

Summary of the dissertation: **“The Hegelian Concept of Time in a Metaphilosophical Perspective”**

The idea of the dissertation flows from two observations. According to the first, the vast majority of significant problems encountered in interpreting Hegel's philosophy ultimately break down over the question of time, or, to be more precise, the question of the profound relationship between time and the concept, which remains effective throughout the system of absolute idealism in its mature form. Nevertheless, according to the second observation, this issue has not yet become the guiding thread of any systematic interpretation of Hegelianism, which would explain comprehensively what role time plays in it. Even when this relationship has been made the subject of analysis, the explanations provided therein have either (1) reduced it to an external, one-sided relationship, (2) relied only on certain fragments of the Hegelian system, or (3) were formulated from a point of view external to Hegel's position. In short, the previous interpretations were oversimplifying, selective or missed their object.

In view of this diagnosis, the purpose of the dissertation is a temporal, holistic and immanent interpretation of Hegel's concept of time, that is, an interpretation (Ad 1) oriented to the co-determination of time and the concept, (Ad 2) taking into account the whole system of absolute idealism and (Ad 3) in tune with the philosophical position of its author. According to the main thesis of the dissertation, the proper research perspective for the interpretation of temporal issues in Hegelianism is determined by Hegel's metaphilosophical position, which he characterized most fully in “Lectures on the History of Philosophy.” The research endeavor thus defined is divided into two minor tasks: (1) the reconstruction of Hegel's metaphilosophical position, and (2) the interpretation of his metaphysics of time from the perspective determined by this position. These tasks determine the two main parts of the dissertation, each of which consists of four chapters.

In the first part, I reconstruct the assumptions of Hegel's historical-philosophical reflection, considering it as a model of both the temporal way of understanding metaphilosophy and the research perspective of this study of the Hegelian concept of time. In the first chapter, I characterize Hegel's philosophy of the history of philosophy against the background of the main paradigms of metaphilosophy known from the literature. The second chapter deals with Hegel's discovery of the phenomenon of historicity (“Geschichtlichkeit”), which the author of the “Phenomenology of Spirit” made while working on his mature philosophical position in the second half of the Jena period (1803–1806). I read this event as a condition for his elaboration of the idea of a philosophical history of philosophy and at the same time the source of numerous problems of his metaphilosophy. I consider this event as a condition for the possibility of his elaboration of the idea of a philosophical history of philosophy. In the third chapter, I undertake a detailed reconstruction of the “Introduction” to Hegel's “Lectures on the History of Philosophy,” focusing on the methodological dimension of the concept of the philosophy of the history of philosophy presented therein and the difficulties it faces in relation to the way Hegel defines the object, purpose and method of the history of philosophy. In the last chapter of the first part of the work — which is a continuation of the said reconstruction — I analyse Hegel's concept of philosophy, considering the question of its function and relation to other fields of culture, and discuss the issue of periodization of the history of philosophy, within which it turns out that many problems concerning Hegel's historical-philosophical reflection do not find a direct solution in his texts.

In the second part of the work, I present a metaphilosophical interpretation of Hegel's concept of time in the light of the assumptions of his the German philosopher's historical-philosophical position. In the first chapter, I undertake an interpretive resolution of problematic issues concerning his philosophy of the history of philosophy, such as the problem of the unity, division and end of world history, or the scope and nature of the relationship between time and the concept. This allows me to formulate a series of postulates for a metaphilosophical interpretation of Hegel's temporal doctrine. In the second chapter, I examine the basis for one of the main postulates of this interpretation, which is the requirement to orient the research gaze to the universal validity of the reflexive relationship between time and the concept. I argue that the antinomy of the two members of this relationship is rooted in the structure of the idea itself, and the key to understanding it is the Hegelian logic of reflection, which I subject to a historical-systematic analysis in this chapter. The third chapter consists of an interpretation of the generalized relationship between time and the concept in light of Hegel's theory of reflection, the problem of the objectivity of knowledge, and the question of evidence for the existence of God. It allows me to explain from a metaphilosophical perspective the temporality of the absolute concept and the meaning of the abolition of time accompanying the full realization of freedom. In the last chapter, guided by the demand for a holistic interpretation of the question of time in Hegelianism, I expose the temporal essence of Hegel's concept of philosophy, and formulate, problematize and finally realize in outline the idea of “speculative chronosophy”, which is the final result of the metaphilosophical interpretation of Hegel's concept of time.

Keywords: Hegel, time, metaphilosophy, history of philosophy, German philosophy, idealism, metaphysics, chronosophy, dialectical method, speculative idealism