] (Moskos and Segal, 2000). This process characterized the IDF until the 1990's, then a diversity became between Israeli sociologists: One group still see in the military a functional social mechanism, others see in it a conflictual mechanism that acts in opposite of what it meant to be.

The "conflictual" group of sociologists argue that the military service in Israel became a platform for social struggle between religious institutions and liberal organizations (Ben-Eliezer, 2014; Levy, 2014), hence empowering social gaps. This process can be connected to a social phenomenon described by the sociologist Robert Merton, who defined problematic social mechanisms as "dis-functional" (Merton, 1968).

The "conflictual" theoreticians' group's conclusion is that if the military service in the IDF became a conflict generator, although it may strengthen integration within minority groups, then it is a dis-functional organization that has to be reformed in order to fulfill its part as a social consensus platform.

The question is if indeed the military service in Israel, the "citizen-soldier" army, became dis-functional?

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[7] An organization that assimilates norms by anchoring it as laws, rules, and restrictions

4.4 Military service effects on cultural identity and values

The military service effect on social values could be a way to examine the functionality of the organization as a socialization agent. First Israeli Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion, designed the IDF as a socialization platform- he described the Israeli soldier as **"The modern Jew",** a one that is "clean" from the historical diaspora Jewish identity and values (Ben-Gurion, 1971)[8].

Ben-Gurion designed the IDF as a 'cultural melting pot', that collect teenagers from a variety of cultures, turning them through the service into **"New Israelis"**, defined by common values such as patriotism and social tolerance. However, 50 years after the foundation of the IDF, new social challenges became eminent in Israel: the increasing gap between religious and seculars, and the national gap between Jews and Arabs.

Sociologists who studied military effects on social values in Israel discovered that although there are religious and national tensions in Israeli society, these tensions are not obstructive to the quietening effect in military service, which bridges over social gaps (Barkai, 2007). The role of the military service as a bridge above ethnic gaps has been studied and examined in the Canadian military. The findings pointed that the service enclosed gaps and decreased tensions between Anglo-sax and Francophones[9] cadets and soldiers (Rennick, 2012).

The quieting effect through military service is been explained as an outcome of the "Organizational socialization" theory. The assimilation of military unit's values among soldiers affects their beliefs, and stabilize a consensual atmosphere that makes them more tolerant through time, hence bridging between significant cultural gaps (Samia, 2008). This effect is also empowering values as patriotism and pluralism (Lewin, 2013).

The military unit social effect can be dramatic: Sociologists that examined the IDF describe the service as an identity national stabilizer, as an outcome of being together under extreme challenges (Popper, 1998). This process drives to an identity discourse, that brings authentic beliefs (Taylor, 1992), and common values (Eggen, 2012).

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[8] Ben-Gurion described the diaspora Jew as frightened, without self-confidence, and confused with identity
[9] The main two cultures in Canada, that live under continued ethnic tensions

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4.5 Inter generation effects

Military service affects also the family. Although the symptom of the post-modern era, where it is argued that parental authority has weakened (Moskos and Segal, 2000), there are still inherited values from parents who served as soldiers to their children (Booth, Segal, and Bell, 2007). A study conducted in the U.S military found that military families tend to be more independent, and defined by republican values (Macholmes, 2012). A research that conducted in the IDF found that in a military family, where the father serves as a reserve soldier, it is most likely that his children will act the same, and join the military as combat soldiers (Itsik, 2013).

The explanation to the phenomenon above is the way that children inherit pre-entry values towards military service from their parents, as a part of the organizational socialization (Cable and Parsons, 2001). They actually adapt military values, such as solidarity and patriotism from youth.

It turns out that despite individualism trends, the parents' military service affects their children's values. Another research that examined children volunteering motivation found that there is a significant correlation between the parent being a reserve soldier and his children's motivation to join volunteering tasks after school time (Huebner and Mancini, 2005). Studies about teenagers volunteering in society tasks found out that the pluralism value is strong among these youths (Dewey, 2008).

In summary, the cultural effect of military service in a "Citizen-Soldier" army is in a crucial debate. Most studies on this issue, mainly in the IDF, have been conducted more than a decade ago, since then dramatic social changes accrued: Groups in society became separatist and extremist because of cultural, religious, and national tense (Peled and Peled, 2019). Hence, it has become increasingly important to study the social effect of the military service today, where a great gap has opened between these groups in Israeli society.

4.6 Gender conflicts

The service of females in the military in general and in combat units in particular is at the center of the academic discourse on army and society over the past years – mainly the issue of integration of women in a totally masculine environment is a subject dividing the Israeli society (Schwartz and Co, 2018).

Conservative factors, mainly religious, vigorously oppose the recruitment of women in the army, in opposition to the liberals, that act towards advancing women in military roles and their integration in all military units. During the past decade the number of women in combat units of the IDF has more than doubled and they serve along the borders and all contact points (Ben-Ari and Kawano, 2020).

Nowadays, women in the IDF even serve as fighter pilots, officers on board battle ships, artillery and field engineering units. In the past the IDF preferred not to integrate women in prime units, infantry or armored forces because of the intimate closeness between men and women in such units. This process takes place together with a significant increase of women integration in staff and home-front roles, far more than in the past.

The discussion in the Israeli society relating to military service for women is based on two fundamental issues – the physiological effects of the service, mainly risks to fertility of serving women, as well as the effect of the military service on the self-confidence of women as to their ability to develop in management roles in society, and their social abilities (Eran-Jona and Padan, 2018).

The liberal side of the Israeli society views military service as an opportunity for women, understanding that in the western world the military profession which is conceived as masculine misses the feminine potential, mainly in the highly technological era we live in (Sasson-Levy, 2011b). There are those who claim that the officer's role has become more 'diplomatic'. The conservatives view military service as damaging the image of the woman, mainly in relation to her traditional roles as a mother and home-maker. There is also a clear fear of the intimate aspects of active service (Levy,2014).

Studies in western armies show a significant and successful integration of women in active and social contexts (Rivnai and Meidad 2017). Nevertheless, Israeli studies show ambivalent findings. Some studies show that the IDF hinders the promotion of women and there is a considerable gap between declarations and actions. On the other hand, some studies show that female motivation to enlist, mainly to combat units has been increasing and the IDF is required to make adjustments and establish units enabling a clear rise in female dominance (Eran-Jona and Padan 2018).

Yet, there are hardly any studies examining the difference in the service experience in gender contexts, especially not in relation to value influences. It should be examined whether the 'citizen-soldier' military that in the past was mainly a masculine domain, has the same strength of social influences – and if there are gender differences in these aspects– we should understand what they are and where they come from.

5. Conceptual and methodological framework

The current research combines quantitative and qualitative methodologies: The quantitative part includes correlation analysis and multi-variate regressions in order to examine how different variables affect changes between two groups. The qualitative part deals with the differences between male and female in regards with their military service experience and also attitudes of reserve soldiers.

The combination of the qualitative and quantitative methods has been less used in the current research field, mainly in Israel during the past decade. The method answers two essential questions: the nature and trends of development of female military service as compared to men, and the reasons for the different trends between genders, and the point of view of the reserves as a major motivate accelerator of spiral effect.

5.1 Population sampled[10]

During the years 2016-2020 structured internet questionnaires were sent out based on social media. 3400 men and women from all over Israel participated: The number of men and women participating was equally divided, about 50% were secular, 20% traditional, 15% religious (minority of ultra-religious), and the rest defined themselves as 'religion-less'. 90% were of Jewish nationality, 5% Druze and the rest Moslem Arabs (mostly Bedouin).

The participant's military service characteristics resembles their distribution in the IDF: 30% served as combat soldiers (men and women), 40% in supporting roles and the rest as home-front soldiers. All the participants finished their military service in the IDF[11].

5.2 Research tools

The internet questionnaires were distributed in Hebrew language via Facebook, Twitter and LinkedIn social networks and groups. Participants from unique communities who are not connected to social networks received the questionnaires via WhatsApp and SMS messages using Snow-Ball method .

The questionnaires were anonymous. Participants were asked to provide details of their military service, their parents' service, family education and socio-economic status.

The participants were required to state their position in relation to phrases related to conflicts in the Israeli society . The phrases are derived from other studies examining cohesion, strength, solidarity, patriotism, fear of terror and war, and readiness for emergency situations in the Israeli society (Ben-Dor and Lewin, 2017).

The data based on the answers was collected on a spread sheet for Google Sheets application, which avoids typing errors, and allows real time follow-up on the accumulated answers. Three pilot trials were conducted on the questionnaire before its final version, reducing duplications, and avoiding misunderstandings, creating an option of contacting the participant for additional interviews or questionnaire.

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[10]

[11] Elaborated in attachment No. 1

The participants were offered the option to attach their e-mail address for an optional personal interview – over 300 left their address, and 30 of those were randomly selected for in-depth interviews to examine common aspects related to the effects of military service and reserves, both for the social or the cultural dimensions

The qualitative phase includes two layers: The first is coding the issues raised in the interviews by categories, in order to define a common denominator between participants as to the manner that the military service influenced them. The second is a deeper layer to identify characteristics on the personal level of the interviewees, and their subjective experiences during their military service.

6. Research limitations

Most of the participants served in the ground forces and is therefore less representative of the air force, intelligence or navy. These have a different service environment, which could not be contained within the limitations of the current study. And yet the layout studied contains the majority of the characteristics of IDF soldiers .

As this is a self-reported internet questionnaire there may be some bias around sensitive issues such as type of service, which may be enhanced to give a picture of a more significant service than in actuality. In addition, the socio-economic level of the participants is biased towards the higher socio-economic level – 50%, 30% presented as medium level, 20% from low socio-economic levels. This upwards bias presents a clearer picture relating to this level, because it is claimed that this is the level that experiences the post-modern era in the deepest context (Levy, 2019; Lebel, 2011).

In addition to that 18% of the participants are currently serving in the reserve military force – these participants were discharged from compulsory service at the age of 21-22, and in the last 2 years recruited as reserves for 10-15 days. Being a reserve soldier has different effects in comparison with compulsory service effects. However, since these participants are discharged for only 2-3 years, and served as reserves only for several days, it is logical that the reserve status has not affected them so far.

The internet questionnaire that was used in the current research has structured disadvantages: it cannot be ensured that the sample comes from the targeted population, and the questionnaire-form link can be opened by anyone. In addition to that, the access to unique populations is very complexed and the outcome could be a bias of selecting study sample (Siva Durga Prasad Nayak and Narayan, 2019). During the study data collection was very challenging among the Druze group which is very unique in the Israeli society. Only 2% of the participants belong to this group, while their proportion in IDF is more than 5%. Nonetheless, although the uniqueness of this group the lack of participation in the study has a marginal effect on the findings, mainly because it is a very small group in comparison with others.

In the last decade female soldiers were tripled in combat duties, in addition to that the service among L.G.B.T. population became consensual. In the current study males and females participated in similar proportions, but in the gender question almost none declare themselves as L.G.B.T – this population, although its small proportion, is not analyzed has a part of this study.

7. Research Importance

This comparative research is focused on the social effect of the military service, and contributes knowledge on the connection between the military service and the containment of social diversities.

This research has a potential of theoretical and a practical contribution: Social theories describe military service in the IDF as a struggle between liberal and national beliefs (Lewin, 2014; Levy, 2014). This research will examine if there is a struggle during military service, and if there is, what its consequences are. On the practical side, this research can give a wide perspective about what happens to recruits during military service – it gives an opportunity to understand what has to be preserved, and what has to be fixed according to the military's high-command goals.

The main argument is that the military service in a Citizen-Soldier army restrains individualism trends, by decreasing differences in the social value system among recruits. This effect becomes more significant where socialization agents mediate the service as a major contribution to civil community, in addition to the national security.

Another argument deals with the military service effect on pluralism: citizens who complete the military service are more tolerant and defined as more consensual in comparison with high-school students. These effects are a major contribution to the democratic nature of a nation.

The arguments presented above are most important to the understanding of the military service social rule in the last decades, where there is a revolution in military threats, and democratic governments try to balance individualism trends, and to tighten the bond between the citizen and the state's institutions.

The uniqueness of this research is based on the fact that it examines long term trends of social values, using a modern data collecting platform, in a period of time when social and national discourse have become separatist, and extreme social groups are rising and are more popular than in the 80's and 90's.

Chapter 2:

Israel's defense ethos – Military Service as a Turning Point[12]

Article:

Itsik, R., 2020. Israel's defense ethos: military service as a turning point.

Ruch Prawniczy, Ekonomiczny i Socjologiczny, 82 (3), 299–309.

Contribution to the article

Author	Contribution in %	Description of contribution
Lewin Eyal	40%	Theory elaboration, constructing research questions, research methodology
Colonimus Neta-Li and Bar-Tal Daniel.	25%	Theory elaboration, research concept, data analysis, coordination of the work
Ben-Dor Gabriel, anf Lewin Eyal	20%	Gathering data guiding research idea, commenting particular versions of the article
Mann-Shalvi Hani	5%	Theory elaboration, constructing research questions, research methodology
Tamari Dov	5%	Gathering data, commenting particular versions of the article, input in the defence believe part
Zigdon Yaakov	5%	Commenting particular versions of the article, input in the analysis part

ISRAEL'S DEFENCE ETHOS:
MILITARY SERVICE AS A TURNING POINT

Summary

Jewish culture deals a lot with survival stories – most of them became myths, especially since the establishment of the state of Israel. The Jewish 'survival ethos' is assimilated in Israel mostly by customs, traditions, and education. Above all, it has been claimed that military service in the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) is the most significant institution that empowers the survival ethos. As a result, it is assumed that those who serve in the IDF are characterized by hatred towards Arabs, and by being extreme nationalists. This claim is examined in the current article, which analyses the level of the sense of security threat among Israelis during the last decade, draws on data on military service and levels of trust in Israeli government institutions, and reveals an essential finding: Israeli's survival ethos is being eroded among IDF soldiers. This finding, followed by the fact that the leaders of the liberal party in the Israeli parliament are former military generals, indicates that military service in Israel does not empower extreme nationalism; on the contrary, service in the IDF has become a moderating social mechanism.

Keywords: defence ethos; security threat; citizen-solider military; terror; socialization

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RONEN ITSIK

ISRAEL'S DEFENCE ETHOS: MILITARY SERVICE AS A TURNING POINT

I. INTRODUCTION

The Jewish culture has a defining characteristic – since its creation it has been based on stories of survival and wars for salvation. Some of these stories became myths; hence, almost all of Israeli traditions are based on legends and real events that revolve around a never-ending war for survival.[1] In recent years, it has been claimed that most Jewish citizens in Israel are trapped with a 'Siege Mentality',[2] because of on-going wars against terror. The situation of being influenced by traditions that include myths and fighting actual wars leads to another claim, namely that the Israeli society is under the sway of a 'Defence Belief' – almost a kind of religion, whereby people believe that almost anything that surrounds them is an existential threat.[3]

Israel's army has been based on a citizen-soldier model since the establishment of the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) following the Independence War of 1948. Hence, in the last 70 years the vast majority of Israelis have served in the army, as did their parents, thus it became traditional to serve in the IDF. Analysing the influence of military service in Israel raises questions about the impact of this service on the 'Defence Belief', or the 'Siege Mentality'. It is logical to presume that if one does military service, especially during periods of war, one will be discharged from army duty with the conviction that Israel is indeed under a great threat. This process could be a major contribution to the traditional 'survival' myth.

On the other hand, an insight into what happens during military service reveals that the IDF has a major influence on soldier's beliefs. Ex-IDF commanders and sociologists claim that the military service could be a turning point in terms of the ethos, and could lead to the development of a moderate point of view when it comes to security threats.

II. ISRAEL'S SIEGE MENTALITY

The decision to establish the IDF as a 'citizen-soldier military' originally arose from an ethnic-biblical context. The theme of external threat was char-

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[1] Yair (2011): 57–85.

[2] Lewin (2013): 15–35.

[3] Ben-Eliezer, Al-Haj (2006): 5–25.

acterized as a feature of inter-generational continuity, whereby the Jewish people have adopted the characteristics of survival and victimization from the beginning of history.[4] These beliefs were implemented in the Israeli culture and became myths of a religious-metaphysical nature. Hence, the image of the Israeli citizen holding a weapon was considered natural for the founders of the Jewish state.

At the end of Israel's Independence War (1948) the first Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion, described the geo-strategic challenge:

> We live in one of the most unstable periods in history [...] no country has yet recognized our borders, which are narrower in fact than in practice, based on the UN decision. The instability does not relate only to borders – there is no stable regime in the neighboring countries – everything is shocked and unstable [...].[5]

The size of the State of Israel in the years of its inception affected the concept of threat in society: the concept of 'war on our soil' had a positive effect on the motivation to enlist since the short distance between front and hinterland was a psychological motive.[6] Even during the 1960s, the sense of existential threat was the basis for readiness to enlist including the return of past migrants in times of emergency.[7] In his book *Ethos Clash in Israeli Society*, the researcher Eyal Lewin describes the characteristics of a 'Siege Mentality':

1. The state of Israel is a vital condition for the survival of Jews.
2. There will always be a war for survival.
3. The only way to survive here is to win wars.
4. Only a great army will give us salvation.[8]

Lewin claims that these characteristics defines citizens who went through military service. Elran, another researcher, claimed that military service in Israel has significant influence on 'Siege Mentality'. Hence, the 'Defence Belief' is a never-ending developing spiral that defines Arabs as demons, increasing hatred, and fostering Islamophobia in the Israel Society. Lewin concludes that this sociological process defines a republican ethos, which clashes with the liberal trend in the last decades. Lewin characterizes the liberal ethos in four main points:

1. We are no longer at war for survival.
2. Israel is a multi-cultural state.
3. We always have to navigate towards peace with our neighbours.
4. A Palestinian state is an essential necessity for Israel's stability.[9]

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[4] Almog (2014).
[5] Ben-Gurion (1971).
[6] Zigdon (2008): 56–94.
[7] Gal (1986): 110–137.
[8] Lewin (2013): 57–74.
[9] Lewin (2013).

III. ISRAEL'S DEFENCE ETHOS

Analysis of the Israeli society leads to a salient insight: the existential secu-rity of this society has been and still is a cultural ethos which affects the concept of national identity.[10] This need for reinforcing national identity out of a sense of danger and crisis also influenced David Ben-Gurion's decision, as Israel's first Prime Minister, to build the IDF as a 'citizen-solider military', since he viewed the army as a socialization mechanism for achieving a cultural ethos.[11]

> Our security issues are different than those of any other people in the world [...] not only because we are few against many, but because we're not yet a nation and we have no country. A population that does not recognize each other's languages, are not versant in the national culture and knowledge of the country, are not bound by a common culture and a national vision, is not a people that can fight its enemies on a rainy day [...].
> The IDF is one of the major forces formulating the image of the state and unifying the people [...] the army builds the people. It turns people who were humiliated and oppressed into people with self-recognition and trust in their power.

A study that has being conducted over the last 10 years, measuring Y gen-eration population's social attitudes, found that most Israelis feel like fresh migrants under existential threat, despite the fact that 70 years have passed since the state achieved independence, and that the Second World War was 80 years ago.[12] In Israeli society, the concepts 'with our back to the wall' and 'the whole world is against us' were adopted as part of the traditions and values implemented by the educational system.[13] Even Israeli leaders use ex-istential terminology periodically perpetuating the concept: 'it is a nation that shall dwell alone'. Hence, the sense of a security threat 'resides' permanently among Israelis and the motivation at the basis of the decision to enlist the army still relates to fighting wars for survival.[14]

These findings raise an important question: how is it still the case that in Israel, a stable nation, with a strong advanced army, one of the most growing economies in the world, an empire of technology; how is it possible that Israeli citizens still feel like migrants under existential threat? Is the traditional sur-vival myth stronger than what has been the actual, on-going reality for decades?

IV. 'DEFENCE BELIEF' IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

Although Israel embarked on real peace arrangements that led to a reduc-tion in the extent of the threats during the 1980s and 1990s,[15] it was found

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[10] Shelah (2003): 23–41.
[11] Ben-Gurion (1971).
[12] Almog (2014): 337–370.
[13] Yair (2011): 82–101.
[14] Itsik (2013).
[15] Tamari (2012): 49–66.

that terror events since the beginning of the 2000s have led to a sense of 'fighting for home, from home', thus reinforcing the sense of threat in Israeli society.[16] According to some sociologists, the Israeli 'siege mentality' has intensified since the establishment of the state. There are those who claim that the Israeli-Arab conflict became uncontrolled, developing a victimization and self-justification narrative, along with blind patriotism and glorification.[17] In this way, the Israeli defence ethos includes even a sacrificial ritual that is reflected in the high motivation to enlist in elite units at the IDF.[18]

Other researchers claim that the service in the IDF intensifies a discourse about the contribution to the society – in the of most of Israelis way of view, warriors are far valuable to the society than other people.[19] In Israel the ultimately contribution, even nowadays, is to join the army as a combat soldier.[20] In that way, the military service embodies society's values.

A recent study on women's child expectations with regard to children in Israel made a dramatic discovery – nowadays, even when planning a family, the Jewish women in Israel think about the possibility that one of their children will die in a war as a soldier.[21] As a consequence, the Jewish family in Israel is larger than the average in the Western world. Actually, Israeli Women see their children as future warriors; this could prove that there really is a deep cultural defence ethos.

Furthermore, army duty, including reserve and compulsory service, may be a significant factor in the inter-generational transference of the defence ethos.[22] Studies examining the effect of army duty on the family found that among the families of those who serve in the army there is a tendency to adopt a set of military values.[23]

The concept of security threat in Israel is based on a number of elements which explain the extreme risk the population faces in times of emergency:[24]

– in the geographical context – a narrow country, the majority of the population residing on the coastal plane;

– in the geo-strategic context – a risk of invasion from Arab countries, threats of missiles and rockets, terror acts;

– in the demographic context – the challenge posed by the Israeli Arabs, as a threat of subversion.

Some claim that the reality of the peace arrangements that Israel has lived in since the 1980s has reduced the existential fear;[25] others maintain that since the 2000s there has been a change in the concept of threat among Israeli citizens. This is due to the second Palestinian uprising ('Intifada') in

[16] Zigdon (2008): 103–138.
[17] Bar-Tal (1997): 55–80.
[18] Gal (2000): 224–240.
[19] Sasson-Levi (2011): 73–98.
[20] Tishler, Hadad (2011).
[21] Mann-Shalvi (2016): 63–127.
[22] Moskos and Segal (2000): 20–48.
[23] Vest (2012): 602–627.
[24] Grinberg (2001): 98–145.
[25] Tamari (2012): 143–177.

2002, and the second Lebanon war in 2006. Even the former Defence Secretary, nowadays a candidate on behalf of the liberal party, announced that the State of Israel is still fighting for its independence.[26]

In the past decade, there have been far-reaching changes in the Middle East:

– instability of the Arab regimes, and the rise of Islamic extremism;

– increased threats from state-sponsored organizations (Hezbollah, Hamas, and the extreme Jihad), increased threats for the hinterland, due to enemies being armed with missiles and rockets;

– the discussion of the Iranian nuclear project, accompanied by declarations of the Iranian leaders on the need to 'annihilate' Israel.

Moreover, during the past few years the IDF has recruited reserve forces and was called to act with greater frequency than during the 1980s and 1990s. Some claim that this trend has led to an increased sense of threat among many in society.[27] The sensation that war may break at any moment characterizes many of those serving in the IDF, hence it is natural to presume that there is a rise in the sense of existential threat.

Graph 1

Military average reserve days per soldier in the years 2007–2012

Source: IDF Human Resources (2013).

V. MILITARY SERVICE AS A POINT OF DILEMMA

There are opposing claims relating to the effect of the nature of army duty on the individual: on the one hand, it is claimed that the emotional experience during war may be traumatic, where the army is a 'republican agent' with lots

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[26] Yaalon (2008): 207–223.

[27] Itsik (2013).

of influence in the defence ethos context.[28] On the other hand, it is claimed that even in times of conflict, the service has a moderating effect.[29] In addition, there are those who claim that the sense of frustration involved in coping with terror attacks, leads to the desire for revenge and attitudes that negates the humanity of the other side, and gives legitimacy for immoral behaviour.[30]

Others claim that the above phenomena does not result from the military service but from the general public mood, and that the army service is a moderating factor in these contexts.[31] Elazar Stern, a retired general from IDF and also a member of parliament representing the liberal party a liberal party, describes the military service as a 'melting-pot' that encourages tolerance and respect towards other cultures.

Graph 2

The perceived 'threat level' among Israeli citizens

Source: Ben-Dor, Lewin, Kanetti (2013).

Amos Harel, a journalist that accompanied an IDF unit for two years, describes that during military service meeting 'real Arabs' gives the soldier an understanding that the conflict is not divided between 'black and white nor good and evil' in reality; and soldiers understand that most of the Arabs are not terrorists.[32] Netta-Ly Colonimus and Daniel Bar-Tal, who studied an elite unit of the IDF for three years, describe a turning point that occurs in the final stage of the service: after understanding the real terrain some soldiers adopt a liberal ethos, based on the understanding that there has to be a peace pro-

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[28] Colonimus, Bar-Tal (2011).
[29] Harel (2013): 57–97.
[30] Elran (2006).
[31] Stern (2009): 137–155.
[32] Harel (2013): 112–130.

cess with the other side, who are also humans.[33] In his book *The Israeli Code*, the sociologist Gad Yair claims that the meeting point between Arabs and Jews, despite the fact it occurs in combat terrains, there is a change of attitude that comes from the empathy towards the condition of the other side who lives in poverty and under an evil dictatorship, which suppress its citizens.[34]

A longitudinal study that has conducted about Israel's resilience since the year 2000, found that the 'threat level' perceived by citizens has been decreasing consistently since the year 2006.[35] As was mentioned, in these particular years there was an increase in calling citizens to reserve duty (Graph 1).

The effect of the military service on the ethos raises an important question: could it be that only in battle situations do people understand the humanity of the other side, and could this be transferred ethically? This could be a paradox.

VI. DISCUSSION

It is clear that the Israeli-Jewish ethos evolved from a brutal history of deportation, the Holocaust and wars for survival. Hence, it is logical that the average Israeli adopted the 'Defence Belief', and because of that his or her motivation to enlist in army are at a high level. consequences of the Defence Belief, on the other hand, are matter of debate.

A glance at recent Israeli politicians presents a clear picture – most of the retired Colonels and Generals from the IDF hold liberal opinions. Some say that retired IDF officers adopted a liberal ethos during service.[36] This could proof that ethical turning point occurs during military service.

Most retired IDF officers who wrote books describe the other side – their Arab rivals – with a great deal of empathy. When there is an ongoing peace process, the IDF generals always lead the talks. This has been a consistent fact since Israel's first peace process with its greatest enemy, Egypt, in 1978. The reason is logical – they know one another from the field, they project fortitude, and they have the confidence necessary to make tough decisions. Moreover, in a society that lives under a 'Siege Mentality', army officers are considered honest and credible. In addition, the IDF is considered the most reliable institution in Israel.[37] Beyond that, it almost became almost a tradition that IDF retired high-ranking officers are becoming members of parliament and government ministers, since they have gained a high level of trust. The military service of Israel's leader is an essential criterion in election debates, and it is repeated in every election to parliament.

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[33] Colonimus, Bar-Tal (2011).

[34] Yair (2011): 124–165.

[35] Ben-Dor, Lewin (2017).

[36] Hensbacher (2018).

[37] Harman et al. (2013).

Graph 3

The level of trust in Israel's institutions (0–100%)

Source: Harman et al. (2013).

The IDF is known not just as a military organization that deals with security threats; it is also considered to be an educational institution. The first Prime Minister, Ben-Gurion, originally planned for the IDF to be a socialization platform. In addition to that, the basic stage of the officer's course in the IDF deals with education: in the IDF, a commander is considered first and most as an educator[38]. This also includes documented ethical orders, which explain how a soldier should act as a human being. Even in the second Palestinian upraising in 2002, which created thousands of suicide bombers who killed thousands of Jews in Israel's central cities, the IDF General commander's orders were: 'We have to win this war, and remain human-beings.' Every inquiry in the IDF deals with moral behaviour. Hence, it is logical that an institution that is considered as an educational place will change attitudes towards enemies, and after years of service can constitute an ethical turning point.

The IDF's moral code was written in the year 2001, after decades of wars, and it was implemented just in the last decade. This ethical document has major effects on operational and tactical decisions, and as has been shown, it is an educational element. In addition to the process of decreasing security threats in the soldier's eyes – the outcome is a change of attitude, which could affect the national ethos.

The researcher Dan Shiftan, in his article 'Strategic challenges for Israel towards is 60th Anniversary,' claimed that four generations after the establishment of the state of Israel, this society was adjusted to the special status of being the only non-Arab state in the Middle-East.[39] According to

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[38] Stern (2009): 62–84.
[39] Shiftan (2007).

Shiftan, following peace agreements with its greatest enemies, Israel's citizens understood that their survival and prosperity are no longer under external threat.

VII. CONCLUSION

The Israeli tradition is based on survival – that has been a historical fact for centuries. After the establishment of the Jewish state and the decision to construct a citizen-soldier army, also as a socialization platform and an educational mechanism, the reality and circumstances shaped the national ethos. After several peace agreements, the figure of the Israeli soldier has reformed. The conflict with the Arabs in the current combat terrain exposed soldiers to the suffering of the other side. The enemy that was a 'demon' became a human who also suffers. This trend, along with moral and ethical orders, developed a 'turning point' in security threats from a soldier's point of view.

After years of military service, the attitudes of soldiers change – they understand the complexity of the conflict with the Palestinians. The attitude change also influences also the security threat, as soldiers understand it; and hence this reduces the sense of threat. After being discharged from service, the attitude can evolve into a liberal ethos. These days, three retired IDF generals, all of them former chief of staff, lead a popular liberal party in the Israeli parliament. Their main slogan is: 'Peace is a thing that has to be considered. We have to revive hope in our state.'

There are researchers who claim that in recent years the primary purpose of military service in the IDF has become social activity, and that the defence mission has taken a secondary role.[40] Others claim that the ID has become a platform for liberal values through its educational activity.[41]

In conclusion, Israel's 'Siege Mentality' security ethos has been eroded in the last decade by its main defence institution – the IDF. The question is what the consequences in the long run on Jewish tradition will be – will it still be based on survival?

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Chapter 3:

Compulsory Military Service as a Social Integrator[13]

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Harman Tamar, Ella Heller, Atmor Nir	20%	Theory elaboration, gathering data, Research ,methodology
Ben-Dor Gabriel, anf Lewin Eyal	15%	Analysis, commenting particular versions of the article
Rennick Joan	5%	Commenting particular versions of the article, input in the analysis part

Compulsory military service as a social integrator

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Abstract

Compulsory military service has become very rare over the last 30 years, in the western world. In the past, most countries considered military service as a socialisation platform, given the fact that most of the population was recruited and military units were a "meeting point" for different cultures — because of that the service then was functional as a social integrator. The current research studied changes in social attitude during compulsory military service in Israel, where the society is considered to be essentially divided around ethnical and national issues. This study is based on an analysis of the attitudes of 3200 internet questionnaire participants via social networks in Israel, followed by a U-test of the collected data. Half of the participants were high-school students (average age 17) and half of them discharged soldiers (average age 23). Analysis of the results reveals significant evidence: discharged soldiers tend to be more tolerant then high-school students with regard to other cultures and ethnic origins. A discharged IDF soldier is less afraid of security threats and considers budget prioritisation towards social welfare to be more important than security challenges. These findings show that compulsory military service can still be effective as a social integrator, even in the post-modern world where countries are dealing with migration issues and ethno-national tensions.

Keywords:

social integration, defence belief, security threat, post-modern army

Introduction

Compulsory military service is a model that has been disappearing in the Western world since the 1980s due to changes in social values, in the nature of military confrontations and technological advances on the battle field (Krebs, 2009). Today, the leading concept in the western world is 'professional army', recruiting only those who are interested. The service therefore became limited to restricted minorities (Hajjar, 2014). Furthermore, in some countries, including Israel, the army is still based on the concept of 'Army of the People', involving compulsory and reserve duties. This is for several reasons: the nature of security threats, the size of the population when compared to geographical dimensions, and social motivation (Tamari, 2012). These countries view the army as a socialisation mechanism, instilling cultural values, and formulating the nature of society and its solidarity.

In the past decade, there has been growing discussion in Israel as to the social needs of a 'citizen-soldier' military: supporters of the model claim that military duty is still an effective socializsation mechanism as an integrator (Stern, 2009). Opponents of the model claim that military service enhances social tensions, creating a gap between the religious and secular population (Levy, 2014), and reinforces Islamophobia, leading to demonisation of Arab national minorities (Gabizon and Abu-Riya, 1999). In addition to that, most studies on the Israeli army (IDF) in the last decade focused on the motivation to enlist, hence a knowledge gap regarding the social effect had been created, mainly on the potential of the service as a social integrator.

The current study tries to give answers to this challenge, focusing on the contribution of military service to social and national aspects. This study sets out to answer the research question whether compulsory military service in Israel is still functional as a social integration platform. This has to be followed by three secondary questions that can explain the social and the national effectiveness of the service:

1. Does military service in IDF have a significant effect on soldiers' 'defence belief'?

2. Does military service in the IDF affect soldiers' attitudes towards Arabs?

3. How does military service in the IDF affect soldiers' social and national values?

Defence belief

Since Israel's independence year (1948), the Israeli army (IDF) has been a mechanism of solidarity that has led to a 'siege mentality' as an evolving defence belief of a Jewish ethos. This phenomenon was an outcome of the brutal history of deportation, the Holocaust and wars of survival (Lewin, 2013). According to Lewin, the characteristics of a 'defence belief' is based on four main ideas: the state is a vital condition for the survival of Jews; there will always be a war for survival; the only way to survive here is to win wars, hence "only a great army will give us salvation". According to Lewin, a strong 'siege mentality' constructs a defence belief that is based mainly on fear of war and terror.

Ruth Gabizon, a former Israeli judge and a law expert claimed that security threats around Israel can enhance fear, which might lead to hatred towards minorities, especially Arabs and Palestinians (Gabizon, 2003). This aspect also affects citizen's attitudes towards security, and Israel's defence budget, which historically has been high over the years (Shelah, 2015). Hence, welfare and other life quality issues, such as medicine and education, were rated low in the priority order. It is well known that Israelis support a high defence budget, but nowadays this is an issue that is much disputed (Shelah, 2015).

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In the past decade, service in the IDF is considered as a potential "turning point" as to ex-soldier's attitudes towards security threats and towards Arabs, especially Palestinians and there are researchers who claim that military service in the IDF could be a moratorium that changes even the soldier's prejudices and beliefs (Colonimus and Bar-Tal, 2011).

Therefore, the question that has to be examined is about soldiers real understanding of security threats, especially after experiences and information to which they are exposed to during military service, and the way that it affects national and social attitudes.

Sense of security threat

The sense of the security threat 'resides' permanently among Israelis (Itsik, 2013). However, a longitudinal study that has been conducted among citizens about Israel's resilience since the year 2000 found that the threat level measured has decreased since 2009 (Ben-Dor and Lewin, 2017). Furthermore, it is claimed that four generations after the establishment of the state of Israel, society has adjusted to terror threats as the only non-Arab state in the Middle East (Shiftan, 2007).

In addition to that the above, Shor and Nevo, who interviewed IDF soldiers and commanders, claim that the Israeli soldier has become more tolerant towards Palestinians over the years (Nevo and Shor, 2002). According to their findings, the reason for that change of attitude is the general orders about the need to "beat terror and remain human-beings". These orders were followed by an ethical moral code and strict supervision which changed the point of view about Arabs in general, and particularly Palestinians as human beings.

The question that has to be asked is about the value effect during military service – has there really been a significant change? Are ex-soldiers really more tolerant towards Arabs, and what are the values that have been enhanced during military service?

Value effects of military service

There are opposing claims relating to the effect of the nature of army duty on individual moral values: on the one hand, it is claimed that emotional experience during war may evolve into extreme nationalism (Hacohen, 2014). On the other hand, it is claimed that the service has a moderating effect on attitudes towards minorities (Rennick, 2013). Bar-Tal and Staub who studied aspects of patriotism found that army duty might affect patriotism in two ways: blind patriotism, based on nationalism and hatred towards minorities, and constructive patriotism based on inter-cultural balances and mutual respect (Bar-Tal and Staub, 1997).

Research that was conducted recently in Poland's military academy found that students of military classes indicated the following to be conducive to strengthening during military service: respect for national security, tradition, and national symbols, patriotism, national awareness, social activity, belonging, community, and the building of a civil society (Uryeh, 2017) – this could be an indication of constructive patriotism.

Yael Tamir, a sociologist and a former Israeli minister of education, claimed that in multicultural societies, there can be mutual respect and tolerance, which depends on normative socialisation platforms (Tamir, 1998). Samia, a researcher and a former General in the IDF, found that cohesion in military platoons forms tolerance towards other cultures (Samia, 2008). Another study found that the IDF applies a multifarious concept of religion with significant impact on the ability to foster a sense of "us" (Røislien, 2013). This

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phenomenon was also described by Elazar Stern, a former general in the IDF, who was the head of human resources (Stern, 2009). Stern claims that during military service, mutual honour between cultures is intensified and also between Jews, Druze, and Bedouins, who are actually Muslim Arabs.

If service in the IDF causes actual pluralism, it is genuine proof that it is a functional integration platform, which also bridges tensions between Jews and Arabs, a major conflict area in Israeli society. The IDF can therefore perform constructive patriotism.

Most Israeli studies on army and society issues in the past decade have focused mainly on motivation for army service. Few have examined value aspects, and even those that did used traditional data collection platforms, creating a reduced perspective for examining this phenomenon. The current study will extensively examine the effects of service in the context of threat concepts and social values, based on an innovative wide platform that can better portray reality.

Methodology

In the past decade, most studies dealing with the social and cultural implications of serving in the 'citizen-solider military' have used the qualitative method. Even studies relating to the effect of serving in the IDF have used similar tools except for a few cases that used the quantitative method to identify value and identity effects of military service on the mass population (Barkai, 2007).

This comparative study is based on wide sampling: 3200 individuals similar to the population serving in the IDF answered internet questionnaires. The participants in the survey reside in all parts of the country, half of them are women and the other half men, and their distribution in terms of type of service, level of religiousness and socio-economic level are similar to those serving in the IDF.

The study tool used was an anonymous internet survey based on a structured questionnaire distributed via social networks in the years 2015-2018. This method allows access without geographical difficulties and also targets unique groups in the population from whom it is difficult to collect data using traditional methods.

The participants had to rank their opinions on different statements relating to defence belief, the concept of security threat, and social challenges, by means of a 1-6 Likert scale. The statements to which the participants had to refer in the questionnaire were based on surveys that were conducted before, and in 3 main sections:

1. Categories of "siege mentality" were used in the section that examined the concept of defence belief (Lewin, 2013).

2. In the section that examined the concept of existential threat, the questions were taken from Israel's resilience study (Ben-Dor and Lewin, 2017).

3. The section of social values combined statements that were used in the Israeli annual report of the Israeli Democracy Institute (Harman et al., 2013), and the "Israeli Jew" survey (Arian, 2009).

The findings are based on comparing the attitudes of two groups, ex-soldiers who were released after compulsory service in the IDF, up to the age of 24, and high-school students from 16-18, followed by U-test analysis.

Analysis

Table 1 gives an overview of the results according to 11 statements that participants had to rank on the Likert scale. In almost all of the statements, the percentage of ex-soldiers is low compared to high school students in the upper ranks (5–6), when it concerns fear, and high in the categories of social values.

In Table 2, where descriptive statistics are shown, it can be seen that most of the participants inside the groups are consensual about most of the topics that were studied.

In Table 3, which provides U-test results of the comparison between the groups, it can be seen that most of the results provide a significant answer to the differences between the two groups.

Table 1. Statement rankings: ex-soldiers after service (a.s.) / high-school students before service (b.s.) %, n=3200

Statement	Fully agree (6)		Agree (5)		Tend to agree (4)		Tend not to agree (3)		Do not agree (2)		Totally disagree (1)	
	a.s.	b.s	a.s.	b.s	a.s.	b.s	a.s.	b.s	a.s.	b.s	a.s.	b.s
Jewish people will not exist without the state of Israel	25.8	27.8	17.7	19.0	14.9	18.5	12.1	14	10.5	11.1	16.9	11.6
We shall live by the sword forever	19.0	22.4	15.0	14.8	19.3	21.5	17.9	18.3	12.1	11.8	16.3	11.1
It is right to cut defence budget to advance health, education, and welfare	23.3	13.4	20.3	15.2	24.0	24.7	17.6	25.9	8.7	13.3	6.1	7.6
A Palestinian state will be an existential threat to the state of Israel	24.9	30.1	9.5	14.8	12.4	14.7	16.0	15.4	18.3	13.8	18.9	11.1
I fear war in the coming 2 years	37.6	43.0	29.9	29.6	19.8	19	7.8	6.0	3.2	1.7	1.7	0.7
I fear being hurt in a terrorist incident in Israel	16.8	27.4	19.2	24.7	25.2	26.1	20.7	13.0	13.0	6.7	5.1	2.0
The level of antisemitism in the world scares me	16.5	24.2	22.3	23.0	21.4	24.1	17.5	14.5	14.1	9.7	8.2	4.5
I am happy to have Arab neighbours	43.1	44.9	20.0	19.8	12.3	12.0	11.3	9.7	6.0	6.0	7.3	7.6
Terrorists are entitled to legal representation	25.8	18.4	16.1	15.5	16.7	15.4	12.3	14.3	10.4	14.0	18.7	22.3
Citizens have the right to protest against an ongoing war	36.7	30.8	19.9	21.5	17.9	18.8	11.2	16.4	7.0	7.4	7.3	5.1
Members of parliament should not dismiss others even if they are Arabs	18.0	18.4	16.5	15.5	18.4	15.4	16.9	14.3	14.9	14.0	15.3	22.4

The concept of defence belief

In the internet questionnaire, participants were asked about their opinions regarding the four characteristics of Lewin's model for 'siege mentality'. The summary of responses points to the differences in defence belief between high-school students and the 'fresh' ex-soldiers released from compulsory duty.

In comparing answers relating to the State of Israel as an existential precondition for the Jewish people, 60% of the ex-soldiers tend to identify or fully identify with the statement, as compared to 63% of the high-school students (Table 1). The U-test (Table 3) between the two groups gives an insignificant result. The average answer scale of the two groups ranges between 3.9 and 4 (Table 2).

In conclusion, in relation to statement no.1, there is no significant difference between high school students and ex-soldiers. However, both groups average ranking shows that

the idea of Israel as a precondition for Jewish survival tended to be accepted. This finding can signal for a "defence belief" in the two groups; however, the deviation in both groups is high, so we can understand that this issue is under debate.

In comparing the results for the statement "Forever live by the sword", 53% of the ex-servicemen tend to or fully identify with the statement, compared to 59% of the high-school students. The largest difference is in the category "totally disagree" where the rate of respondents among the ex-servicemen is higher by 5.2%.

The U-test gives a significant result for this issue (Table 3), while both groups rank the idea between 3.5 and 3.8 on average (Table 2). It can be said that in relation to the thought of eternal wars, ex-soldiers are more optimistic than high-school students.

In relation to the statement "Cut security budget for other plans", 68% of the ex-soldiers do not view the security defence budget as the highest priority, while 53% of high-school students think it is. In both the higher categories, the differences are clear: 43% of the ex-servicemen believe that budget should be moved from defence to other areas, while 29% of the high-school students believe this.

According to the U-test (Table 3), there is a significant difference between the two groups and, furthermore, the average ranking for this statement is 4.1 among ex-soldiers compared to 3.7 among students (Table 2). This finding can prove that ex-soldiers are more socially oriented when it concerns the implications of a high security budget.

Comparing responses in relation to the concept of danger in establishing a Palestinian state, there are clear differences between ex-soldiers and high-school students. While 47% of the ex-soldiers view the establishment of a Palestinian state as an existential danger, 60% of the students believe it is.

According to the U-test (Table 3), the differences between the two groups are significant, where ex-soldiers rank the statement 3.5 compared with 4 among students. Nevertheless, both groups rank the threat of a potential Palestinian state above 3 with a high level of deviation (Table 2) – this could be a sign that this issue is a topic of debate among these groups.

Table 2. Descriptive statistics of answers to statements (n=3200, range 1-6)

Statement	Ex-soldiers			High school students		
	Mean	s.e.	st.dev	Mean	s.e.	st.dev
Jewish people will not exist without the state of Israel	3.9	.048	1.82	4.0	.039	1.69
We shall live here by the sword forever	3.5	.045	1.72	3.8	.038	1.64
It is right to cut defence budget to advance health, education, and welfare	4.1	.031	1.48	3.7	.033	1.43
A Palestinian state will be an existential threat to the state of Israel	3.5	.049	1.85	4.0	.041	1.75
I fear war in the coming 2 years	4.9	.031	1.18	5.0	.025	1.06
I fear being hurt in a terrorist incident in Israel	3.9	.037	1.43	4.5	.030	1.31
The level of antisemitism in the world scares me	3.8	.040	1.52	4.2	.034	1.44
I am happy to have Arab neighbours	3.6	.041	1.62	3.6	.038	1.61
Terrorists are entitled to legal representation	3.8	.048	1.84	3.4	.042	1.81
Citizens have the right to protest against an ongoing war	4.5	.041	1.57	4.4	.035	1.49
Members of parliament should not dismiss others even if they are Arabs	3.6	.044	1.69	3.7	.038	1.65

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To sum up defence belief measures, most of the findings point to significant difference between ex-soldiers and high-school students. While high school students tend to adopt a strong defence belief, shown as a constant defensive approach, identifying Israel as an existential condition for the Jewish people, determining defence as the highest priority in allocating national resources, and viewing a Palestinian state as an existential threat, ex-soldiers view things differently and their concept regarding these issues is significantly more moderate. However, the findings show that some of the ideas are a topic of debate in both groups.

The concept of existential threat

In a longitudinal study conducted annually since the year 2000 regarding the national resilience of Israeli society, the researchers Gabriel Ben-Dor and Eyal Lewin (2017) examine the index of security threats such as war, terror and anti-Semitism among Israeli citizens.

Ben-Dor and Lewin identify that since the year 2000, there has been a slight yet fluctuating decrease in the level of fear from security threats among Israeli citizens. The current study measured levels of fear in relation to security threats among high-school students and ex-servicemen.

From the ranking for the statement "Chance of war in the next 2 years", it can be seen that in categories 4 and 5 (tend to agree and agree) there are almost no differences in relation to fear of war. Nevertheless, in 6 there is a significant difference – 43% of the high-school students fear a war soon against 37.6% of the ex-servicemen. It may be said that both populations fear war in general, 87% of the ex-servicemen and more than 90% of the high-school students. According to U-test results (Table 3), there is a significant difference between the two groups concerning an incoming war. However, the average ranking for both groups is very similar (5 out of 6), with low-level deviation and this could also be a sign of a "defence belief".

When the analysis deals with fear of being hurt by terrorism, there are clear differences between the two groups – 78% of the high-school students fear obeing hurt in a terrorist attacks, in comparison with 61% of the ex-soldiers (Table 1). The differences are even clearer in the higher categories: 36% among ex-soldiers compared to more than 52% of the high-school students. U-test results show this parameter as significant, with an average scale of 4.5 among students compared with 3.9 among ex-soldiers. In this parameter too, it can be seen that both tend to agree with the threat of being hurt in a terrorist incident in Israel.

Table 3. The Mann-Whitney U-test, student / ex-soldier (n=3200)

Statement	U-test	S.e	St. dev		Sig.
No existence without Israel	1302608.000	26470.213	0.324	-0.987	H0 accepted
Forever live by the sword	1196091.000	26533.715	0.000	-4.999	H0 rejected
Cut sec. budget for other plans	1577134.500	26448.948	0.000	9.392	H0 rejected
Palestinian state is a threat	1157449.500	26517.273	0.000	-6.459	H0 rejected
Chance of war in next 2 years	1236325.500	25563.732	0.000	-3.615	H0 rejected
Being hurt in a terror attack	1030762.000	26351.798	0.000	-11.307	H0 rejected
Anti-Semitism threatens me	1139854.000	26441.694	0.000	-7.143	H0 rejected
Agree to having Arab neighbours	1352709.500	25624.780	0.349	0.936	H0 accepted
Terrorist access to lawyers	1472438.500	26540.883	0.000	5.414	H0 rejected
Freedom of speech during war	1403392.500	26201.142	0.004	2.849	H0 rejected
Par. mem. can impeach others	1290514.000	26569.873	0.150	-1.438	H0 accepted

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With regard to fear of antisemitism, there are clear differences between the two groups: 60% of the ex-soldiers describe such fear compared to over 71% of the high-school students expressing fear of antisemitism. The U-test result shows a significant difference between the two groups (Table 3).

In summary, the fear index points to a significant difference between ex-soldiers and high-school students. It may be said that ex-soldiers fear security threats less than high-school students. However, both groups rank security threats above level 3 and this is a sign that external threat still exists among these groups, although at a moderate level.

Social concepts

The discussion on the social effects of military service will relate to measures taken from several sources: a study relating to Arab society in Israel, dealing with agreeing to have Arab neighbours (Smooha, 1992), and a study relating to the democracy index in Israel (Harman et al., 2013). An additional measure relates to the issue of the ability of the Knesset (Israel's parliament) members to dismiss another member, an authentic issue, which clearly conflicts with the democratic principle: 'rule of the people'.

Analysis of the findings relating to agreeing to have an Arab neighbour show that there is almost equality between the sampled groups (Table 1). The U-test result (Table 3) shows no significant difference between the two groups on that issue. Nevertheless, both groups average ranking is 3.6 out of 6 with a low-level of deviation (Table 2). It is therefore impossible to claim that military service positively affects openness towards Arabs, but it can be said that it has no negative effects. It seems that both groups have a moderate opinion regarding having Arab neighbours.

To sum up, more than 75% of the respondents replied positively to this question, almost 65% of them in the higher categories. This shows that both ex-soldiers and those facing enlistment in the army do not see a problem living next to Arabs.

The issue examined in the statement "Terrorists should have access to lawyers" relates to equal rights in society, emphasising the right to legal representation. The findings show that 59% of the ex-soldiers believe that even criminals of a nationalist nature should be allowed legal representation, as opposed to 49% of the high-school students. The U-test results show significant differences between the two groups (Table 3), while ex-soldiers average ranking is 3.8 compared with 3.4 among students (Table 2). Furthermore, the deviation level is high and similar in these groups, so it can't be said that ex-soldiers are more moderate, but this issue is a topic of debate for all.

The freedom of speech is an elementary right in a democratic regime. This statement relates to the issue during war. 75% of the ex-soldiers believe that even rivals are to be allowed freedom of speech during war, while about 71% of the high-school students believe so. In ranking 6, the results are significant with a 6% change of attitude. The U-test results show significant differences, while ex-soldiers average ranking is 4.5 compared with 4.4 among students. It may thus be stated that military service does not hinder expressing this democratic value in extreme times.

The issue "Members of Parliament can impeach others" relates to the understanding of the right to choose or to be chosen, a benchmark in parliamentary democracy. This issue was discussed several times in Israel in the past few years, in view of the support of certain Arab Knesset members of terrorist organisations.

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The findings show that 53% of the ex-soldiers believe that Knesset members should not be allowed to dismiss other members, while 49% of the high-school students believe so. In the "totally disagree" index, there is a major significant change of 7% between the groups (Table 1). The U-test in this parameter results in an insignificant difference between the two gropes, but close to being significant (Table 3). Ex-soldiers' average ranking for this issue is 3.8 compared with 3.4 among students, with a high level of deviation (Table 2).

According to these findings, it cannot be claimed that military service prevents agreement with the above democratic right. Nevertheless, the findings show that 50% of the young people in Israel believe that Knesset members should have the right to dismiss others.

To sum up, these findings show that in almost all aspects studied, the ex-soldiers are more moderate in their views than high-school students. We may deduce that military service does not lead to extremism and it can be said that ex-soldiers are more tolerant of social and national conflicts, although both groups show a medium level of "defence belief".

Figure 1. Ex-soldiers answers to the statement "Soldiers become more tolerant towards other cultures during military service" (%), n=1400

Furthermore, when ex-soldiers were asked about the effect of military service on their tolerance towards other cultures, a more than 60% agreed that during service they became more tolerant (Figure 1). When the characteristics of these soldier's service were examined, it was remarkable to see that most of them had actually been together for more than 5 days a week (including nights) during 3 years of military service (Figure 2).

Figure 2. Military service characteristics of ex-soldiers who participated in the questionnaire analysed by days and nights spent together in a week, n=1400

This could be important evidence for an effective socialisation process.

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Discussion

The findings above show significant differences in the concept of security fears, the perceived defence belief and social attitudes between those who finished their compulsory service in the IDF and those before enlisting. Discussion will hopefully provide reasons for these differences.

The erosion of the defence ethos during military service in the IDF seems opposed to logic, since the IDF is constantly in contact with close and distant enemies. The rhetoric of political leaders in Israel, mainly in relation to the Iranian threat, loudly expressed during the past decade can be added to this.

Moreover, the change in soldiers' attitudes could be for several reasons and their common denominator is the change in the nature of the confrontations. This is an era of 'hybrid' confrontations against subversive and terrorist actions. The fighting is less combative and more narrative-communicative (Elran, 2006). This is an era of wars without winners (Ben-Eliezer and Al-Haj, 2006), which can also be characterised by the penetration of civil practices (Levy, 2009).

As it well known, there has been a significant transformation in the nature of the battlefield in the last decade, which is currently saturated with technological abilities (Kopka, 2019) and fighting concepts that strive for a dramatic reduction in the danger to human lives (Lutwak, 2002, pp.73–102). Coping with these threats is usually achieved by means of media and technology. This process is turning the IDF into a 'neo-professional' army (Ben-Eliezer, 2012). Moskos claimed that in the western world, this process is defined as the 'post-modern' stage of an army, coping with low-grade threats, defending borders of peace, and coping mainly with challenges of nature (Moskos, 2000). In addition, there is a change in the mix of servers, including extensive investment in the army as a social mechanism leading the socialisation process.

The former Israeli Commander in Chief, Lt. General Gadi Eisenkott, recently expressed a view on the concept of security threats, emphasising two aspects: the danger of damaging the dignity of the IDF, involving it in social struggles over the image of Israeli society, taking place at the army's expense; and that the IDF is invincible now and in the near future. These two contexts show that the commander of the IDF does not perceive any security threat that is an existential one. In his opinion, the struggle in society is in jeopardy.

In addition to Eisenkott's ideas, his deputy, MG Yair Golan, has often reduced the strength of security threats, emphasising social threats resulting, according to him, from radicalisation processes in Israeli society. The opinions of the two most senior officers in the IDF show that Israel's main challenge is not defence related, but social and internal. The narrative described by the IDF commanders is considered extremely reliable (Harel, 2013, pp. 107–125), and soldiers get the message loudly and clearly.

There has also been a reduction in fighting setups, the establishment of instrumental units, and a sharp reduction in calling up reserve personnel and coping with many non-combative missions. Therefore, it is not surprising that these phenomena 'mask' the nature of the threats (Isik, 2019). The social preoccupation in the army has become more significant over recent years. This is seen in the quotations above from the speeches of Lt. General Eisenkott and his deputy.

At the beginning of the last decade, the Behavioural Science Division of the IDF presented the view that its main activity was the effort to conserve the 'citizen-soldier military',

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especially the values of uniformity, equality, and integration, in addition to dealing with absorbing new immigration and ultra-religious youths (Tishler and Hadad, 2011). As this study has found, these perceptions have been fulfilled.

The IDF's attempt to connect basic republican and liberal values do not operate in a vacuum, but relates to a commanding staff that has varied views (Popper, 2009), leading to soft social multi-culturalism (Nevo and Shor, 2002). This concept has dictated the 'spirit of the IDF' as a normative frame work that puts human dignity at its centre, assimilating such values as civic duty and tolerance towards others (Nevo and Shor, 2001). This liberal concept, where commanders lead soldiers as equals, in a service where everything is negotiable, gives legitimacy to even refusing an order that a soldier regards as immoral (Yair, 2011, pp. 62–85).

Conclusion

The findings of the current study show that ex-soldiers for whom the defence belief has weakened, with a reduced threat picture, are more sensitive to social aspects, and tolerant towards Arabs. This means that the intention of the IDF high command to create an ideological-social balance during military service is effectively implemented.

These findings, as well as the dramatic absorption of technological abilities and strengthened measures against cyber threats raise the question of whether the IDF is a 'post-modern' army, and whether an army can be post-modern and, simultaneously, be a ,citizen-soldier' army.

These findings show a significant attitude shift in ages 16 to 24 – this echelon in society is the future of the state of Israel. The fact that military service in the IDF has seen moderate social attitudes evolve is essential for a democratic and pluralistic society.

Given the fact that Israeli society is in a continuous conflict with itself, this is an astonishing finding, and it can be said that at least Islamophobia isn't derived from military service in Israel, or demonisation of the other side. It seems that the outcome is the opposite – serving in a citizen-soldier army in a democratic state could build bridges for major social and national conflicts and be an integration accelerator.

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Chapter 4:

The inter-generational effect in a citizen-soldier army[14]

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Harel Amos	20%	Gathering data, guiding research idea, methodology
Harman Tamar, Ella Heller, Atmor Nir	20%	Theory elaboration, gathering data, Research ,methodology
Ronen Itsik	20%	Theory elaboration, research concept, gathering data, data analysis
Ben-Dor Gabriel, and Lewin Eyal	15%	Analysis, commenting particular versions of the article
Nevo Baruch and Shor Yael	10%	Theory elaboration, constructing research questions
Moskos Charles and John Williams	10%	Theory elaboration, research concept, data analysis, coordination of the work
Rennick Joan	5%	Commenting particular versions of the article, input in the analysis part

The Intergenerational Effect of Military Service in a Country with a Citizen-Soldier Army

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The claim has been made that the social impact of army service has eroded in recent decades as the influence of service as an intergenerational familial tradition has declined, affecting the willingness of children to volunteer in the community and to enlist in the military. This study examines the effect of past service in the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) on the values families have about both community and military service as a family tradition. Survey results from more than fourteen hundred respondents to a questionnaire published on social media show that the army service of parents positively affects the readiness of their children to volunteer in the community as well as to join the IDF. Additionally, the children of parents who have served in the military have a significantly higher social motivation than a security motivation to engage in military service, which lends support to the "citizen–soldier," as opposed to the "professional army," model. Hence, within contemporary Israeli society, the "citizen–soldier" army still serves as a "tribal fire,"[1] and military service helps establish a constructive patriotism that is essential for such a divided society as Israel.

Introduction

In the few Western countries that rely on citizen-soldier armies, a conflict exists between the need for a "national army" based on compulsory service and the need for a "professional army" composed of volunteers. This conflict relates to the tension between the perceived social contributions of a citizen-soldier army—such as social cohesion, solidarity,

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1. In Israel, "tribal fire" is a metaphor for a significant cultural custom.

and patriotism—versus its high budgetary cost to the state (Krebs 2009). Those opposed to compulsory service claim it is too costly: Army veterans enter the labor market late, and its social contributions are doubtful (Arad 2010). Another claim is that military service may intensify social conflicts within society (Levy 2014), which is an especially problematic issue in ethnically or religiously divided settings.

On the positive side of the debate is the common argument that military service plays a significantly positive role socially, particularly in promoting social solidarity (Vest 2013). According to this argument, military service draws disparate groups within the population together, providing a model of "good citizenship," and is often considered the highest contribution to society (Moskos 2002). However, despite such positive contributions, some argue that in the modern, Western world the motivation to serve in the army is declining. This is accompanied by the claim that the intergenerational effects of military service have greatly eroded and that, in the spirit of "postmodernism," family traditions of military service, in which children follow their parents into the military, have also declined (Moskos, Williams, and Segal 2000).

It is important to note, however, that few recent studies have examined the effect of parents' military service on the tendency of their children to volunteer in their communities and, later, to serve in the military. This gap in our knowledge is significant, particularly in an era in which most Western armies have become professional voluntary armies and those countries that continue to maintain citizen-soldier armies are beginning to question the model. Given this, the current study seeks to examine the intergenerational aspects of military service in Israel, where a long-standing discussion over compulsory conscription, as well as the continued social necessity of a citizen-soldier army, persists. The main question to be addressed in this study is: How does parents' military service in Israel affect their children's motivation to contribute to society through community and military service?

The claim of the current study is that compulsory service in the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has a significant and long-term social impact on ex-servicemen and -women and on their children. In particular, I maintain the following:

1. Over time, service in the IDF has come to be accepted as a social, rather than simply a security, contribution.
2. Parents' military service has a positive influence on their children's readiness to volunteer in the community.

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3. Ex-servicemen and -women prefer the citizen-soldier model over the professional army model.

Indeed, within Israeli society, the intergenerational relationship as well as the influence of parents on their children's readiness to volunteer in the community and to later serve in the army has not declined over time, but has grown. Hence, the contributions of military service to society and national security continue to be significant.

Parents' Military Service and Children's Volunteering for the Community

Volunteering in one's community emphasizes the importance of the collective over the individual and often results from an inner motivation to be a better citizen (Popper 2009). In the past, serving in the army was considered the ultimate contribution to one's society and an essential component of social solidarity (Janowitz 1983). Over time, however, change in the nature of military conflict,[2] the reduced risk of a general war, and changes to military activity involving such civic practices (Hart, Hart, and Nesbit 2011) as peacekeeping missions and disaster relief operations have led to the belief that volunteering is no less important than service in the armed forces. Moreover, a willingness to perform community service appears to be connected to one's willingness to serve in the military. In fact, even today, parents' military service appears to affect their children's readiness to both volunteer in the community as well as to serve in the armed forces, whether in compulsory, reserve, or permanent duties (Itsik 2013).

Despite this, some claim that because of postmodern developments within Western democracies, whereby military service has become professionalized and a preferred income source for certain social groups, parents' military service no longer induces their children to enlist. Increased individualism and an instrumental focus on the personal benefits of military service have also contributed to this trend (Adres, Vanhuysse, and Vashdi 2012). Still others claim that even if military service affects veterans after they are discharged, this effect is only short-lived and likely disappears in a few years as one's personal circumstances change (Colonimus and Bar-Tal 2011).

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2. We are referring here to the shift from militarized threats emanating from other countries to terrorist threats from sub-state organizations.

Conversely, other studies that have examined families and especially their children have found that when one of the parents is deployed for extended periods away from home, the children's readiness to volunteer in the community is high, especially when their community service is focused on assisting other families (Masten 2013). Scholars also have found that the military service of at least one parent reinforces civic values within the family, increasing family members' willingness to contribute to the general good (MacDermid et al. 2005). Finally, the claim is also made that parents' military service reinforces their children's willingness to engage in reserve army duty (Griffith 2009).

Given that military service affects families' social values, including family members' readiness to volunteer in the community, it is worth examining the nature of the value that is placed on volunteering.

Military Service and Constructive Patriotism

As noted above, the influence of military service is debated in the literature (Krebs 2005). Bar-Tal and Staub studied patriotism and found that military service can affect patriotism in two ways: it can create either a blind patriotism based on nationalism and hatred of others or a constructive patriotism that is based on intercultural exchange and mutual respect (Bar-Tal and Staub 1997). Thus, while some scholars claim that enlisting in the army leads to nationalism and militancy (Bachman, Sigelman, and Diamond 1987), others maintain that army service results in more positive national motives (Walsh 2004), leading to a positive change in one's level of social sensitivity, such as, for example, in the will to contribute to the poor or to volunteer in other socially beneficial activities (Popper 2009).

Many studies also point to the positive effects of parents' service in the army on family cohesiveness (Hogan and Seifert 2010). They argue that such service leads to a more sophisticated manner by which families cope with difficulties and tensions (Lester et al. 2011), reinforces their children's sense of responsibility (Kelty, Kleykamp, and Segal 2010), and contributes to the earlier maturity of enlistees (Huebner and Mancini 2005). In addition, parents' military service also reinforces children's social skills and leads children to be more tolerant toward other cultures within society (Lande 2007). This may lead to constructive patriotism, which reinforces social cohesion. Because others maintain

that the positive effects of military service on social issues are short-term and can erode over time (Leander 2004), this study aims to examine whether parents' military service affects their children's social abilities and, if so, in what ways.

The Intergenerational Effect on Motives for Military Recruitment

Moskos, Williams, and Segal (2000) argue that, in the Western world, the relationship between the individual and the state, including one's readiness to serve in the army, has changed over time, developing through three stages: the modern stage (the end of the era of colonialism), the late-modern stage (the Cold War era where the main threat was nuclear annihilation), and the postmodern stage (the period since the disintegration of the USSR and the end of bipolar superpower rivalry). During the modern stage, the motivation to serve in the armed forces derived largely from a sense of threat and necessity. During the Cold War period, one's motivation resulted from patriotism and a sense of family tradition. In the postmodern stage, motivation to serve is derived mainly from individual factors and, in some families, from a tradition of family service. In this most recent period, Moskos (2002) argued that the growing erosion in people's motivation to enlist in the armed forces was the result of a decline in loyalty to society and country.

However, other studies have emphasized the formulation of a national identity (Lande 2007) and a solidarity (Rennick 2013) that emerges as a result of military service, leading to the assimilation of positive social values, including solidarity (Franke 2000) as well as the democratic norms of equality and pluralism (Itsik 2020b). Specifically, it has been shown that in army-serving families, a tendency exists to adopt values that develop during military service. Hence, a parent's service may lead to a deep pro-military socialization (Sackett and Mavor 2003), leading to sympathy and loyalty for the military, including a strong faith in the decisions taken by officers and commanders (Cable and Parsons 2001).

Methodology

The current study is longitudinal and uses correlation and multivariate regression analyses to determine which variables affect youth

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readiness to volunteer in their communities and to join the military. Over fourteen hundred men and women from throughout Israel participated in this study by responding to a structured internet questionnaire that was distributed via social media from 2016 to 2020. The average age of the participants was twenty-two. Participants were asked to express their attitudes regarding a number of statements related to conflicts within Israeli society[3] that were taken from other studies which examined cohesion, strength, solidarity, patriotism, fear of terror, war, and readiness for emergency situations within the country (Ben-Dor and Lewin 2017). In addition to providing details of their past experiences with community volunteering, participants were also asked to provide details of their own and their parents' military service, their parents' level of education, and their family's socioeconomic status.

The questionnaire was tested in three pilot studies prior to the formulation of a final version. This allowed the researcher to reduce duplication of answers, to clarify any vague questions, and to create an option for participants to be able to return to previous questions in the questionnaire if necessary. Finally, participants had to answer every question before they could submit their responses, as the questionnaire did not allow participants to leave questions unanswered.

Administered anonymously, the questionnaires were distributed in Hebrew via Facebook, Twitter, and LinkedIn social networks and groups. Additional participants from other communities who were not on social media, such as the ultra-Orthodox or Arabs, received the questionnaires via WhatsApp and SMS messages using a snowball sampling method.

Sample Population

As shown in Appendix 1, the number of men and women participating in the study was close to equal. About 53.5 percent of respondents were secular Israelis, 16.3 percent were traditional Jews,[4] 10.8 percent were religious Jews, 1.2 percent were ultra-religious Jews, and the rest defined themselves as "no religion." Nearly 92 percent of respondents were Jewish,

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3. For example, they were asked about the size of Israel's spending on security or the threat from a possible Palestinian state.
4. Traditional Jews, as opposed to religious Jews, are people who follow family traditions and ethnic customs.

1.2 percent were Druze, and the rest were Muslim (mostly Bedouin) and Christian. These demographic characteristics resemble the demographic distribution of the IDF. Within the IDF, 30 percent of respondents (both men and women) had served as combat soldiers, 38 percent had served in supporting roles, and the rest had been home-front soldiers who served in the rear by performing logistic and management work in support of the front line. All participants had completed their military service obligation in the IDF.

Study Variables

The variables that were selected for the correlation and regression analyses were similar to those in a study conducted by Barkai (2007) that examined the effects of military service on political issues. The dependent variable was the reported level of one's volunteering (ordinal measure). This included such activities as participants' extracurricular school activities, any roles they undertook in youth organizations, and any year-long volunteer service within their community—including in hospitals, community centers, and nursing homes—prior to recruitment into the military. The independent variables were age (scale), the gender of each participant (nominal), their parents' level of military service (ordinal), their parents' level of educational attainment (ordinal), the participant's military service characteristics[5] (ordinal), and whether he or she was an officer. (See Appendix 2)

Limitations of the Study

Most of the participants in this study served in the ground forces. As a result, the findings are less representative of the air force, intelligence services, and navy. Moreover, since the questionnaire was based on self-reporting, some bias may also exist regarding the type of service performed, since respondents may attempt to portray their service as being more significant than it was in reality. Finally, the socioeconomic background of participants was also skewed, as many participants were of a higher socioeconomic status. This bias is important because, as Levy

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5. This would include service in a home-front unit, a logistics unit, as a combat supporter, or as a combat soldier.

claims (2019), it is at higher socioeconomic status that individuals experience the postmodern era most intently (Levy 2019).

Findings

Longitudinal Trends

Figure 1, which focuses on the contributions of military service to Israeli society, illustrates that over time participants have come to perceive that the military's social contribution relative to its security contribution has grown, a trend that is consistent. Furthermore, the standard deviation decreases over time from 1990 to 2000, implying that an even greater consensus regarding this perception exists today than in the past, and the differences are significant at the 0.05 level.

Results of the Correlation Analysis

In addition, the correlation between the different variables points to the following results (see Table 1):

- A positive correlation was found to exist between parents' military service (PSRVC) and children's motivation to volunteer in the community (VOLVL). A positive correlation was also found to exist between the parents' level of military service and the children's motivation to serve in significant roles in the armed forces, such as in the front lines (SVMTV), including volunteering to serve as officers.[6] A positive correlation was also found to exist between the parents' military service and the family's socioeconomic status (SOCECO), followed by a positive correlation between level of religiosity (RELIG) and the motivation to volunteer in one's community.
- Finally, the correlation between the participant's age (AGE) and the other variables was found to be statistically insignificant, as was the correlation between the level of the children's community volunteering and their motivation to serve in the front lines.

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6. In the IDF, soldiers volunteer to serve as officers during their time of service.

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Figure 1. Identification with the statement "Service in the IDF contributes to Israeli society more than to Israel's security" (*N* = 1,426, scale 1–6 [Std. Dev.]).

Results of the Regression Analysis

The first regression model (see Table 2) examines the effect of parents' military service, the age of the participant, and the participant's gender, socioeconomic status, and religiosity on the dependent variable, which is the level of the participant's motivation to volunteer in the community. The model was found to be highly statistically significant. Moreover, parents' military service was found to be a highly significant factor in motivating volunteerism among their children.

The second model (see Table 3) considers the effect of the independent variables on the children's level of motivation to enlist in the army's front lines. This model was also found to be highly statistically significant, as parents' military service was found to be highly significant in motivating their children to serve in the army. It is interesting to note that, while gender was also found to be significant, the relationship was negative, which may be the result of female respondents viewing the military as masculine in orientation (Itsik 2021).

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Table 1. Correlations between Variables (Pearson Correlation)

		RELIG	SOCECO	PSRVC	VOLVL	SVMTV	OFFICER	AGE
RELIG	Pearson Correlation	1.00	−0.01	−0.04	0.15	0.07	0.05	0.02
	Sig. (2-tailed)		0.73	0.16	0.00	0.00	0.08	0.4
	N	1,426	1,426	1,426	1,426	1,426	1,426	1,426
SOCECO	Pearson Correlation	−0.01	1.00	0.14	0.06	−0.01	0.03	−0.05
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.73		0.00	0.015	0.69	0.26	0.06
	N	1,426	1,426	1,426	1,426	1,426	1,426	1,426
PSRVC	Pearson Correlation	−0.04	0.14	1.00	0.19	0.08	0.08	−0.02
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.16	0.00		0.00	0.00	0.00	0.44
	N	1,426	1,426	1,426	1,426	1,426	1,426	1,426
VOLVL	Pearson Correlation	0.15	0.06	0.19	1.00	0.08	0.02	0.03
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.00	0.01	0.00		0.96	0.36	0.32
	N	1,426	1,426	1,426	1,426	1,426	1,426	1,426
SVMTV	Pearson Correlation	0.07	−0.01	0.08	.08	1.00	0.13	−0.03
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.00	0.69	0.00	0.96		0.96	0.22
	N	1,426	1,426	1,426	1,426	1,426	1,426	1,426
OFFICER	Pearson Correlation	0.05	0.03	0.08	0.02	0.13	1.00	−0.02
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.08	0.26	0.00	0.36	0.00		0.5
	N	1,426	1,426	1,426	1,426	1,426	1,426	1,426
AGE	Pearson Correlation	0.02	−0.05	−0.02	0.03	−0.03	−0.02	1.00
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.4	0.06	0.44	0.32	0.22	0.5	
	N	1,426	1,426	1,426	1,426	1,426	1,426	1,426

Table 2. Regression Analysis for the Dependent Variable "Level of Children's Motivation to Volunteer in the Community"

R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
0.30	0.09	0.09	1.31

ANOVA (VOLVL)

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Regression	255.89	5	51.18	29.63	0.000
Residual	2,452.94	1,420	1.73		
Total	2,708.83	1,425			

Coefficients (VOLVL)

	B	Std. Error	Beta	T	Sig.
(Constant)	−0.16	0.75	0.00	−0.21	0.837
AGE	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.91	0.362
GNDR	0.47	0.07	0.17	6.74	0.000
RELIG	0.24	0.04	0.16	6.22	0.000
SOCECO	0.03	0.02	0.03	1.33	0.185
PSRVC	0.19	0.02	0.21	8.08	0.000

In short, gender has a statistically significant effect on the dependent variables in both models, but its effect on each dependent variable is opposite: it has a positive effect among women when it comes to volunteering in the community, but a negative effect among them when it comes to significant military service.

When participants were asked whether they identified more with the statement that their parents encouraged them to serve in the military because of its contribution to security or because of its contribution to society, it appears that the majority volunteered to serve in the military because of the military's perceived social contribution (49.3 percent), rather than its security contribution (44.0 percent) (Figure 2). In yet another finding, Figure 3 reveals that participants' support for conserving the citizen-soldier army model in Israel is significantly greater than their support for a change to a professional army model.

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Table 3. Regression Analysis for the Dependent Variable "Significant Service in the Army"

R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
0.45	0.20	0.20	0.74

ANOVA (SVCMOTIV)

	Sum of Squares	Df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Regression	190.78	6	31.80	58.67	0.000
Residual	769.07	1,419	0.54		
Total	959.86	1,425			

Coefficients (SVCMOTIV)

	B	Std. Error	Beta	T	Sig.
(Constant)	2.45	0.42	0.00	5.79	0.000
AGE	0.00	0.00	−0.02	−0.88	0.379
GNDR	−0.72	0.04	−0.44	−18.03	0.000
PSRVC	0.03	0.01	0.05	2.04	0.041
VOLVL	0.03	0.01	0.05	1.99	0.047
RELIG	0.07	0.02	0.07	3.07	0.002
SOCECO	−0.01	0.01	−0.01	−0.48	0.634

Figure 2. Identification with the statements "My parents encouraged me to serve in the military because of its contribution to security" and "My parents encouraged me to serve in the military because of its contribution to society" ($N = 1,426$, 1 = totally disagree, 6 = totally agree).

Figure 3. Answers to the question "Should the model of the army be maintained as a citizen-soldier army or changed to a professional army?" (*N* = 1,426).

Discussion

These findings confirm the claim that there is a positive connection between parents' service in the army and children's motivation to volunteer in the community and to serve in the military. This connection was shown through both correlation and multivariate regression analyses.

In Israel, military service is conceived as closely related to the concept of volunteering, both of which are highly regarded within society. The social component of compulsory service in the IDF reinforces a social consciousness among family members, which helps to create a willingness to volunteer among the children of parents who have had significant military service. Moreover, the correlation between the socio-economic level of the family and the characteristics of the parent's military unit in service[7] may indicate that the army is an effective mechanism of social integration (Itsik 2020a).

A particularly interesting finding of this study is the significant correlation between gender and both dependent variables, pointing to an important difference in how the concept of volunteerism is understood by males versus females. As shown above, while the relationship for

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7. As stated above, this would include service in a home-front unit, a logistics unit, as a combat supporter, or as a combat soldier.

women was positive when it came to volunteering in their community, it was negatively correlated to military service. In short, females appeared less motivated to serve in the IDF. This finding may reinforce the perceptions of some with regard to Israeli women and military service—something that recently has been a source of significant conflict, as Israeli conservatives question the legitimacy of female military service, while Israeli liberals are highly supportive of it (Pileggi 2017). Given this split, the findings of the current study may reveal that the conservative view, according to which men, rather than women, are expected to be combat soldiers, is still relevant in today's Israel. As such, Israeli society may be more conservative than previously believed, and postmodern values may be less widespread than is often claimed.

Moreover, the finding regarding religiosity and its relationship to the dependent variables further reinforces this conservative tendency: the more religious a citizen is, the greater his or her willingness to serve in the community. This may be the result of the Jewish religious tradition, which places a great emphasis on the relationship between the individual and society (Yair 2011). However, it is also important to note that Israeli religious groups view army service as a means of social advancement (Levy 2007).

Finally, it is important that within Israeli society—even among the most recent and youngest generation—there is a clear connection between parents' military service and their children's military service (Itsik 2013). Specifically, the children of parents who served in the army also end up serving in the IDF. Moreover, the motivation for community service among Israeli youth is strong, given the fact that 37 percent of survey participants volunteered, dedicating an entire year to community service and thereby delaying their military service for that year. Indeed, it is interesting to note that the tendency to delay military service in order to volunteer in the community is growing.

Conclusion

This study has illustrated that Israeli society is still conservative, showing a strong commitment to military duty, which is largely perceived as a duty to society. This results in a readiness to volunteer in the community—what one might call constructive patriotism. This phenomenon may be the result of considerable traditionalism partly related to the influence of conservative Judaism. It may also be the reason why women view themselves less in combat roles as compared to

men and why men and women are equally prepared to engage in community service. However, the reality of Israel's complex security situation may also contribute to the belief that military service is a social need as well as a security necessity, thereby contributing to citizens' commitment to military service. Finally, it may also be the case that even today the IDF continues to be viewed as the "tribal fire" of Israeli society, leading many citizens to continue serving in it long after their compulsory service has ended.

Finally, and most importantly, the findings of this study support the claim that there is an intergenerational influence in all that relates to the IDF—both as a defense and a social mechanism; hence children whose parents served in the army show a high degree of readiness to volunteer in the community. However, the weak correlation between the parents' military service and their children's willingness to serve in the IDF, which was shown in the present research, may be an indication that the Israeli security ethos is eroding. Thus, while Israelis still perceive service in the IDF as the "tribal fire," a weakening of the intergenerational effect in the last decade may be an indication that society is on its way to becoming postmodern.

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Appendix 1. Characteristic of Sampling

1,426 answered questionnaires on social network, media, and internet during the years 2016–2020.

Category	Ex-soldiers (N = 1,426)
Female	52%
Male	48%
Average age	22
Age characteristics	14.1% age 24
	18.4% age 23
	23.0% age 22
	26.2% age 21
	18.3% age 20
Religion	91.8% Jewish
	5.0% Muslim
	2.0% Christian
	1.2% Druze

Religion scale	18.2% no religion
	53.5% secular
	16.3% traditional
	10.8% religious
	1.2% extremely religious
Participant military service	38.1% rear logistics
	29.6% front logistics
	25.1% warrior
	7.2% other
Father's military service	18.5% rear logistics
	29.3% front logistics
	47.0% warrior
	5.0% other
Mother's military service	50.3% rear logistics
	18.8% front logistics
	8.2% warrior
	23.0% other
Socioeconomic status	43.0% above average
	34.0% average
	23.0% below average
Residential area	56.6% center
	37.0% periphery
	6.4% border settlement
	(2.7% Yehuda and Samaria)

Appendix 2. Independent Variables

Variable	Type	Explanation
Age	Scale	Age of participant
Gender (GNDR)	Nominal	Gender of participant
Parents' military service (PSRVC)	Ordinal	Triggered variable that combines the father and mother's service on a 0–3 scale: 0 - didn't serve in the military 1 - served in rear unit logistics 2 - served in front unit logistics 3 - served as a combat soldier
Participant's military service (SVMTV)	Ordinal	0 - didn't serve in the military 1 - served in rear unit logistics 2 - served in front unit logistics 3 - served as a combat soldier

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Socioeconomic status (SOCECO)	Ordinal	Family's income and parents' education
Participant volunteering in community (VOLVL)	Ordinal	Aggregate points of volunteering: 0 - didn't volunteer 1 - volunteered in school (student council, etc.) 2 - instructor in youth movement 3 - 1 year of volunteering before military service
Religion level (RELIG)	Ordinal	0 - non-religious (anti-religious) 1 - secular 2 - traditional 3 - national religious 4 - orthodox ultra-religious

Chapter 5:

Military service and female empowerment[15]

Article:
Itsik, R., 2021. A Battlefield of Social Challenges Military Service and Female Empowerment Ronen Itsik , Ph.D candidate, 10 (2), 42–50.

Contribution to the article

Author	Contribution in %	Description of contribution
Ronen Itsik	30%	Theory elaboration, research concept, gathering data, data analysis, discussion
Moskos Charles and John Williams	20%	Theory elaboration, research concept, data analysis
Sasson-Levy Orna	20%	Theory elaboration, research concept, discussion part
Barkai Zvi	15%	Research concept, gathering data, data analysis, Commenting particular versions of the article
Senor Dan and Singer Shaul	5%	Theory elaboration, constructing research questions
Tishler Asher and Hadad Sasson	5%	Theory elaboration, constructing research questions
Ryan Kelty, Meredith Kleykamp and David Segal	5%	Theory elaboration, constructing research questions

A Battlefield of Social challenges Military Service and Female Empowerment

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Abstract

Armies are known for their masculine characteristics, therefore women serving have to cope with a double challenge: fulfilling their military mission, and handling the masculine environment .

The current study examines how women are affected from military service, by a combination of a qualitative and quantitative methods. During the years 2015-2019, 3800 men and women responded to an internet questionnaire concerning their service experience. Out of these, 30 men and women were randomly selected for phone interviews.

These findings show that military service experience for female is mainly social- It empowers their inter-personal communication skills, and provide them essential characteristics for future roles in the society.

State of art: Social sciences, Civil-Military Relations

Key words: *socialization, female empowerment, social polarization, pluralism, professional army, citizen-soldier military*

I. INTRODUCTION

One of the outcomesby transition military service to professional service model,is female duties, an issue thalhas been undergoing change in the past decades (Sasson-levy, 2014). Female roles in these armies is also influenced by the changes in the battle field characteristics, mainly the extended use of technology and remote fighting means. These reduced the direct encounters between warriors and enemies, and the resulting risk for life (Lutwak, 2002).

Yet, there is an on-going discussion about the army effectiveness as a social mobility mechanism relating to female empowerment. On the one hand it is claimed that the role of women in western armies is reinforced and they are continuously more involved in core functions. On the other hand, there are those who claim that the gender hierarchy in the army is controlled by men, and eternalizes gender gaps preventing women from reaching key positions.

The same process accrues in the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), in relation to the integration of women(Englender, 2006), where some claim that there is a structured conflict between genders, based mainly on a religious background (Levy, 2014). This leads to internal arrangements limiting the operational roles of women, and even gender segregation as well as physical and ideological separation of genders during military service(Haber & Sharvit-Baruch, 2013).

Focusing on the discussion relating to the participation and fulfillment of women in the military in the western world in general and in Israel in particular, leads to knowledge gaps relation to the effect of the service on the social development of women in the foreseeable future   Does the army provide a platform for the empowerment of women despite the built-in tensions and difficulties, or does this conflict, controlled by men, eternalize male superiority and prevents women from furthering their positions in the army and in society in general.

Main research question:

How are women affected by their service in the IDF?

This question is followed by sub-questions:

1. What is the unique characteristic of female service in the IDF?
2. How are the gender differences expressed during military service?
3. How does military service affect female social concepts?

The main argument in this studyis that despite tension in the Israeli society, that affects gender-related decisions in the IDF, women are significantly empowered during their military service. This results from their coping with social aspects, empowering their skills for open discussion with other cultures, containment of 'others',

acquiring networking skills that improve their social capabilities. These processes allow women to display greater flexibility in their thinking about social aspects.

These aspects may enhance the status of women in society since the military service increases communication and social skills, as well as capabilities for coping with the structured conflict between conservatism and progressiveness. Such skills are essential in the era of increasing social polarization, and the expansion of the influence of social networks. Hence the role of women in society may become more significant in the future.

II.   FEMALE MILITARY SERVICE – UNIQUENESS AND MISSION

World-wide, armies have dealt with increasing women motivation forenlisting, resulting from the need for high-quality manpower and restricted national resources. As the army has traditionally been a popular militia with male dominance, women have been placed after men in the social hierarchy (Sasson-levy, 2014). The more social and technological the army, the variety of roles open to women has expanded significantly (IDF-BSD, 2011).

In the IDF the missions of the human resources department over the past decade were directed at reducing social gaps and integrating unique populations, while empowering women and their integration(Tishler & Hadad, 2011). This social value motif of the military service was integrated in the normative document 'The spirit of the IDF', written in the early 2000's - nowadays it appears that these missions will be achieved (Itsik, 2019).

This is important as it is implement along two other dramatic processes in the IDF 'The neo-professional army' and 'The market army'.

Professionalization of the army, and mainly in operative and technological roles has increased integration of women in combative units, which has not occurred in the past (Sasson-levy, 2014). During the past decades, women in the military have managed to 'break the glass ceiling' and to be appointed as battalion commanders in field units, as well as continued service in administrative roles (Beeri, 2019). The need for cooperation between the different arms, requiring inter-personal communication, and the establishment of instrumental units to conserve defense stability within peace boundaries, the increased need for human resources to cope with the challenges of the civilian hinterland have significantly increased integration of women in different units and roles.

Nevertheless, the utilitarian discussion that characterizes the 'Y generation' (Almog, 2014), has negatively affected male motivation to serve in the army in significant jobs. Military service in the 'market army' has increased male expectations for social remuneration, especially for those serving in combative units (Levy, 2010). Hence, motivation of men to serve has decreased over the past decades, forcing the army to integrate more women into its ranks.

Changes in the battle field, combined with the social trends have enabled the army to reinforce platforms for the integration of women in a wider range of roles than in the past. It is still maintained, however, that the army is controlled by masculine concepts, preserving the traditional gender hierarchy (Sasson-Levy, 2014).Military service demands a high personal price that may deter women from serving in the army in the future (Havman & Levi-Zehira, 2014).Therefore, we need to examine the sources of the motivation of women to serve in the army at this time.

III.   MOTIVATION OF WOMEN SERVING IN THE ARMY

Military service is considered as the major contribution of an individual to his country and society. Together with feminist influences for a more just gender distribution are the reasons for more women entering military roles (Sasson-Levy, 2014).

It is claimed that over the past decades, governments have neglected social needs, mainly the integration of special populations, addressing the challenges of the civil hinterland during wars, and even the economic needs of weaker populations (Livio, 2012).Therefore, the IDF has undertaken more social missions as a result of such neglect.

Examining the data relating to the enlisting of women to the IDF shows several intriguing facts: The percentage of women volunteering for social activities before military service is significantly higher than that of the men (IDF-BSD, 2011. In addition, women are more alert to the security risks and their implications.

Moreover, the need to include women in the developing cyber systems, operation of unmanned military weapons, intelligence and computers enables them to serve in more relevant roles in order to create opportunities for social mobility(Haber & Sharvit-Baruch, 2013), and issue that is directly related to the subject of 'market army'.

The integration of their significant social contribution and the relevant security contribution helped women gain greater influence in an organization which is traditionally viewed as strictly masculine. Yet a military career is still not generally welcomed among women who tend to avoid frequent change, and view

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themselves as 'homemakers' holding the family together (Lunney, 2013) reducating the children, and in general supporting the main provider – the man (Hubner & Mancini, 2005).

Enlistment data from many western armies show an increase in the percentage of women serving(Kelty, Kleykamp & Segal, 2010), but the military is still viewed as a masculine profession. Hence we have to ask, how are women empowered during their military service and what are the consequences of their continued involvement in military roles?

IV.   THE EFFECT OF MILITARY SERVICE ON SOCIAL ASPECTS

Military service, although changed over the past decades, still includes clear social aspects, resulting from the need to integrate special populations, deal with human distress, and a need for effective inter-personal communication.Although female motivation to serve in combative units has increased, the percentage of women in combat manpower is still low (Sasson-Levy, 2014). The variety of roles offered to women increases their number in combat support roles, requiring more and varied skills, in view of the military challenges that have become more social than in the past (Moskos, 2000).

The most significant cultural effect on armies in the post-modern era is that transition from the warrior ethos to the diplomatic ethos – which in itself is a significant experience for women fulfilling the different roles that developed in this era (Hajjar, 2014). The increased social challenges and the need for reducing military resources require women to have higher negotiation skills, persuasion and integration, and an emotional containment of social variance (Tishler & Hadad, 2011).Moreover, skills that were acquired during military service are proven as very efficient in future roles, in society and in and also in private sectors (Senor & Singer 2011).

In societies maintaining gender separation during service, the challenges for women in the military increase (IDF-BSD, 2011). The containment required of women in such a conflict is enormous, and needs to create thinking flexibility and creativity. This is subject to a military gender functioning, without obliterating or declining certain groups. Fulfilling the professional goals defined for the military role leads women to maximize their social skills (Haber and Sharvit-Baruch, 2013). It is also maintained the gender separation and the preservation of hierarchy between women and men suppress social services, create tension and lead to a negative social conflict (Sasson-Levy, 2014).

Therefore, we need to examine to what extent women are empowered in the army and what are the social implications of their military service within the social characteristics presented.

V.   METHODOLOGY

5.1 Research tools and the population sampled

The current study integrates a quantitative methodology involving theoretical statistical analysis and multi-variate regression to examine the variables affecting the level of pluralism of women discharged from active military duty during the past four years, and a qualitative methodology involving in-depth interview analysis of this female population.

During the years 2016-2019 internet questionnaires were postedin social networks to over 3800 men and women all over Israel. Half of them were high-school students, aged 16-18, and the other half, youngsters after their military service, aged 22-25. The participants were required to state their position in relation to certain phrases related to conflicts in the Israeli society.

The phrases are derived from other studies examining cohesion, strength, solidarity, patriotism, fear of terror and war, and readiness for emergency situations in the Israeli society (Ben-Dor & Lewin, 2017).

The internet questionnaires were anonymous. Participants were asked to provide details of their military service, their parents' service, family education and socio-economic status. The data was collected on a spread sheet for Google Sheets software, which avoids typing errors, and allows real time follow-up on the accumulated answers. Three pilot trials were conducted on the questionnaire before its final version, reducing duplications, and avoiding misunderstandings, creating an option of contacting the participant for additional interviews or questionnaires.

50% of the participants were female and the other half male, 50% secular, 20% traditional, 15% religious (minority or ultra-orthodox), all the rest defined themselves as 'no religion'. 90% of the participants were Jewish, 5% Druze and the rest Moslem Arabs (mainly Bedouin). Their characteristics are similar to their distribution in the IDF. The characteristics of the military service: 30% combat soldiers, 40% in combat-support roles, and the rest regular soldiers. All the participants finished their military duty in the IDF.

The participants were offered the option to attach their e-mail address for an optional personal interview – over 300 left their address, and 30 of those were randomly selected for in-depth interviews to examine common aspects related to the effects of military service, both for the social or the cultural dimensions.

The combination of the qualitative and quantitative methods has not been used in the current research field during the past decade. The method answers two essential questions: the nature and trends of development

of female military service of women as compared to men, and the reasons for the different trends between genders.

The qualitative phase includes two layers: The first is coding the issues raised in the interviews by categories, in order to define a common denominator between participants as to the manner that the military service influenced them. The second is a deeper layer to identify characteristics on the personal level of the interviewees, and their subjective experiences during their military service.

5.2 The study variables
The variables chosen were selected based on the response of the participants to the internet questionnaire, including self-report data.
Dependent variable:
Pluralism (PL) – contains two parameters: The level of tolerance and the level of agreement. The tolerance parameter is based on the identification of the participants with phrases related to the need to accept and contain disputed phenomena in the Israeli society. The agreement parameter is based on the identification of participants with phrases expressing essential democratic principles. The answers are graded from 1-6 on the Likert scale.
Independent variables:
Gender (GNDR), military service (SRV), parental education (EDU), religiosity (RELIJLVL). These variables were selected based on a study relating to the effect of compulsory military duty on political attitudes (Barkai, 2007).

5.3 Study limitations
Most of the participants in the study served in the army, and therefore it is less representative of the air force, navy or intelligence corps. Nevertheless, the study describes the main characteristics of those serving in the army.
Moreover, as this is an internet questionnaire based on self-report, there may be biases relating to sensitive issues such as type of service, which may be enhanced to portray a more significant service than it actually was.In addition, the socio-economic background of the participants is biased towards the higher socio-economic levels – 60%, 30% represented medium levels and 20% come from low-income families. This bias presents a clear picture of this level, as it is claimed they experience the post-modern era on a deeper level.

VI. FINDINGS

6.1 Quantitative analysis

Figure No. 1 – The change in pluralism after military service (%)

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
According to Graph No. 1 it is seen that pluralism rises among men and women after the military service – this rise takes place in the years between high school and the release from army duty. It may be presumed that the service itself had a clear effect on tolerance and agreement among the study participants. It may be seen that among men the effect was higher, where in the higher category the rise was 23% for the men and 10% for women in the same category.

Table No. 1 – level of pluralism for women (n=1710) scale 1-6

Phrase	Change in PL level	Post military service		Before military service	
		Standard deviation	average	Standard deviation	average
Wholeness of society is more important than the wholeness of the country	Positive	1.50	4.39	1.41	4.33
Freedom of speech should be allowed during war even for those opposing it	Positive	1.55	4.36	1.5	4.23
Parliament members should not be allowed to dismiss each other it is the people's prerogative	Negative	1.61	3.64	1.63	3.80
I am ready to have an Arab neighbor	Positive	1.56	4.68	1.64	4.62
An LGBT parade should be allowed even on streets where religious people live	Negative	1.74	2.91	1.81	2.94
Even terrorists should have appropriate legal representation	Positive	1.83	3.62	1.78	3.33
Defense budget should be cut in favor of welfare issues	Negative	1.44	4.10	1.41	4.14

Analyzing the change in average response to the different phrases and comparison between women before and after army duty show minor changes, mostly positive, level of variance remains high.

A multi-variate regression on the effect of the independent variables on the level of pluralism shows that the gender variable is not significant, as compared to the other variables which are highly significant in relation to their effect on pluralism. The whole model is highly significant.

Table No. 2 – The effect of parental education, level of religiosity, army duty and gender on the level of pluralism

R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
.33	.11	.11	5.05

ANOVA (PL)

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Regression	8230.75	4	2057.69	80.77	.000
Residual	68938.17	2706	25.48		
Total	77168.33	2710			

Coefficients (PL)

	B	Std. Error	Beta	T	Sig.
(Constant)	19.97	.29	.00	67.73	.000
TOTEDU	.66	.07	.17	9.51	.000
RELIGLVL	-1.57	.11	-.27	-14.58	.000
SRV	.42	.19	.04	2.17	.030
GNDR	-.30	.19	-.03	-1.55	.121

To summarize the quantitative analysis - it may be seen that there is an apparently positive effect of the period of army duty on the level of pluralism, but the nature of the difference between men and women is indeterminate regarding the level of tolerance and agreement since the gender variable is not significant in the model. This issue requires further study within the qualitative analysis section of the interviews subsequently performed.

6.2 Qualitative analysis
6.2.1 Primary categorical analysis
The first phase of the interview analysis related to locating information based on declaration of the informants and their division into categories, based on aspects that recurred clearly. This methodology enables

the analysis of the subjects of the interviews, from which we can delve into the personal experience of each participant.

During this stage, 4 central categories were apparent for men and women in relation to compulsory army duty: characteristics of the military system, characteristics of the contribution during military duty, the role of comfort and economic stability in relation to the possibility of long-term army duty,

the effect of military service on personality, tolerance towards others and outsiders in the Israeli society.

Table No. 3 – categorization of main issues

	Female experience	Male experience
The military system	The system gives up on women. For some criteria women will be ruled out of the service and men will not. The organizational culture is clearly masculine. Even the response to women's medical problems is basically faulty. The roles open for women are limited although the army declares that may roles are open. A woman needs to give more of herself to prove she is worthy, and break gender prejudices There is a tendency to support a professional army since it enables better use of manpower and resources	The military system is dominant. It decides, it is total. An essential system for the country. Often unworthy commanders have a lot of power. The army sometimes presence false successes. There is a 'show' culture with nothing to back it up. Ineffective system – inappropriate use of resources, wrong prioritization, the army is not operationally prepared. The army should remain national and not professional. This leads to social equality and enables the use of the highest quality in society
Contribution in the army duty	Contribution is mainly social acquaintance with other cultures, communication and common denominators. Reinforced motivation for weaker populations to contribute more. The army service helps connect people. The common experience is unifying and leads to pride and trust among those who serve together.	The operational activities contribute to the country's safety. The general feeling is that you contribute to something important and influential. The social contribution is considerable in terms of cohesion, equality, also between genders.
Stability and comfort	The tendency towards long-term service will exist when such service affords economic stability and comfort relating to residence close to the army unit location.	Motivation for long-term army duty is conditioned upon the ability to vary activities and to develop in the future. The motivation stems from professional challenges. When these do not exist the tendency is to leave the army. Economic considerations are not relevant in the masculine discourse.
Personality formulation	The army makes women more assertive, believe in their ability to perform, mainly cope successfully with the significant masculine hegemony.	Army duty leads to quick maturation, reinforcement of independent abilities and significant improvement in the ability to fit in a group.
Tolerance for others	A tendency to view the army as a platform enabling connection between groups of population, a positive social effect, reinforcing the collective aspects.	Tendency to view the exceptional and the weak as issues the army should not deal with due to high investment of resources for operative purposes.

The category analysis enables understanding the difference between men and women in relation to army service effects.This division reinforces the differences in relation to the experience of compulsory army duty, almost in every category. It provides a general context relating to the gender context of service. Almost all the women interviewed mentioned the male hegemony in different ways. The social aspect of the service is more salient for women, while men emphasized the operational-professional aspects. The social context also appears in the masculine discourse alongside the operational one.

In addition, men view the military system as inefficient due to its dwelling on social contexts at the expense of operational or professional ones. The female criticism focuses mainly on the implications of male dominance that characterizes the service leading to women not fulfilling their potential in the service, and a more declarative than practical discourse. Women tend to support a professional army, understanding that their fulfillment in such a model will improve.

Men rarely discuss contexts of economic stability or comfort. This is important for women considering options for service in the career army. Male considerations for extended service are professional and functional. Both men and women interviewed were critical towards the military system in general but both discuss the social contribution of serving in the army, the connection between populations who would never have met but for the army.

6.2.2 In-depth analysis of the interviewees' comments

Analyzing the information from the interviews enabled to divide things into categories providing the context for differences between men and women in relation to the military service experience.

Gender conflicts

Most of the female interviewees requested to mention a significant experience during their military service chose an event where they had to prove their ability to perform and be assertive mainly because they are women.

V'. (female) who served as a psychological analyst describes the peak of her activity during the military service.

"I initiated a study dealing with the potential of women warriors in different roles onboard vessels. When we were asked to present the study to the Commander of the Core, his chief of staff did not authorize my attending the discussion. The corps is masculine, relying on the historical culture of core officers.My commanding officer insisted and then I could attend the meeting. This is a moment I shall never forget."

O'. (female) served as a paramedic in a rear unit, describes her experience as a conflict where she had to be assertive:

"Our commander did not authorize an act essential for the fitness of the medical corps. I was certain he was wrong and his priorities were off. I decided to insist. I won. Until then I was shy, afraid to comment and dispute. Since then I have not been afraid to express my opinions. I learnt how to use this."

N'. (female) served in the intelligence corps and tells of a negative experience during her military service:

"I understood our soldiers were about to be hit by enemy fire. I updated the desk commander but he did not adopt my opinions. I did not insist, and the soldiers were indeed hurt. Since then I do not give up, if I see an error, I go all the way".

E'. (female) served in the air force as a flight inspector, and describes her significant experience:

"The area was foggy and I had to land a large number of aircraft simultaneously. I managed it. I felt I proved myself and showed that I can cope with unforeseen situations".

The above experiences were described by the interviewees; they were not instructed towards any specific subject. It appears that many of their experiences focus on the conflict between men and women, forcing the women to be more assertive, prove themselves and not give up.

The experience of women versus those of the men

Most women interviewed emphasized the social role of the army, while the men mentioned the mission-professional aspects.

S'. (male) served in a combat unit, and then transferred to an educational commanding role. He described his experiences of the service:

"The height of my service was to protect a settlement surrounded by a hostile population. The understanding that I am safe-guarding civilians gave me enormous satisfaction. I understood I was doing something important. This is why I decided to transfer to an educational role to help others, be active and create cohesion within the group".

R'. (female) served in a combat unit within the airforce:

"The most important experience was the first time I had to stand guard. Suddenly some of my friends came up to me and remained with me throughout the shift. This togetherness was important for me. I understood I was not alone."

O'. (male) served in a medical rear unit. He describes his experience:

"I found a critical issue – we were short of a certain vaccine. It was my personal initiative to run the check. It was important to me to be prepared for any eventuality. My thinking was humane".

II'. (female) chose national service and describes the reasons for her choice:

"I wanted to help people in distress. I helped special need elderly people and also children with cancer. The thought that they could reach me any time and I could help them was important to me".

The significant common experience among women during military service is distinctly social and relates to interaction with partners or helping others. Men, on the other hand, put the mission first, but also emphasize its social purpose.

Effect of the service on personal and social issues

The interviewees were asked to grade on a 1-6 Likert scale the effect of their military service on a number of issues, some personal, professional and others social. The results show the differences between the genders:

Table no. 4 – skills improvement during military service

	Interpersonal communication (s.d.)	Profession-alization	Meeting other cultures	Getting to know the country	Decision making
Improvement among women	5 (0.66)	3.1 (1.28)	4.2 (1.47)	4 (1)	3 (0.68)
Improvement among men	3.8 (0.47)	4.2 (2)	4.5 (1.41)	5 (0.81)	4.9 (0.81)

The data presents averages between the two groups and show that for most of the issues there has been progress within the two genders during the army service. Interpersonal communication has undergone a more significant change among women.

The army as a platform for inter-gender equality

Most of the interviewees did not view the army as a platform advancing inter-gender equality. Yet many thought that in the transition from a national to a professional army such equality will be possible.

R'. (female) served as a warrior in the aerial defense unit. She describes:

"We have to become a professional army. Maximizing the potential of human resources under the current system is inefficient – there is unnecessary wastage of manpower".

H'. (female) served in a unit coping with chemical weapon threats:

"I support the transition to a professional army. I know many people not suited for the current military system, as it interferes with their professional development. This is a waste".

V'. (female) served as a research diagnostician:

"I support the transition to a professional army. Those who serve out of free choice contribute more. Motivation determines the quality of performance".

C'. (female) served as a squad commander in the Home Front Command, mentions gender equality resulting from the characteristics of the activities:

"In the Home Front Command women have greater opportunities. The unit was built on the concept of equality between men and women. I know from friends who served in combat units that there it was not the same. The 'macho' image rules there and women suffer from it".

T'. (male) who served in an infantry unit views the professional army as an opportunity for women:

"A professional army will use women better – such a platform will know to take advantage of the differences between men and women and will be more effective."

VII.   DISCUSSION

From the qualitative and quantitative analyses, it appears that compulsory army service positively affects both men and women in connection to exposure to different cultures and improvement of inter-personal communication. Nevertheless, it appears that for most variables examined in the qualitative methodology, the influence was higher among men.

The in-depth interviews show that the compulsory service is a unique social experience from the women's perspective. The salient aspect is coping with a dogmatic system controlled by men and leading a clear masculine culture.The scope of coping presented by women includes coping with the commanding level that is generally masculine. They describe overcoming this difficulty as success, also the ability to express an independent opinion, argue and convince. For most women this is a formative experience in this context.

The unique aspect of female service is the ability to successfully cope with challenges that are mainly masculine. This in addition to developing their own social skills, and interacting with other culture. This supports the claim related to women's ability to develop in a masculine society in view of the barriers and gender limitations in the IDF (Sasson-Levy, 2014). In addition, the difference between men and women in relation to the effect of the service is the essence of the experience – for women this is a significant social experience while for the men it is a combined experience, mainly operational or professional – target oriented, integrated with a social challenge.

This may explain why the gender variable in the quantitative analysis was insignificant, as the service appears to be a social experience for both groups.

Military service affects social concepts differently between men and women on several levels. The service is an empowering experience for women – they feel they can prove themselves, acquire self-confidence, improves their communication skills. The service provides them with an opportunity to better integrate in the civil world. Nevertheless, Women abstain from continuing in the career army under the current system. They tend to support a professional army, which is conceived as more enabling and understanding female advantages, where they can maximize their potential more effectively.

Women view the professional army as more egalitarian platform, supporting the theory of the post-modern army (Moskos, 2000), that social elements are expressed better in the professional army since it integrates a larger variety of people in a gender context. This theory is even more valid in an era where the battle field becomes more technological. The physiological context is less dominant in such an army; hence women get more opportunities.

The findings discover a conflict within the position of the women – on the one hand they present military service as a formulating experience for coping with male dominance, an experience that provides important skills in civil life. On the other hand, they support the transition to a professional army, where gender conflicts are reduced.

VIII.   CONCLUSION

The current findings show variances in the implications of compulsory army duty within the gender context. Females feel they can prove themselves in a masculine environment, they are more empowered than the men in inter-personal skills. They believe the army prepares them better for the challenges of civil life. For men the experience of the service combines coping with an operational or professional challenge together with social interaction.

Both genders emphasize the social advantages of compulsory army duty, while criticizing the military system with low effectiveness in utilizing manpower. Both genders view service in a professional army as an opportunity for women, but men prefer the current model of a national army. It is possible that men intend to preservetheir hegemony in a citizen soldier army.

In sum, the study clarifies the unique contribution of compulsory army duty among women. As time passes, women increase their support of the professional army model, and maybe this is the direction the army will adopt in the future. It is possible that the Israeli society is moving towards a post-modern era. The IDF is conceived even today as the 'tribal fire' and becomes a more utilitarian platform. The transition into a professional army will mark a deep change in social concepts within the Israeli society, that hitherto concentrated on collectiveness and solidarity.

Such a process requires a change in the models of enlisting in the army, an army based on volunteering form long-term army service and requires practical examination – is the IDF preparing itself in the interim for such a dramatic change? Will the professional army still be considered the 'tribal fire? These may be crucial questions for the Israeli society that has become more divided and conflicted during the past years. The compulsory army duty, requiring most youth to enlist, has been a bridge over these divisions.

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Chapter 6:

<u>Motivation for Reserve Military Service in Israel [16]</u>

Article:
Itsik, R., 2022. The Triple Commitment - Motivation for Reserve Military Service

Contribution to the article

Author	Contribution in %	Description of contribution
Gabriel Ben-Dor	30%	Theory elaboration, research concept
Ronen Itsik	20%	Research concept, gathering data
Meir Elran, Carmit Padan, Ronny Tirgian, and Oshea Fridman-Ben Shalom	20%	Theory elaboration, constructing research questions
IDF human recourses	15%	Methodology of questionnaires
Charles. W. Moskos, and David Segal	15%	Theory elaboration, constructing research questions

Motivations for Reserve Military Service in Israel

Ronen Itsik

Reserve military service in Israel has undergone significant reform over the past decade. Some claim that the IDF reserve corps are 'sinking' and the defence ethos has eroded, as well as the motivation to serve in the reserve corps. Ronen Itsik analyses the motivation to serve as a reserve soldier in the IDF and, through a combination of quantitative and qualitative analysis, shows such motivation results mainly from 'constructive patriotism', hence the reforms undertaken by the IDF in this area were effective.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) have been based on a significant reserve service – principally soldiers who finish their compulsory army duty – since the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948. This reserve allows Israel to cope with routine security challenges while conserving forces for emergencies.[1] Israel has seen dramatic changes in recent decades, including rapid advances in technology as well as the shift from confrontations against regular armies to sub-state terror organizations. There have also been changes in social priorities and increased investments in civil areas such as education, health and welfare.

Israeli society is affected by postmodern changes: the erosion of the defence ethos; the emergence of a more affluent society; and the rise of individualism, a liberal trend in the Western world, which has led to less emphasis on the value of collective sacrifice.

These changes in Israeli society have also led to a reduction in the IDF's reserve forces, that are still essential for the defence of Israel and provide about 70% of its personnel.[2]

The reserve soldiers who enlisted in the past from a sense of need and the awareness of threats enjoy improved conditions today, higher remuneration for their service, financial bonuses and other benefits in different areas of life. Some claim that the current main motive for serving is now utilitarian and economic.[3] This claim relates to the dilemma the average reserve soldier experiences: the tensions generated by their obligations to the military unit, family and civilian career. Such tensions often affect preferences.[4]

The need to remunerate reserve soldiers requires higher budget allocations, a significant consideration in decision-making related to reserve recruitment in

1. Yaacov Zigdon, *Eiunim betorat benian hcoach hatzvai* [*Deliberation in the Theory of Establishing Power*] (Tel Aviv: Maarachot ,2008), pp. 35–51, <https://fliphtml5.com/vmkhr/xeju/basic>, accessed 7 September 2022.
2. Oshea Friedman Ben-Shalom, 'Maarach hamiluim lean – hayaalom shebeketer zva haam' ['Reserve Military Power – The Crown Jewel of IDF'], Memorandum 183, Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), 2018, pp. 35–44, <https://www.inss.org.il/he/publication/the-israeli-military-reserves-what-lies-ahead/>, accessed 7 September 2022.
3. Yagil Levy, 'Mezva haam lezva haperiferiot', [From "People's Army" to "Army of the Peripheries"] (Jerusalem: Magnes Pub,2007), pp. 10–43.
4. Gabriel Ben-Dor, 'Hagormim hamashpiim hal motivazia lesharet bemiluim beshalom ubemilhama' ['Reserve Soldiers Motivation to Recruit'], Maarachot (Vol. 394, 2003).

IDF soldiers patrol the streets at the Shuk Mahane Yehuda Market reinforcing the Israel Police in crowded urban settings during the Muslim month of Ramadan.
Courtesy of Nir Alon / Alamy Stock Photo

any specific year.[5] In turn, this budgetary decision affects the extent of training for reserve units and their operational ability, while also impacting soldiers' perceptions of the necessity of their service.

This article examines the relations between the IDF reserve forces and Israeli society, specifically relating to the way they deal with the dilemma described above. These aspects have implications for Israel's military power and its national strength. Furthermore, the unique role of the military reserves for national security has been highlighted by the current war in Ukraine – the need for available forces as a retaliation against an imminent attack has become concrete.

At the beginning of the 2010s it was claimed that the reserve army in the IDF was 'sinking' due to the significant costs required for its maintenance,[6] the change in the nature of security threats and the reduced motivation of citizens to serve in reserve units.[7]

This led to further concerns, especially over the need for a new IDF service model. This would turn it into a professional army, in line with the practice adopted by many Western armies in recent decades.[8]

Nonetheless, there are those who claim that military reserve duty still has a significant role in fostering social cohesion.[9] The IDF has undertaken far-reaching reforms at the beginning of the previous decade to conserve the value of reserve duty as a

5. Shmuel Even and Eran Yashiv, 'Eibetim calcaliim shel march hamiluim bezaal' ['Economic Aspects of the IDF's Reserve System'], INSS, 2018pp. 169–77, <https://www.inss.org.il/he/publication/%D7%94%D7%99%D7%91 D7%98%D7%99%D7%9D-%D7%9B%D7%9C%D7%9B%D7%9C%D7%99%D7%99%D7%9D-%D7%A9%D7%9C-%D7%9E%D7%A2%D7%A8%D7%9A-%D7%94%D7%9E%D7%99%D7%9C%D7%95%D7%90%D7%99%D7%9D-%D7%91%D7%A6%D7%94%D7%9C/>, accessed 7 September 2022

6. Due to special bonuses and the need to recruit reserves for a greater number of days a year after the Second R Lebanon War. Ronen Itsik, 'How Much Longer will IDF Neglect Its Reservists?', Israel Hayom, 2021, <https://www.israelhayom. com/opinions/how-much-longer-will-idf-neglect-its-reservists/>, accessed 7 September 2-22

7. Dov Tamari, 'Hauma hachamusah - aliyata ushkiata shel tofaat hamiluim' ['The Armed Nation: The Rise and Fall of Israel's Reserve Forces Phenomenon'], Tel Aviv, Ministry of Defense, 2012, pp. 82–95.

8. Boaz Arad, 'Zava mikzoei leIsrael' ['A professional military for Israel'], Jerusalem: market research center (2010), <https://www.news1.co.il/Archive/003-D-53967-00.html>, accessed 7 September 2022.

9. Ben-Shalom, 'Maarach hamiluim lean – hayaalom shebeketer zva haam' ['Reserve Military Power – The Crown Jewel of IDF'], pp. 35–37.

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'top national team'.[10] Yet there are those who doubt the effectiveness of such actions.[11] This article aims to understand and resolve this gap in perceptions.

The study consists of one primary and three secondary questions. The primary question is:

What is the main motivational factor in the decision of reserve soldiers to continue to serve in the IDF?

The secondary questions are:

1. What is the main goal of the reserve corps in the view of the serving soldiers?

2. How does reserve duty in Israel affect the concept of security ethos at the individual level?

3. How do reserve soldiers in the IDF cope with the triple commitment: army; family; and work?

The major claim of this article is that reserve soldiers have a significant defence ethos concept – hence the motivation to join the reserve corps constitutes a cultural 'anchor' in Israel, conserving national values and reducing the impact of postmodern processes – for instance, by conserving the value of sacrifice for the greater good of society.

Hence, the motivation for reserve duty, even today, results from defence necessities, and constructive patriotism[12] has led to greater pluralism[13] in Israeli society.

The current study makes an important contribution to understanding the efficacy of IDF reforms that aim to improve motivation for reserve duty even though the main motivation for this service has not changed.

This insight, combined with the fact that reserve duty is a natural continuation of compulsory service in the 'citizen-soldier military' model, enables decision-makers to change their approach to remuneration and bonuses given to army reserve soldiers. In turn, this would help to ensure that the defence budget is used in a more effective manner, conserving the reserve corps at the level of fitness required for war or emergency situations.

This conclusion is based on a broad analysis. The study uses mixed methods, including an internet survey between 2016 and 2020, followed by semi-structured interviews.

The Triple Commitment of a Reserve Soldier

In recent decades, reserve duty in Israel has become dramatically less common – nowadays 12% of Israel's population serve in reserve units while in the 1980s more than 30% served. This reasons for this are two-fold: the number of IDF personnel has not grown at the same rate as Israeli society;

and the reserve law that was legislated in 2008 has now limited service to those aged 40 or under[14]. Since then, many reserve units have been reduced or even closed as a result of changes in combat characteristics and smaller budgets.

It is also claimed that motivation for service has eroded over the years.[15] And with reservists now a smaller minority in society, the competing demands of army and civic life have increased.[16]

Being away from home for 15–30 days annually means that the whole family burden is put on the partner for this period. This can lead to family tension and reduced commitment of the reservist to serve in the army.[17] Moreover, female partners also serve in the reserve corps – the number of women

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10. General Orna Barbivai stated in a lecture at the IDF command and staff college in 2013: 'reserve units soldiers as the best and most excellent civilians in Israel', <https://dr-hemmo.co.il/%D7%94%D7%90%D7%9C%D7%95%D7%A4%D7%94/>, accessed 7 September 2022.

11. Ophir Kabilo, 'Eyun Mehudash beraaion haafichabemeupach', ['Inception of a revolutionary idea – civilian groups influence on the reserve law'], , Doctoral thesis, 2019, Bar-Ilan University, Israel.

12. Defined as the relationship with the country or society characterised by a more flexible identification, support for constructive criticism and a desire to implement positive change.

13. Defined as a diverse society, where the people in it have a variety of beliefs, yet they tolerate each other's beliefs even when different.

14. Zvi Zarhaia, 'The coalition disqualified the reserve compensation law', *Themarker*, 14 October 2015, <https://www.themarker.com/news/1.2751688>, accessed 7 September 2022.

15. Dotan Druck, '"The Reserves Will Hold": Changes in the Israel Defense Forces' Operational Concept', *RUSI Journal* (Vol. 166, No. 3, 2021), pp. 1–11.

16. Ronen Itsik, 'Shirut hamiluim beIsrael beidan shel individualizm' ['Reserve army duty in Israel in view of individualism'], MA Thesis, 2013, Haifa University, Haifa.

17. Bonnie M Vest, 'Citizen, Soldier, or Citizen-Soldier? Negotiating Identity in the US National Guard', *Armed Forces and Society* (Vol. 39, No. 4, 2013), pp. 602–27.

currently serving in key roles in the IDF has risen significantly, leading to a situation where it will be more common for both partners to be serving in the reserve corps. This enhances family difficulties in dealing with the dilemma of choosing between commitment to the army or to the family.

Many reserve soldiers claim difficulties in the workplace. Being absent many days a year leads organisations to reduce support for army reservists and sometimes even avoid employing them.[18] This puts further difficulty on reserve soldiers and reduces their ability and motivation to join current military activities, mainly training, which are essential for maintaining the unit's level of military readiness so that it can respond in emergency situations. This also affects the willingness of reservists to take on increased responsibilities in their military roles or attain higher ranks.

Some claim that this challenge leads the army to compromise in key areas: when preparing for certain duties; or in the quality of the commanders. Often, the army has little choice in the people it recruits for specific roles.[19]

Compromising on the quality of personnel serving in commanding roles can adversely affect the unit's performance and further development of their personnel.

Over the past decade, the Israeli government has taken significant steps towards improving the conditions for reservists, especially with improvements to financial remuneration and by limiting the number of reserve service days per year.[20] The cap on the number of days has eased the dilemma for reservists but damaged the ability of units to recruit people as a result of a short limit compared with training and operational needs: routine activities and enhance unit cohesion.

The budgetary implications of enlisting reserve units have led units to change the frequency of training and enlistment. Furthermore, the IDF has changed the mix of forces and constructed regular functional units to defend borders and reduce the need for reserve duty.[21] Some claim that these decisions have reduced the quality of the forces defending the borders. They also claim that by avoiding the enlistment of reserve units for routine defence tasks, the IDF's strength is significantly damaged, as is its readiness for war.[22]

The obvious question is whether the Israeli government and the IDF have over-reacted by being more flexible and generous towards the difficulties of reserve soldiers, and thus broke the balance between empathy for army reservists and defence needs.

The Ethos and Motivation of Reserve Soldiers

Israel's citizen-soldier military was formed under the principle that 'the whole nation is an army' or 'the militarised nation',[23] as defined by David Ben-Gurion, the first prime minister of Israel. Ben-Gurion defined the IDF in the 1950s as 'the builder of the nation' based on the need to collect the diaspora in those years. He viewed reserve military power as Israel's main strike force – an ethos that enhanced by the canonic Jewish belief of being a persecuted nation.[24]

Eyal Lewin describes the outcome of the brutal history of deportation, Holocaust and survival wars experienced by Jewish people as a phenomenon of 'siege mentality' that evolved into a defence belief. In turn, this has contributed to a motivation to

18. Tali Levi, 'Miluim, ezrahut vehakika', ['Reserves, Citizenship, and Legislation'], in *The Future of Reserve Military Service in IDF* (Tel-Aviv: INSS, 2018), pp. 203–18.

19. Amos Harel, '12 hauzim memfakdey gdudey hamiluim bezaal – anshey keva', ['12 Percent Of Reserve Battalion Commanders Are Professional'], *Haaretz*, 19 February 2014, <https://www.haaretz.co.il/news/politics/.premium-1.2248157>, accessed 7 September 2022.

20. Friedman Ben-Shalom, 'Maarach hamiluim lean – hayaalom shebeketer zva haam' ['Reserve Military Power – The Crown Jewel of IDF'], pp. 38–42.

21. Ariel Hayman, 'Irurim behalof 10 shanum lehakikat hok hamiluim'['Military Reserve - A Decade After Legislation'], INSS, October 2018), pp. 23-34, <https://www.inss.org.il/he/publication/the-israeli-military-reserves-what-lies-ahead/>, accessed 7 September 2022.

22. Yehuda Shlezinger, 'Moridim yeilut bezaal kedei lesharet agendot feminiostiot', ['Reduced Operational Effectiveness Due to Female Service in Combat Units'], *Israel Today*, 25 March 2017, <https://www.israelhayom.co.il/article/462847>, accessed 7 September 2022.

23. David Ben-Gurion, 'Yehud veihud – dvarim hal bitchon Israel' ['Uniqueness and mission – issues of Israeli defense'], *Maarachot*, 1971, pp. 23–38.

24. Gad Yair, 'Zofen haIsraeliut - ['The Code of Israeliness'] (Jerusalem: Keter books, 2011), pp. 52–60.

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undertake military service.[25] According to Lewin, the characteristics of a siege mentality are based on four main thoughts: the state is a vital condition for the survival of Jews; there will always be a war for survival; the only way to survive here is to win wars; and, hence, 'only a great army will give us salvation'.[26]

The siege mentality factor has also been articulated by Israeli leaders, especially in the past decade – by phrases such as 'Forever we will stay on our own', and 'If I am not for myself, who will be?!'.[27] These phrases have been a part of the Jewish culture for more than 2,000 years and became a foundational myth. Logically, a significant siege mentality leads to the fact that Israeli society views the IDF as the most reliable establishment in Israel.

Even today the IDF is perceived as the 'tribal bonfire' of Israeli society – a major national symbol that fosters the basic motivation in young people for enlisting in compulsory service. However, reserve duty was always conceived as 'exaggerated volunteering' – many reservists were viewed over the years as 'suckers'.[28]

Yet, the reduction and closure of reserve units led people to believe that they were no longer essential. These developments took place during the peace processes between Israel and its enemies.[29]

After increased Palestinian political violence in the 2000s, Israel faced many key threats: terror attacks in major Israeli cities; increased rocket threats from Lebanon and the Gaza Strip; and the Iranian nuclear project. This fostered a heightened sense of imminent danger, rekindling the siege mentality in Israel. The increased defence threats were why, since the mid-2000s, the reserve corps was required to enlist personnel to wars and operations unheard of in the previous generation. During this period, the state invested in the strength of the reserve army and the motivation of the reservists to enlist. This is seen in the improvement of weapons and serving conditions in reserve units – a dramatic improvement that contributed to the reservists' sense that they were needed.

A significant reform took place between 2008 and 2012 following the Second Lebanon War (2006) in which hundreds of thousands of recruits took part.[30] The IDF identified an increase in motivation to serve in the reserve corps, as well as an improvement in unit training and the quality of the commanders.[31]

Researchers of the reserve corps describe unit cohesiveness as a motivational factor, where the service itself reinforces solidarity among recruits, in part because of the informal intense meetings among the recruits.[32] Earlier generations arrived as an organic, united group straight from their compulsory army service, where they served from the age of 18.[33] The connections among service personnel often led to a sense of family in spite of religious-ethnic differences and political views – it is claimed that in such units the level of pluralism (openness towards others, agreement on 'the rules of the game') is very high.[34]

The connection among members of the military unit has been reinforced over the years, and is a strong bond; people worry about their friends' livelihood and economic situation in general. Some claim that the greatest motivation to serve in the

25. Eyal Lewin, *Ethos Clash in Israeli Society* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2013), pp. 9–25.

26. Gershon Hacoen, 'Zva haam ozva schirei herev' ['National Army or Mercenaries'], Maarachot (Vol. 458, 2014), pp. 53–59.

27. See, for example, prime-minister Netanyahu in his speech at Israel's Navy commanders ceremony, Ynet 2013, <https://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-4428592,00.html >, accessed 7 September 2022.

28. Yair Golan,'Kolo shel miluimnik frayer', ['I'm a Sucker Reservist'], *Ynet*, 9 July 2012, <https://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-4252926,00.html> accessed 7 September 2022.

29. Tali Levi, 'Miluim, ezrahut vehakika' ['Reserves, Citizenship, and Legislation'], in *The Future of Reserve Military Service in IDF*, pp. 203-218. <https://www.inss.org.il/he/publication/the-israeli-military-reserves-what-lies-ahead/>, accessed 7 September 2022.

30. Shlomo Brom and Meir Elaran (eds), *The Second Lebanon War: Strategic Perspectives* (Tel Aviv: Institute for National Security Studies, 2007).

31. IDF human resources, 'Hamotivazia leshirut miluim', [The motivation of reserve soldiers], IDF sociological department, Tel-Hshomer, 2013, <https://www.israeldefense.co.il/>, accessed 7 September 2022.

32. Yoav Zeitun, 'Hazarnu le 2006', ['Back to 2006 Situation'], *Ynet*, 4 June 2013, <https://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-4387844,00.html>, accessed 7 September 2022.

33. Ben-Shalom, 'Maarach hamiluim lean – hayaalom shebeketer zva haam' ['Reserve Military Power – The Crown Jewel of IDF'], pp. 42–45.

34. James Griffith, 'Being A Reserve Soldier: A Matter of Social Identity', *Armed Forces and Society* (Vol. 36, No. 1, 2009), pp. 38–64.

reserve corps is the friendship that strengthens over time.[35]

In the past, the sense of readiness to enlist for reserve duty has been affected by family tradition, passed from father to son and as part of the historic Jewish ethos. However, it is claimed that family tradition is not as influential today, because of the weakening of the family cell and late-modern values.[36]

Nonetheless, studies show that, for reserve duty, traditions have eroded only slightly. Reserve duty still has a significant weight in family traditions – hence the argument relating to the continuing intergenerational influence of the family cell on readiness to serve in the reserve corps.[37] It is feared that with time the influence of such traditions will be reduced as the percentage of reservists is constantly decreasing in relation to the Israeli population.

Nevertheless, the reserve corps still constitutes a very high percentage of the IDF's personnel involved in training, operational activities and wars. The question is why. Are the reservists conservative in their national concepts, and not influenced by individualistic social trends?

Methodology

This is a comparative study combining qualitative and quantitative methods. Between 2016 and 2020 a semi-structured internet questionnaire was distributed via social networks. Over 4,200 veterans responded to questions on their attitudes towards the main conflicts facing Israeli society in the past decade, focusing mainly on social and security issues. The participants were required to state the extent of their identification with phrases representing these conflicts on a Likert scale (1–6).

Of all the respondents, 1,420 participants were reserve soldiers in the army,[38] while the rest have not served in the reserve corps.

The answers were collected automatically on Google Drive and collected through Google Forms. This collection method has several advantages: the avoidance of typing errors and duplications; and the ability to sample populations with no geographical restrictions.

The mix of respondents is very similar to that of those serving in the reserve corps in terms of socioeconomic markers and level of religiosity – from atheists to ultra-religious. In the past, these were found to be significant variables affecting service in the army.[39]

Based on this data, a correlation was run between the different variables, then a multi-variable regression to determine the significance of the model examining the various influences of reserve service and the significance of the variables.

Of 500 respondents who left details for interviews, 30 were randomly selected for semi-structured phone interviews which were held in 2021. The sample selected is similar to that of the internet respondents in terms of socioeconomic status and level of religiosity. The participants who were interviewed had to answer three structured questions:

1. How does your civilian career affect decisions concerning reserve service?

2. What are your family limitations for reserve duty?

3. In your view – how are military reserves appreciated by Israeli society?

After answering these questions, the participant had 20 minutes to speak freely on their reserve service experience.

The combination of methods allows the study to understand the tendencies and effects of the selected variables, while examining in-depth processes among reserve soldiers in terms of the concepts of threat, siege mentality and the social role of the reserve duty. The quantitative method enabled an understanding of the extent and direction of the influence of the variables, while the qualitative method of analysing the phone interviews enabled the in-depth analysis of the findings. Hence, this study provides a more complete answer to the various influences of reserve duty in the IDF – what motivates it and why.

35. Yom-Tove Samia, 'Meyehidim leyehida', ['From individuals to units'], Israel Ministry of Defense, Tel-Aviv 2008, https://www.nli.org.il/he/books/NNL_ALEPH002622603/NLI

36. Charles C Moskos, John Allen Williams and David R Segal (eds), *The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces After the Cold War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 7–21.

37. James A Martin et al., 'What We Know About Army Families: 2007 Update', US Army Installation Management Command, 2007, p. 186.

38. Sample characteristics detailed in Annex 1.

39. Zvika Barkai, 'Hashpaat hasheirut hzvai hal izuv dea politit' ['The Influence of Army Duty on Fashioning Political Attitudes'], Doctoral thesis, Haifa University, 2007.

The Study Variables[40]

1. gndr – Gender – a nominal categorical variable.

2. age – Year of birth – a numerical continuous variable.

3. plural – A qualitative variable representing the level of pluralism, based on weighting the response to phrases on conflicts in Israeli society.

4. siegemntl – A qualitative variable representing the mental level of 'blockade' – based on perceptions of imminent war, terror events and the fear of antisemitism (attitudes measured on a Likert scale, 1–6), based on the factors identified by Ben-Dor and Lewin.[41]

5. socioeco – A qualitative variable representing the socioeconomic level, based on wages and level of education.

6. unitchar – A categorical variable based on characteristics of reserve duty: rear; administrative; combat support; and combat.

7. reserve – Binary variable – reserve soldier or not.

The validity of qualitative variables was determined based on findings in the area of national security in recent decades, including the level of democracy[42] and the effect of military service on social aspects.[43]

Study Limitations

The mix of respondents to the internet questionnaire was varied and similar to that of those ending their compulsory military duty. Nevertheless, the sample was biased towards an above-average socioeconomic status, and tertiary level of education. Therefore, the study is less representative of those from lower-than-average socioeconomic status.

Almost all the participants in the qualitative study were reservists from the IDF ground forces. The representation of the air force and navy is lacking. Yet, most reservists in the IDF come from ground units so the bias is not high – and the distribution is similar to the general population of reservists in the IDF.

Findings

Quantitative analysis

Descriptive Analysis

Graph 1 represents the distribution of the study participants based on their mental perception of 'siege' as expressed by their attitude towards various phrases on Israel's security. The frequency of reservists who have a 'blockade' mentality is high, relative to those not serving in the reserve corps.

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40. See Annex 2.

41. Gabriel Ben-Dor and Eyal Lewin, 'Hosen haleumi shel Israel', ['Israel's national resilience'], Center for National Security Studies, Haifa University, Haifa (2017).

42. Tamar Hermann et al., 'The Israeli Democracy Index 2013', Israel Democracy Institute, 2013, <The Israeli Democracy Index A Periodic Check-Up - The Israel Democracy Institute (idi.org.il)>, accessed 7 September 2022.

43. Barkai, 'Hashpaat hasheirut hzvai hal izuv dea politit' ['The Influence of Army Duty on Fashioning Political Attitudes'], Haifa 2007, <https://poli.hevra.haifa.ac.il/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=195&catid=51&Itemid=368&lang=he, https://haipo.co.il/item/8720>, accessed 7 September 2022.

Figure 1: Siege Mentality Levels

Source: Author

Graph 2 represents the distribution of participants based on their level of pluralism as expressed by their attitudes towards various phrases on conflicts in Israeli society. The level of pluralism among reservists is high relative to those not serving in the reserve corps.

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Figure 2: Pluralism Levels

The above findings resemble those on compulsory IDF service and show the level of tolerance and acceptance in reserve units that meet more frequently and where the people have been connected for many years since their regular army duty.

Correlation Analysis

Analysing the correlation table, a significant positive correlation is found between the level of pluralism and reserve duty. It was also found that the more combat-oriented the service, the less frequently its personnel have a high-level siege mentality. These findings are also similar to those for personnel in compulsory service and may show that reservists conserve their defence and social concepts from that time.

Table 1: Correlation Analysis

		plural	unitchar	siegemntl	socioeco	age	reserves
plural	**Pearson Correlation**	1.00	.05	-.14	.04	-.02	.10
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.095	.000	.151	.531	.001
	N	1242	1242	1242	1242	1242	1242
unitchar	**Pearson Correlation**	.05	1.00	-.09	.00	.00	.33
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.095		.003	.934	.963	.000
	N	1242	1242	1242	1242	1242	1242
siegemntl	**Pearson Correlation**	-.14	-.09	1.00	-.04	-.02	-.02
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.003		.171	.562	.537
	N	1242	1242	1242	1242	1242	1242
socioeco	**Pearson Correlation**	.04	.00	-.04	1.00	.02	-.05
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.151	.934	.171		.567	.055
	N	1242	1242	1242	1242	1242	1242
age	**Pearson Correlation**	-.02	.00	-.02	.02	1.00	-.03
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.531	.963	.562	.567		.372
	N	1242	1242	1242	1242	1242	1242
reserves	**Pearson Correlation**	.10	.33	-.02	-.05	-.03	1.00
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.001	.000	.537	.055	.372	
	N	1242	1242	1242	1242	1242	1242

Source:

Multi-Variable Regression Model Analysis

The multi-variable regression relating to siege mentality provides a significant model based on gender, socioeconomic status, age and reserve duty. Findings show that the gender variable positively affects siege mentality; women tend to perceive a greater existential danger than do men. Traditionally, in Israeli society women feel more threatened by security threats.[44] In addition, the model shows that the effect of reserve duty on the siege mentality is positive and quasi-significant (p = 0.057).

Table 2.1: Regression Analysis: Model Summary (siegemntl)

R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
.28	.08	.07	2.85

Source:

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44.   Hanny Mann-Shalvi, *Mehaultra-sound el hazava* [*From Ultra-Sound to Army: The Unconscious Trajectories of Masculinity in Israel*] (Tel-Aviv: Routledge, 2016), pp. 23–52.

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Table 2.2: Regression Analysis: ANOVA (siegemntl)

	Sum of squares	df	Mean square	f	Sig
Regression	848.09	5	169.62	20.89	.000
Residual	10034.25	1236	8.12		
Total	10882.34	1241			

Source:

Table 2.3: Regression Analysis: Coefficients (siegemntl)

	Standardised Coefficients B	Std. Error	Beta	T	Sig.
(Constant)	11.66	.46	.00	25.22	.000
unitchar	.10	.11	.03	.89	.371
gndr	1.76	.18	.30	9.60	.000
socioeco	-.09	.09	-.03	-.94	.349
age	.00	.00	-.01	-.31	.760
reserves	.33	.17	.06	1.91	.057

Source:

In summarising the quantitative findings, it may be deduced that the defence ethos has not been eroded among reservists, and it is statistically significant within this group compared with those who do not serve in the reserves. In addition, a significant social impact of reserve duty can be identified, namely a high level of pluralism compared with those who do not serve in the army.

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Qualitative Analysis

Table 3: Categorical Analysis

Categroies	Postive infulences	Negative influences
The security threat	The fear of an Iranian nuclear bomb, terror organisations sent by Iran, intra-national subversion.	Improvement in the defence situation over the past's, reduced sense of existential danger, social polarisation is conceived as more powerful than an external threat.
National support motive	Zionism, love of the country, core values, social melting pot, personal responsibility, history, tradition.	A certain apathy on the part of the government, reservists being taken for granted, a sense of cynicism.
The social infulence motive	The need for social cohesion, educating for essential civic values, the reality that is not shown on media or social networks, desire to contribute for the greater good, solidarity.	A sense of inequality in the burden from a social perspective, see themselves as 'suckers'.
Family-level motive	Education at home, passed from generation to generation, the burden is tolerable.	Difficult when there are small children at home, often impossible, timing is very difficult.
Employment-economic motives	General support of the employers and co-workers, significant remuneration, flexibility towards the reservist.	Significant conflict in priorities, some employers not supportive, very inconvenient.

Source:

The categorical analysis presents elements repeated in the in-depth interviews. It appears that reserve duty significantly affects the concept of the defence ethos, as well as social contexts, family aspects and the attitude of Israeli society.

Interviews In-depth Analysis

The Defence Ethos and Internal Social Dangers

S, female, aged 33, officer in the military human resources branch, describes her motivation for reserve duty:

'I view the service as a pure contribution for the safety of the country – since the establishment of the state we have been in a state of emergency and learned that "If I am not for me, who will be for me"'.

B, male, aged 33, combat soldier in the armored corps expands:

'A functioning army is essential, and I have a personal responsibility. The service has a significant operational importance – we are severely threatened by terror organisations inspired by Iran. The Israeli home-front is constantly under danger of severe harm. It is not existential, but has grave implications'.

L, female, aged 27, training officer in the armored corps, qualifies:

'There are concrete external defence threats, but for me the more difficult problem is the extremism in the Israeli society, polarisation is increasing and there are internal disputes'.

C, female, aged 27, serves in the engineering corps:

'I am aware of the danger from Iran and its emissaries, the threats of rockets but I want to contribute in my professional military area and am bothered by the internal national dispute between Jews and Arabs. The national conflict bothers me more'.

These four respondents represent the security beliefs of reservists – they distinguish between external and internal threats, but in both cases the threats are the Jewish–Arab conflict that has characterised the atmosphere in Israel since its

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establishment. Here, the respondents present a typical siege concept that exists in Israel even now, as mentioned above. The saying 'If I am not for me, who will be for me', is repeated by almost all the respondents, representing Israel as standing alone in front of threats.

The Familial-Educational Tradition

D, male, aged 30, serves in the infantry and describes the family atmosphere: 'I don't really have a dilemma, my father served in the reserve, and it comes up often in family conversations, including pictures we take and send each other. The family is part of the experience and it also influences the children, it is constantly in our awareness. I understand that it is my shift now'.

N, male, aged 25, serves in the armored corps: 'I feel I am needed, and when they call me – I come. It is my choice, based on how I was educated. A Jew must defend himself, that comes from my parents, and is my responsibility'.

Y, female, age 24, serves in the border defence unit:

'Both my parents were officers in the IDF. This was the atmosphere at home, especially when there were serious events. My father still serves in the reserve corps and he is over 50. He volunteers. If he feels the need – it is clear to me that I am needed'.

The respondents present the family influence on their point of view, creating a security necessity as well as a family tradition that is binding on them. There is also the educational element that is passed between generations according to Jewish tradition. The respondents see their reserve duty as a personal responsibility emphasising the educational-familial elements.

The Attitude of the Israeli Society Towards the Reservists

A, female, age 26, serves as an aerial control officer:

'I feel cynicism as well as appreciation. I believe that those who served as combat soldiers in the regular army appreciate the reserve duty more, and those who have not served do not really understand. There are favorable feelings around me and from society in general'.

R, male, age 30, in the artillery:

'Call it "madness", I have no rational explanation for my willingness for reserve service. The first thing that comes to mind is friendship, a melting pot and solidarity. The unit is a social idyll, and the social reality in Israel forces us to conserve it'.

D, female, age 31, training officer in the infantry:

'It is always inconvenient to be called for reserve duty. But my employers have never prevented me from serving, sometimes reluctantly – the army is also flexible as well as the workplace towards my reserve duty. I feel there is a general recognition of the need'.

The respondents generally describe a positive social attitude and recognition of the importance of reserve duty. Difficulties, such as a certain cynicism and inconvenience expressed by employers, are described as marginal. Most of them emphasise the flexibility of both the army and the employers.

The Need for Reserve Service

S, female, age 33, serves as a liaison officer:

'I regard the service as my personal contribution to the country and society. I know that most of those who serve see it this way. Hence the importance of the reserve duty – besides contributing to security, this is a clear social issue'.

I, male, age 28, serves as a logistical operator:

'I serve in the reserve corps because it is the real thing, Israeli society at its best. The media does not do justice to the qualities of our society. When I am on reserve duty I meet the actual reality. The experience balances the biased narrative presented by the media'.

R, male, age 27, officer in the home front command:

'The media does not do justice to reserve duty. It emphasises compulsory service, but the real actual experience is that of the reserves – it is the most significant contribution in Israeli society, and this should be emphasised'.

The interviewees view reserve duty as a significant social need, in view of the polarisation in Israeli society. They present a view combining dissonance and personal balance, a response to a personal emotional need besides the criticism towards the biased media, that distorts social reality, and the contribution of the reservists from the social point of view.

Table 4: Frequent Expressions Appearing in the Discourse

Expression	Iran	Terror	Social extremism	Mission	Zionism	Responsibility
Frequency	41%	35%	85%	62%	46%	50%
Notes	Conceived as a leading security threat	Mainly rockets from Gaza/Lebanon	Extreme discourse, polarisation			Personal destiny versus security threat

Source:

The main discourse of the reservists is related to social issues – mainly the fear of extremism in Israeli society. Many of them view it as a danger to the country, beyond the external defence threats. In this context, words that show values on the connection between the citizen and the country are very frequent, emphasising mission and Zionism. These have been the cornerstones of the vision of the Jewish state since the 19th century. This finding emphasises the understanding that reservists have a high social ethos, beyond the defence ethos, and they believe that social strength is above any other value.

Discussion

Since the late 1990s, the claim that 'the reserve army is sinking' has been a central criticism of the IDF's reserve corps. The claim affected decision-making on remuneration for reservists, and the best use of reservists in building Israel's power.

The findings of the current study show that reservists still carry a significant defence ethos, and their level of social awareness is very high. This is shown in discussions of the major challenges for Israeli society, mainly polarisation in discussions and social issues. Nevertheless, reservists participating in the study point out their willingness to continue to serve in the reserve corps out of personal responsibility, based on the need for defence response, and to provide a positive educational example in terms of mission and values. This is evidence of significant constructive patriotism – that is militaristic in nature – which has been pointed out by several researchers when they describe the effect of the citizen-soldier military in Israel.[45]

In view of the claims that material remuneration has a dramatic effect on the dilemma of simultaneous commitments to the army, work and family,[46] the findings of the current study point to service being motivated by national and social values, where material remuneration has only a minor effect. The participants point out that the level of flexibility given to them from the army and from their employers enables them to fulfil the military missions despite the difficulties. The family difficulties are also minor, according to them.

The findings show that Israeli society has adjusted to the defence reality in this era and has shown flexibility towards reservists, based on a value concept of necessity for the country, rather than one based on economic considerations.

In addition, according to the study, the current discussion among reservists is not material but based on social values. Their level of commitment to continue to serve results from the perceived need for Israel's defence and social factors.

As most of the study participants come from a high socioeconomic level, the findings cast doubt on the importance of economic incentives in motivating service for this group.[47]

It was also found that the ability to cope with issues in daily life has improved as a result of reform to the number of required service days. This has significantly reduced the burden of service and made it possible for many personnel to make the commitment. The traditional aspect of generational values passing from parents to children is also apparent–

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45. Edna Lomsky-Feder and Tamar Rapoport, 'Cultural Citizenship and Performing Homecoming: Russian Jewish Immigrants Decipher the Zionist National Ethos', *Citizenship Studies* (Vol. 12, No. 3, 2008), pp. 321–34.

46. Hagai Amit, 'Hapzaza hametakteket', ['The Ticking Bomb of the Reservists'], TheMarker, 3 May 2013, <https://www.themarker.com/markerweek/1.2010755>, accessed 7 September 2022.

47. Yagil Levy, *Mezva haam lezva haperiferiot* [*From the 'People's Army' to the 'Army of the Peripheries*] (Jerusalem: Carmel Publishing House 2007), pp. 75–102.

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the intergenerational influence of the defence ethos, contrary to some expectations, has been conserved. This evidence supports the claim that the erosion of an intergenerational tradition of serving in the army[48] does not characterise reserve duty in Israeli society.

Conclusion

The readiness to serve in the reserve corps of the IDF, according to the current study, results from the combination of social and security elements. Reservists, in this context, are less concerned over material and utilitarian matters; their motives for service are more emotional. That they come from a higher socioeconomic level shows that the importance attached to economic incentives should be doubted.

The conclusion suggests that the establishment should not take reserve duty for granted. However, in terms of budget allocation for remuneration, decision-makers have substantial flexibility for adjustments and reinforcing 'weaker links', such

as commanders. It is often claimed that persons serving in these roles are there by default, rather than because of their qualities[49]. Using resources in this way may be a more efficient way to incentivise recruitment.

According to the study, reservists appear to have high awareness of social aspects. Their level of pluralism is high, they are more invested in values of education and mission. These findings strengthen the case that reserve service makes a unique social contribution[50] and has remained a value, one shared by the founders of the modern Israeli nation – the army that builds the society. It is possible that the reserve corps is no longer seen as having the critical role that it once had in the past, particularly as the army has not grown as fast as Israel's population. However, it is still a high-value institution committed to the country and the society.

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48. Moskos, Williams and Segal, *The Postmodern Military*, pp. 7–21.
49. Amos Harel, '12 hauzim memfakdey gdudey hamiluim bezaal – anshey keva', ['12 Percent Of Reserve Battalion Commanders Are Professional'], *Haaretz*, 19 February 2014,., <https://www.haaretz.co.il/news/politics/. premium-1.2248157>, accessed 7 September 2022.
50. Baruch Nevo and Yael Shor, *Zva haam? Shirut miluim beIsrael* [*The People's Military? Reserve Military Service in Israel*] (Tel Aviv:Institute for Democracy,2002).

Annex 1: Characteristics of the Sample

1,420 answered questionnaires on social network, media, and E-mail:

Category	Reserve Soldiers (n=1400)
Male	48%
Female	52%
Average age	24
Age distribution	26 – 10.8% 25 – 32.5% 24 – 15.1% 23 – 18.4% 22 – 23.2%
Religion	Jews 91.8% Muslims 5% Christians 2% Druze 1.2%
Religion scale	No religion – 18.2% Secular – 53.5% Traditional – 16.3% Religious – 10.8% Extremely religious – 1.2%
Participant military service	Rear logistics – 38.1% Front logistics – 29.6% Warriors – 25.1% Others – 7.2% Officers – 16.6%
Father's military service	Rear logistics – 18.5% Front logistics – 29.3% Warriors – 47% Others – 5% Officers – 20.2%
Mother's military service	Rear logistics – 50.3% Front logistics – 18.8% Warriors – 8.2% Others – 23% Officers 8.6%
Socioeconomic status	Above average – 43% Average – 34% Below average – 23%

Source:

Motivations for Reserve Military Service in Israel

Annex 2: Independent Variables

Variable	Type	Explanation
Age	Scale	Age of participant
Gender (gndr)	Nominal	Gender of participant
Unit characteristics (unitchar)	Ordinal	1 – rear unit logistics 2 – front unit logistics 3 – combat duty
Participant service (reserve)	Ordinal	0 – does not serve 1 – serves in reserve unit
Socioeconomic status (soceco)	Ordinal	Triggered variable that combines family's income and parents' education
Siege mentality level (siegemntl)	Ordinal	Triggered variable that combines: threat from oncoming war; terror; and anti-semitism
Pluralism level (plural)	Ordinal	Triggered variable based on aggregate points of attitudes towards: freedom of speech; Arab society; legal rights; civilian demonstrations against military acts; legal defence for terrorists; openness towards reformed Jews; openness towards LGBT community.
Religion level (relig)	Ordinal	0 – non-religious (anti-religious) 1 – secular 2 – traditional 3 – national religious 4 – orthodox ultra-religious

Source:

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Chapter 7:

Summary and the main conclusions

7.1 Examining the study question

The main focus of the current study deals with the question of compulsory service in the military and its value-social effects. The comparison of attitudes between high school students' pre-military service and those who finished their military duty shows essential difference between the participants, relating to the core of the social-democratic discourse in Israel.

The dramatic finding is that serving in the military service in IDF leads to a change in attitudes and in the concept of the ethos. Many believe that leading civilians through the military establishment will cause extremism and militancy. Therefore, many view Israel and its society as leading towards extreme national concepts (Peled, 2019). Some even believe that serving in the army leads to nationalism and racism (Camp and Greenburg, 2020). The findings of the current study show significant movement towards liberal values among male and female soldiers.

It may be claimed, therefore, that compulsory army duty has a significant effect on civilians – mitigating extreme attitudes, balancing national and liberal values and even reinforcing essential democratic elements. These findings are crucial as Israel is in a constant war against terror, grappling with a declared threat of nuclear annihilation on the part of Iran, and facing constant friction on issues of religion, nationality and social gaps (Lebel, 2012).

The reduction in gaps between the attitudes presented in the current study show an increased level of social agreement during and after military service- this is an essential milestone for solidarity and national strength. This phenomenon is caused by the direct meeting of cultures and ethnic origins during military service, and on no other normative platform, especially over a long period. It builds bridges and close social conflicts. Accordingly, where it not for army duty, the participants would not have met the variety of cultures and concepts that characterize the Israeli society – hence the enormous importance of this service.

In countries where military service is voluntary-professional, this social phenomenon is marginal: only a small percentage of citizens enlist the army, mainly from a weaker socio-economic background. Military duty in these countries has become a means for socio-economic improvement, but it lacks the strengths of the citizen-soldier army full integration of all classes and cultural backgrounds. However, countries that have chosen a professional army usually have no immediate imminent threat of war, and are not under daily security threats along their borders (Zigdon, 2008; Tamari, 2012).

Although the level of threat felt by participants in this study who released from army duty is lower than during their high-school period, it is still high, mainly due to the fact that Israel is still under considerable defense and security threats. This fact basically affects the justification for enlisting in the army – leads young people to enlist. This phenomenon is enhanced by family traditions: the connection between family and national values are reinforced, especially when the motives for enlisting are social as well as defense-based, and also by reserve service effects on the family's tradition.

The findings show that even today, over 70 years after the establishment of the State of Israel, compulsory military service responds to the social challenges aimed at by the founding fathers. Hence, there has been an evolution in the nature of the social challenges: at first they were creating a nation and gathering the diaspora, and currently they are more about bridging social conflicts.

The common denominator for both periods is that the security problems of Israel still justify the investment of vast human resources. In spite of the many changes the Israeli society has undergone these past years as a collective, it views army service as an essential process in both defense and social contexts.

7.2 The ethos clash

People from all types of populations, different backgrounds and classes enlist the Israeli army. They enter the military system with the same concept formulated in their family and living environments. The ethos is built during childhood and adolescence and takes on shades identical to those of the family and the close surroundings (Lewin, 2013). This effect is spiral – between generations and in the family.

In the primary group, mainly the platoons and companies, where soldiers work, act, and actually live together during military service enables getting to know closely both defense threats, as well as people with different attitudes, sometimes even conflicting ones. At the meeting point, conflict is significant and relates to almost all spheres of life, language, type of food, the music one listens to, customs etc. The IDF norms currently deal less with uniformity and more with unity, formatting consensual attitude trends concerning social conflicts in Israel.

The findings of the current study show significant effectiveness in this context. Serving in the army does not attempt to assimilate minorities in the concepts of the majority, but attempts to instill tolerance for different concepts leading to a reduction in conflict and mutual respect. This phenomenon indicates the evolution of military duty in comparison with the social duty that Israel's forefathers meant: from assimilation towards pluralism and acceptance of the multi-cultural characteristics.

The basis of the liberal concept is the principal of freedom: Israel's declaration of independence determined in 1948: "**The State of Israel will ensure complete equality of social and political rights to all its inhabitants irrespective of religion race or gender**".

Hence, the tendency to adopt liberal patterns during army service aiming at cooperation, fraternization and equality to defend the country and its citizens. Therefore, mixing cultures and the need to support each other force recruits to accept each other's culture. These soldiers are actually calling each other 'brother' or 'sister', the most popular words in the IDF jargon. The service experience is that of a primary group and is enhanced the longer people remain together and especially in intense times.

The ethos clash is decided in the direct contact with defense threats – as it described there is no immediate existential threat to Israel today – but the threats are considerable, and recruits understand that the State of Israel as a national home and an institution is under constant threat. This understanding is enhanced when senior officers emphasize the need for social solidarity. Therefore, those who serve in the army will adopt more liberal approaches than they did within their families or at school.

The changed ethos, if so, lies in the direct social meeting combined with understanding the real security threats. Serving in the army exposes citizens to the true reality that until then was mediated by their parents, their environment, the media and social networks. As it seems, the outcome of a shift towards professional military in Israel, where only a small percentage of the population will serve in, will be an increasing polarization in the Israeli society, and the concepts and beliefs will focus on mediated defense threats. The direct contact with the experience of existence is crucial to the 'battle' of the ethoses. Damaging the relations established during military service may damage social solidarity, and democratic values related to agreement and tolerance.

7.3 The paradigmatic challenge

As mentioned in the theoretical background, the paradigmatic question at the basis of the current study: Is the citizen-soldier army, the IDF in this case, dis-functional as a socialization mechanism? Has the establishment become a means for social polarization, preventing it from fulfilling its social destiny?

The post-modern era, reinforcement of individualism and globalization present a significant challenge for the paradigm where the army is a cultural or normative socialization mechanism that reduces conflicts and leads to balance within the society (Adres and Co., 2012). It has to be mentioned that serving in the army means sacrificing years and lives, and in the 'citizen-soldier' case with no significant remuneration – as the salary of a combat soldier is less than half the minimum wage in Israel.

Individualistic motivation to serve in the army is reinforced over the past years. Youngsters seeking self-fulfillment wish to enlist to elite units to challenge themselves, gain prestige and social status. These motivations are not in conflict with the need to serve the country, or to serve society, as seen in the current study.

Schwartz has responded to these aspects in his model formulated in the 1990s. The model shows that the needs people want to fulfill are not necessarily found in Maslow's pyramid of needs – in today's reality people have a mix of motivations: seeking for self-fulfillment, mixed with patriotism, love and security.

There is not necessarily a conflict between individualistic motives and sacrifice for the collective good (Schwartz and Boehnke, 2004).

Figure No. 1 - relations among motivational types of values
(Schwartz and Boehnke, 2004)

The current findings show that military service is an effective normative socialization mechanism, with almost no conflicting influence of the socio-economic background. The conflictual aspects presented by those who blame compulsory service, are resolved during the service. Hence the findings related to the effects of military service reinforce the paradigm of the army being a functional mechanism to soothe social conflicts.

Nevertheless, there is a paradigmatic difficulty in the general concept of social cooperation in military service – currently almost 40% of the Israeli population do not participate in this, and the trend increases over the years. Hence, the Israeli society is in conflict between those who serve and those who do not (Livio, 2012): groups exempt from military service include mainly the ultra-orthodox and Arab populations- this exemption legislated almost 50 years ago, as a political agreement between ethnic groups in Israel, and over the years was edited with minor changes.

The main reason for this historic exemption is avoiding conflict in forcing this population into an activity that is in contradiction to their national and religious as well as cultural beliefs. The reality in Israel is that the natural population growth of these groups is higher than in those sections that do serve in the army.

These facts are challenging the paradigm – if serving in the army is a normative socialization mechanism, and we are approaching a situation where the majority does not serve, the normativity of the mechanism becomes irrelevant over time. If the state enforces the service mechanism on a minority, then the majority is not within the norm, and therefore excluded. Another challenge comes from the fact that compulsory service mechanism affects a decreasing percentage of the population and its effectiveness within society as a whole is weakening.

The processes described above introduce the army as a normative social institution paradigm in danger. Nevertheless, there is a parallel channel of national service that requires those who do not serve in the army to contribute a year or two to activities at the service of society. This mechanism has not hitherto been enforced. As long as Israel avoids defining this national service by law, as an alternative to military service it causes damage to the army as a normative mechanism and damages society as a whole because of the inequality in the decreasing percentage of citizens who serve in the army.

In sum, it may be said that according to this study, the paradigm of the social-normative mechanism leading to social balances is still valid, but its stability is undermined over time and Israeli society will need new balancing mechanism or the expansion of the normative institution of social service for the community by law. Yet, the findings show also that even today, youngest people, including those who have already served in the army believe that the 'citizen-soldier' model should be preserved although it has obvious shortcomings.

7.4 The cultural foundation stone

The Jewish people carry a historic survival ethos, that affects is culture, customs, concepts and beliefs. The establishment of the state of Israel was based on this culture– the founding fathers have chosen to open the Declaration of Independence with a historic and moral justification for establishing the Jewish home in the middle of a hostile region. This has led to an acute and on-going reaction over decades of violent opposition from the peoples in the region.

Ze'ev Jabotinsky, a philosopher and influential political leader in the modern Jewish history has emphasized that the return of the Jewish people to its country will lead to significant objections on the part of the people of the area – he claimed that it is impossible to convince natives of the justification in the return of a nation to its homeland, when these natives have been residing there for centuries. Jabotinsky suggested the doctrine of the 'iron wall' representing the harsh defense mechanism required for the Jewish state. He said that young people settling in Israel should first and foremost be taught self-defense based on armed forces, until the peoples of the region remove their hostility and compromise may be (Jabotinsky, 1923).

The survival ethos in Israel, based on the tradition of 'and you told your son' which is repeated every Passover remembering the exodus from Egypt, passage from slavery to freedom. This concept is a cultural foundation stone in the Jewish world view, a result of the struggle that led to the most famous self-definition in history.

The motif of passing on traditions from father to children is felt well in the Israeli society, while in the western world family values are eroded (Gon-Gross, 2003). One of the Israeli almost sacred traditions is serving in the IDF. The findings of the current study show a significant relationship between the service of parents and the readiness of the children to volunteer for the community and later enlist for a significant service in the army. Hence, this ethos has not eroded, and therefore Charles Moskos' theory does not fit the case in point. There still who refer to the nuclear family in Israel as an 'enlisted family' when one of their children serves (Harel, 2013). this can be an evidence that the Israeli society is not in a post-modern stage- as it concerns the view on the service in the IDF the Israeli society as a collective described as between modern stage and late-modern stage (Zigdon, 2008).

Some claim that the basic sympathy for the army conserved within the family leads to a set of pre-entry values mediating the military organization for the children even before they join it – this phenomenon also occurs in civil organizations (Cable and Parsons 2001).

The current study shows that these values are conserved and have undergone transformation from the defense context to the social one. The process is clear relating to the conceptual turning point the citizen undergoes while serving in the army –

the parents have served and formulated a balanced ethos which the children continue in their own way, adopting a more liberal attitude. In this concept we can also understand participants who support the claim that budgets should be allocated for social and welfare issues at the expense of defense budgets as a result of the transformation between service values based on defense needs to those based on social needs.

A salient issue in the findings of the current study is the gender variable – there appears to be a significant difference between males and females in the way volunteering for the community continues. Some claim that the Israeli society views the IDF a priori as a masculine organization and educates girls less for army duty and more towards civic contributions. On the other hand, the IDF is in a growing integration process of women and it could be that are witnessing a significant change in this context.

7.5 The gender conflict

With a view to the future it will be interesting to examine the inter-generational implications of this past generation where women were integrated in typical combat roles in the IDF – it should be examined how these combat mothers will educate their daughters in relation to army service. However, this study also shows that even in this past generation the masculine motif is dominant in the experience of women who have finished their military duties over the last decade. The common experience described by women interviewed for this study describes the necessity to overcome their commanding male who does not fully believe in their capabilities, while service-men described as empowered in professional and operational contexts.

The question needs to be asked – Is there a covert gender struggle in the IDF?

The findings show that the struggle is not one of defiance but for a place of honor among the combatting forces and around the decision-making table. From the women interviewed it cannot be deduced that this struggle leads to damage to social solidarity,

and does not enhance conflicts. It is a struggle that portrays social struggles outside the army, where women take key positions in all areas of activity, including politics and business, and expect the army to follow suit.

Women interviewed for this study show no aversion towards the military establishment. They have criticism that the army uses women ineffectively, that they contribute more based on their abilities. None of the respondents claimed that this is a clear male activity where there is no room for women. This shows that the deterrence barrier in relation to women serving in combat units, no longer exists.

Over the past years' women in Israel have succeeded in removing barriers and enlisting in combative units in the IDF. There have been fighter pilots, wing commanders, navy ship commanders and even commanders in the artillery and armored corps. This process continues to expand, with a fivefold increase in the number of women serving as fighters in contact areas, defending most of Israel's borders, and home-front areas as Jerusalem, that is known for its religious and ethnical extreme conflicts that lead occasionally to terror events.

This trend affects women's status in the Israeli society, clearly affected by serving in the IDF as a normative-social mechanism. The process has increased over the past decade and will be apparent clearly in the following generation.

7.6 The 'spiral' process

A major mile stone in the generational process is the reserve military service – In Israel the reserve military power became almost as an establishment by itself- these serviceman and women are continuing their contribution for 15-30 days per year, some of them, mainly officers do it for more than 60 days, besides their civilian career. The reserves have a significant effect on their children's willingness to recruit for compulsory service, and in that way they preserve the spiral effect of ongoing service for the country- this fact has an educational value besides tradition.

However, in the last decade reserve military power suffered from budget cuts, hence reserve soldiers recruited less significantly then in the past.

This trend can be reflected in the future, mainly because its outcomes concerning defense ethos, and the essentiality of reserve military power as it is understood by civilians and their point of view on security challenges compared with other social challenges.

Figure No. 2 – the 'spiral' model of military service

The scheme above illustrates the social effects of military service in a 'citizen soldier' military: while there is a consistent traditional motivation to recruit, the social impacts of the service is affected by security threats, national ethos, global effects, both social and military. In years, both security threats and siege mentality eroded, and the reserve military power became limited – according to that the spiral effects decreased. However, the service motivation characteristics shifted – from a security oriented service, to a social oriented service. This scheme emphasizes the main dilemma concerning military power in general, and in particular the social functionality of a 'citizen-soldier' military. In time the Israeli government will have to establish an official national force to deal with social challenges, based on youths.

The dilemma will be between a shift to a professional military or another model that will preserve the reserve military with a small proportion of compulsory service.

7.7 The study area with a view to the future

This study presents the social functionality of serving in a citizen-soldier army in a late-modern era, focusing on the IDF.

The case in point studies the army of a nation that has carried throughout history a cultural ethos of survival. Recruiting in the army since the establishment of the State of Israel has undergone transformation to social rather than defense motivation. This way the IDF regulates conflicts and creates balances.

The study examines a riveting question in relation to the success of the civilian army as an effective social mechanism – does this require culture and history that conserve an intensive basis for recruiting? Or can a civilian army also be established in other countries under post-modern influences?

Switzerland for instance has decided to conserve the national army as a matter of tradition of citizens serving their country. On the other hand, Germany, France and Britain have chosen a professional army. These countries have a long history of harsh wars based on citizen-soldier army.

The change to a professional army occurred after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, namely the lessening of the threat against them, but the history has not disappeared nor eroded (Tamari, 2012).

The scientific field relating to army and society relations, mainly the issue of 'citizen-soldier army' and its effect on cultural and social concepts should examine the issue is it possible to change the army back from a professional to a civilian army?

What are the conditions required for such a process? Will the citizens agree to such a process in democratic countries?

Above all, the directions pointed by the current study require a continued study of the issue how the changes of the past generation, the technological developments and the increased rate of women enlisting in combat roles affect the readiness of the next generation to enlist in the army and conserve the tradition passing from one generation to the next.

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Attachment 1 – characteristic of sampling

Participants answers to questionnaires on social network, media, and internet during the years 2016-2020:

Category	Ex-soldiers (n=1426)
Female	52%
Male	48%
Average age	22
Age characteristics	age 24-14.1% age 23-18.4% age 22-23% age 21-26.2% age 20-18.3%
Religion	Jews 91.8%, Muslims 5% Christians 2% Druze 1.2%
Religion scale	no religion 18.2% secular 53.5% traditional 16.3% religious 10.8% extreme religious 1.2%
Participant military service	rear logistics 38.1% front logistics 29.6% warriors 25.1% others 7.2%
Father's military service	rear logistics 18.5%, front logistics 29.3% warriors 47%, others 5%
Mother's military service	rear logistics 50.3%, front logistics 18.8% warriors 8.2% others 23%
Socio-Economic status	above average 43% average 34% below average 23%
Residential area	center 56.6% periphery 37% border settlement 6.4% (2.7% Yehuda and Samaria)

Attachment 2 – independent variables

Variable	Type	Explanation
Age	Scale	age of participant
Gender (**GNDR**)	Nominal	gender of participant
Parents mil' service (**PSRVC**)	Ordinal	Triggered variable that combines the father an mother's service by 0-3 scale: 0 - didn't serve in the military 1 - served in rear unit logistics 2 - served in front unit logistics 3 - served as a combat soldier
Participant mil' service (**SVMTV**)	Ordinal	0 - didn't serve in the military 1 - served in rear unit logistics 2 - served in front unit logistics 3 - served as a combat soldier
Socio-economical stat. (**SOCECO**)	Ordinal	Triggered variable that combines family's income and parents education
Participant volunteering in community (**VOLVL**)	Ordinal	Triggered variable that based on aggregate points of volunteer: 0- didn't volunteer 1- volunteered in school (stud. council etc.) 2- instructor in youth movement 3- 1 year volunteer before military service
Religion level (**RELIG**)	Ordinal	0 - non religious (anti-religious) 1- secular 2 - traditional 3 - national religious 4 - orthodox ultra-religious